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Shifting State Constructions of Anangu Pitjantjatjara

Yankunytjatjara: Changes to the South Australian

Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981-2006

DEIRDRE TEDMANSON

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

February 2016

ii

Declaration of Originality

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material

previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to the best of my

knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by

another person except where due reference is made in the text.

Signed: On: 20/10/2016

iii

Acknowledgements

There are many people I would like to acknowledge for their support on this journey. First and

foremost, I would like to thank Principal Supervisor and Chair of my Supervisory Panel, Dr

Will Sanders, Senior Fellow at the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR)

at ANU for his constancy throughout my candidature. From our first discussions to final

submission, you have challenged, advised, guided and provided unfailing support and it is very

much appreciated – thankyou.

Thanks also to supervisory panel members, Professor Jon Altman for generosity of spirit and

inspiring ideas; Professor Tim Rowse for important early theoretical insights; Professor Richard

Mulgan also for helpful early discussions. Thanks also to Professor Mick Dodson for timely

clarifications and Professor Larissa Behrendt for insights into legal issues. I would also like to

extend my gratitude to Director Jerry Schwab and everyone at CAEPR, staff, academics,

colleagues, students all - for making me welcome throughout my time with the Centre.

Thanks also to all my wonderful friends and colleagues for your encouragement. To Lia Bryant,

your support, timely debriefing, and ongoing belief in me and this project has been a tonic

which helped keep me focused; I am very grateful. Thank-you Sue King, for your generosity

and solidarity throughout this journey, from beginning onwards you have helped in so many

ways, and it is much appreciated. I could not wish for better colleagues or friends. Thanks also

to Christine and Peter, Frances Bedford, Bebe Ramzam (and Bibi Leslie and Dolly), Roxanne

Colson, Dennis Colson, Gary Lewis, Sandra Lewis (and family), Makinti, Peter Furze, Peter

McDonald, Lowitja O’Donoghue, Peter Buckskin, Maryann Bin-Sallik, Donna, Tammy, Ann

Killen, Pauline, Collette, Denise Wood, Adrian Vicary, Kurt Lushington, Bill Edwards, Bruce

Underwood, Sam Osborne, Jonathan Nicholls - and my colleagues in the corridor at Magill.

To people on the Lands I offer my respect and gratitude for all that you have so generously

shared, Kunmanara Nyaningu, Kunmanara Thompson, Yami Lester, Uncle Murray, Makinti

Minutjukur, Lewis family, Burton family, Ramzan family, Singer family, Stepahn Rainow,

Donald Fraser, Ronnie Brumby, Rex Tjami; and many many others. Palya.

I want to especially acknowledge the love and support of my beautiful family: to Louise,

Sophie, Claire, Grace, Lucy, Jeff and Charlie – thank-you for being the joy of my life; and to

the love of my life Hans, my partner, husband, colleague and friend – thank-you for your

intellectual, material and emotional support, I could not have done this without you.

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Abstract

The Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act (PLRA), passed by the Parliament of South Australia in

1981, was a milestone for Indigenous self-determination in Australia and a pinnacle of Anangu/

state relations. Although passed under Liberal Premier David Tonkin, the PLRA had its roots in

the leadership of Labor’s Don Dunstan, Premier for over a decade until 1979 and before that

Aboriginal Affairs Minister. Dunstan’s vision for Indigenous land rights and self-determination

for the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara (APY) Lands was embraced by both major

parties. This historic achievement of communal land title and community self-determination

was also the result of a five-year campaign by the Pitjantjatjara Council (PC) formed by Anangu

in 1976. The PLRA created Anangu Pitjantjatjara (AP) as the ‘body corporate’ of Traditional

Owners (TOs) and, through an elected Executive, empowered Anangu decision-making over

development, access and other matters.

By 2004 the Rann Labor Government was arguing that self-determination on the APY Lands

had failed and seeking to appoint an Administrator to oversee the Lands. Over the next two

years, amidst much contestation, Rann gained Opposition support to substantially amend the

PLRA. Amendments re-asserted SA Government oversight and control of the Lands through

ministerial powers to direct the Executive, or to suspend it and appoint an Administrator,

amongst other changes.

This thesis is a narrative account and critical analysis of what happened, how and why in the 25

years between the passing of the PLRA 1981 and its amendment into the APYLRA by 2006. It

draws on two bodies of social science literature, critical policy analysis and political theory on

Indigenous rights. Conceptually it argues that framing is an important part of the policy process.

Using interpretative and critical policy thinkers like Colebatch, Bacchi and Fischer, the thesis

considers how problems were identified and issues problematized in the politics of policy-

making. It locates this discussion within broader questions of recognition, sovereignty,

decolonisation and power.

The thesis argues that the original policy context for the PLRA sought greater self-

determination as justice for Anangu, enhancing the social well-being of their communities and

reversing some of the debilitating effects of colonisation. In a very different framing 25 years

later, Anangu leadership and governance were blamed for social ills in their communities, such

as petrol sniffing. Despite two Coronial Inquests identifying inadequate government service

delivery as contributing to the persistence of petrol sniffing on the Lands, the State Government

targeted self-determination as the problem. Anangu community-control was pathologised,

whereas in 1981 it had been eulogized.

Drawing on the work of political theorists Kymlicka, Tully, Taylor and Fraser on minority

rights and the politics of recognition, the thesis explores possibilities and limitations of self-

determination within the context of the APY Lands. While the 1981 PLRA optimistically

promoted Anangu self-determination as a form of internal decolonisation, this thesis argues that

policy shifts through to 2006 mark a substantial retreat from the politics of recognition and

minority rights.

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Contents

Declaration of Originality............................................................................................... ii

Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... iii

Abstract ........................................................................................................................... iv

Contents ........................................................................................................................... v

List of Figures ............................................................................................................... viii

List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................... iix

Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................... 12 1.1 Thesis Aims ........................................................................................................... 13

1.2 Methodology ......................................................................................................... 15

1.2.1 Personal location in thesis .............................................................................. 19 1.3 Thesis Structure ..................................................................................................... 23

1.4 APY Lands Context .............................................................................................. 26 1.4.1 Demographics ................................................................................................ 28 1.4.2 Communities, councils and homelands .......................................................... 29 1.4.3 Regional Anangu organisations ..................................................................... 31

Chapter 2: Recognising Anangu Land Rights ............................................................ 35 2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 35

2.2 Dunstan’s Agenda ................................................................................................. 36 2.2.1 Aboriginal Lands Trust Act 1966 ................................................................... 36 2.2.2 Incorporating Aboriginal ‘collective’ identity ............................................... 37

2.3 Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Campaign: ‘Growing up the Country’ ........................ 38 2.3.1 Ernabella Mission .......................................................................................... 39

2.3.2 Anangu leadership .......................................................................................... 42

2.3.3 ‘We want the Land here’ ................................................................................ 44

2.3.4 Underlying tensions within an emerging unity .............................................. 45 2.4 Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Working Party ............................................................. 46 2.5 Party Politics and Converging Opinions ............................................................... 49

2.6 The Act Passes through the SA Parliament under a Tonkin Liberal

Government ........................................................................................................... 52

2.7 The 1981 Act ......................................................................................................... 55 2.7.1 Anangu as ‘body corporate’ ........................................................................... 55 2.7.2 Consultation and consent of traditional owners ............................................. 56

2.7.3 Executive ........................................................................................................ 57 2.7.4 Permit access .................................................................................................. 58 2.7.5 Mining and development ............................................................................... 59 2.7.6 Government access for the ‘advancement of Pitjantjatjara people’ ............... 60

Chapter 3: The First Decade: ‘And Now We Live in Two Ways’ ............................... 61 3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 61 3.2 Gerhardy v Brown: Private or Public Land? ‘Discrimination’ or ‘Special

Measure’? .............................................................................................................. 62 3.3 Emerging Issues under the PLRA: 1983–1986 ..................................................... 64

3.3.1 ‘Things that cause us unhappiness’: alcohol and petrol sniffing ................... 66 3.3.2 Proctor review of the delivery of human services .......................................... 70

3.4 Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act Amendment Bill 1987: Moving towards Public

Local Governance .................................................................................................. 73

vi

3.4.1 Confusion between PC and AP ...................................................................... 77 3.5 High-profile State and Commonwealth Reviews in 1987–1988 ........................... 79

3.6 AP’s Response to the Dunstan Report .................................................................. 91 3.7 AP Moves to the Lands: Tensions with the PC Emerge ....................................... 92

3.7.1 From open to closed communication ............................................................. 95 3.8 Reflecting Back on the First 10 Years .................................................................. 97

3.8.1 Celebrating the first decade: Anangu aspirations for the next decade ........... 97

Chapter 4: The Second Decade .................................................................................. 100 4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 100 4.2 ATSIC Takes Centre Stage ................................................................................. 102

4.2.1 Politically engaged Anangu—same people, different organisations? ......... 104

4.2.2 Growth in regional organisations—crowded and competing ...................... 106 4.2.3 AP seeks to limit the piranpa and PC’s influence and develop its own

role ............................................................................................................... 108 4.3 Changing Commonwealth/State Balance and Other Policy Developments ....... 109

4.3.1 Pitjantjatjara Lands Parliamentary Committee is abandoned ...................... 110

4.3.2 Anangu voices get action on asbestos .......................................................... 112 4.4 Mayatja Manta Nyangaku Kutju: Local Government for Anangu

Communities? ...................................................................................................... 114

4.5 Petrol Sniffing Persists ........................................................................................ 117

4.5.1 Alcohol supply and control issues: the HREOC Report .............................. 119 4.5.2 Deteriorating health and well-being on the Lands ....................................... 120

4.6 The PC/AP Relationship: Tensions Erupt over Mining ...................................... 121 4.6.1 Applications from the Pitjantjatjara Mining Company and Musgrave

Block Holdings ............................................................................................ 123

4.7 Anangu Pitjantjatjara Operational Review 1998................................................. 127 4.7.1 PC/AP relationship: tensions escalate around the Operational Review ....... 131

4.8 Reflecting Back on the Second Decade .............................................................. 133

Chapter 5: 2001–2002: Tensions between Anangu Pitjantjatjara and the

Pitjantjatjara Council: First Coronial Inquest ........................................................ 136 5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 136

5.2 Signing a Service Agreement: Appointing an Administrator for AP ................. 137 5.2.1 ‘Practical reconciliation’ in practice ............................................................ 138

5.3 Twenty Years’ Celebration of the PLRA—as Petrol Sniffing Reappears .......... 142 5.3.1 Coronial inquest announced ......................................................................... 142

5.3.2 Celebrating the second decade of the PLRA ............................................... 144 5.4 Rift between AP and the PC Widens as Rann Takes Office ............................... 145

5.4.1 AP turns away from the PC .......................................................................... 145 5.4.2 A minority Labor government ..................................................................... 146 5.4.3 PDP Strategic Economics Initiatives Plan (Phase II) ................................... 149

5.5 Dodson Report .................................................................................................... 152 5.5.1 Parliamentary Select Committee on the PLRA established ......................... 155

5.6 First Coronial Inquest Reports ............................................................................ 155

5.6.1 Findings ........................................................................................................ 158 5.7 Conclusion........................................................................................................... 161

Chapter 6: 2003–2005: Consultations, Crisis, Consultants and a Second

Coroner’s Inquest ....................................................................................................... 164 6.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 164 6.2 Statement of Intent .............................................................................................. 165

6.2.1 Mining still in focus as arts gain support ..................................................... 167

6.3 ‘Working Together’: The COAG Trials ............................................................. 167

vii

6.3.1 From Statement of Intent to MoU ................................................................ 168 6.4 ‘People Cannot Be Allowed to Die!’ .................................................................. 169

6.4.1 ‘What is the name of that committee again please?’ ................................... 172 6.5 COAG Trials: Mai Wiru and PY Ku................................................................... 173

6.5.1 The ‘Allocations Committee’ ....................................................................... 175 6.6 Rolling (Over) the Executive .............................................................................. 177

6.7 The Ides of March ............................................................................................... 179 6.7.1 ‘Tied up by red tape!’ ................................................................................... 181 6.7.2 ‘Time’s Up!’ ................................................................................................. 182

6.8 ‘Rann Takes Control from Blacks’ ...................................................................... 184 6.8.1 ‘We will not be pushed around’! .................................................................. 185

6.9 Litster Visits the Lands—Litster Resigns ........................................................... 189 6.10 Collins Flies in .................................................................................................. 190

6.10.1 Collins reports and resigns ......................................................................... 192 6.11 Report of the Select Committee on Pitjantjatjara Land Rights ......................... 194 6.12 O’Donoghue and Costello Enter the Fray ......................................................... 197

6.13 Executive Board Elections—October 2004 ...................................................... 199 6.13.1 Crisis exploitation ...................................................................................... 199 6.13.2 The extraordinary elections—who votes, where and how? ....................... 200

6.13.3 Gender and representativeness ................................................................... 204 6.13.4 Election fall-out .......................................................................................... 205 6.13.5 Centralising control .................................................................................... 205

6.14 Second Coronial Inquest ................................................................................... 206

Chapter 7: Limiting Self-determination ................................................................... 209 7.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 209

7.2 Anger, Anguish, Acquiescence, as the PLRA is Again Amended ...................... 209 7.2.1 Tjungugka Kuranyukutu Palyantjaku .......................................................... 210

7.2.2 ‘Undermining self-determination’ ............................................................... 212 7.2.3 TOs travel to Adelaide to appear before the Aboriginal Lands

Parliamentary Standing Committee ............................................................. 215 7.2.4 ‘Tjukurpa nyanganpa kampa kutjupankuku Pitjantjatjara Land Rights

Actangka’ ..................................................................................................... 216 7.2.5 Passing of the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights (Miscellaneous) Amendment

Bill 2005 ...................................................................................................... 219 7.2.6 November 2005 AP Executive Board elections take place under the new

rules ............................................................................................................. 223 7.3 Significance of the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights (Miscellaneous) Amendment

Act 2005 .............................................................................................................. 224 7.4 Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Land Rights (Regulated Substances)

Amendment Act 2006 ........................................................................................... 226

7.5 Reflections on Changes to the PLRA 1981–2006............................................... 229 7.5.1 Nganampa Manta Festival ........................................................................... 229 7.5.2 Shifting concepts—self-determination or sovereignty? ............................... 230

7.5.3 Recognising group rights ............................................................................. 233 7.5.4 Relevance of recognition theory .................................................................. 234

7.6 Politics, Policy and Hypocrisy—A Critical Policy Perspective .......................... 237 7.6.1 Shifting contexts—from self-determination to ‘normalisation’? ................. 238

7.6.2 Shifting stories—from governance to ‘governmentality’ ............................ 239

Chapter 8: Conclusion - 'The Whole Aboriginal Problem in Microcosm'……..........242

References .................................................................................................................... 246

viii

List of Tables

Table 4.1: ATSIC AP Lands’ Representatives 1990–2002 ..................................... 103

Table 5.1: Source PDP Report Matrix (2002, p.6) ................................................... 150

List of Figures

Figure 1.1: Map of Lands tri-State border modified, source APY Lands homepage

(http://www.anangu.com.au/).................................................................... 26

Figure 1.2: AP Lands map 2001 source, ATSIC and Sinclair Knight Mertz ............ 27

Figure 2.1: Premier Don Dunstan (centre) and the Minister of Community Welfare,

Mr Payne (far left) talking to Anangu leaders at a campfire conference to

discuss land rights (The Advertiser, 7 May 1977, p. 3). Reproduced

courtesy of the SA State Library. .............................................................. 46

Figure 2.2: Premier David Tonkin with Chairman of the Pitjantjatjara Council,

Kunmanara Thompson, signing the Land Rights Act agreement, 2

October 1980. Messenger Press collection (copyright). Reproduced

courtesy of the SA State Library. .............................................................. 55

Figure 3.1: Offices of Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara at Umuwa. Source:

APY Lands (http://www.anangu.com.au/) ................................................ 94

Figure 3.2: Celebrations of 10-year anniversary of the PLRA (Koori Mail, 20

November 1991, pp. 12–13)...................................................................... 99

Figure 5.1: ‘Rolling Thunder’, Proposed APY Relationships. Copyright Burdon, R,

Burdon Torzillo Pty Ltd, 2002. ............................................................... 141

Figure 6.1: Koori Mail (30 July 2003, p. 5) ............................................................ 171

Figure 6.2: SA State Electoral Office 2004, APY Lands election poster 2004, of

SEO Annual Report 2004/5, p. 22 .......................................................... 203

Figure 7.1: Source: Aboriginal Lands Parliamentary Standing Committee Annual

Report (2005/6, p. 26) ............................................................................. 217

Figure 7.2: Source: Aboriginal Lands Parliamentary Standing Committee Annual

Report (2005/6, p. 34) ...…………………………………………………219

ix

List of Abbreviations

ALT Aboriginal Lands Trust

AnTEP Anangu Tertiary Education Program

AP Anangu Pitjantjatjara

APLIICC Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands Inter-Governmental Inter-Agency

Collaboration Committee

ALPSC Aboriginal Lands Parliamentary Standing Committee

APY Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara

APYLRA Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Land Rights Act

ATSIC Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission

COAG Council of Australian Governments

DAA Department of Aboriginal Affairs

DAARe Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation

DoHA Department of Health and Ageing

DOSAA Department of State Aboriginal Affairs

ELA Exploration licence applications

HALT Healthy Aboriginal Life Team

HREOC Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission

LCL Liberal Country League

MBH Musgrave Block Holdings

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

MTLR Maralinga Tjarutja Land Rights

NPY Ngaanyatjarra Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara

NSW New South Wales

PC Pitjantjatjara Council

x

PLPC Pitjantjatjara Lands Parliamentary Committee

PLRA Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act

PLRWP Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Working Party

PY Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara

PY Media Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Media

PYEC Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Education Committee

RDA Racial Discrimination Act

SA South Australia

SAPOL South Australia Police

SC Select Committee

SCPLR Select Committee on Pitjantjatjara Land Rights

SEO State Electoral Office

SRA Shared Responsibility Agreements

TO Traditional Owner

UPK Uwankara Palyankyu Kanyintjaku

UTLC United Trades and Labor Council

YC Yankunytjatjara Council

xi

Dedicated to the people of the APY Lands

‘I am Anangu…This is my land you’re speaking about. This land is our land.

We are the Traditional Owners, the tjilpis and pampas of this land, and we know the law, and

we know the culture. It is our past, and it is our future. It is our life.

The 1981 Act was discussed over many years and supported by all Anangu.

It recognised and accepted our land rights and our human rights to decide what could happen

on our land, in our ways, in Anangu ways, together on our land’1.

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people please be aware that this thesis

contains images and names of people who have since passed away.

1 Evidence ALPSC, 2006/5, p.30.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

‘The law has been here forever’

Kunmanara Baker2

1.1 Thesis Aims

In March 1981, the South Australian (SA) Parliament passed the Pitjantjatjara Land

Rights Act 1981.3 The legislation was an important milestone in the South Australian

Government’s relationship with Indigenous4 peoples (Parliament of SA, House of

Assembly, 4 March 1980, p. 3454), and it was heralded nationally and internationally as

the first legislative land rights settlement of its kind in Australia5 (Peterson 1981, p. 121;

Jaensch 1986; Richards 1986; Reynolds 1992). Then Liberal Premier David Tonkin

referred to the PLRA as ‘one of the most significant pieces of legislation which has come

before this Parliament in its entire history’ (Parliament of SA, House of Assembly, 26

November 1980, p. 2311).

Introduced initially in 1978 by then Labor Premier Don Dunstan as ‘an act of simple

justice’ (Parliament of SA, House of Assembly, 22 November 1978, p. 2236), the

legislation created a body corporate, Anangu Pitjantjatjara (AP), of all Pitjantjatjara

traditional owners (TOs)6 in SA and gave them unique rights to control access to, and

2 Kunmanara Baker cited in Toyne and Vachon (1984), p. 33. 3 Referred to in short form in this thesis as the PLRA. 4 In this thesis, ‘Pitjantjatjara’, ‘Yunkunytjatjara’ and/or ‘Anangu’ are used to refer to people of the Lands;

‘Aboriginal’ is used to refer to Australian Indigenous people of mainland Australia (and as the preferred

term for SA’s first peoples); ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander’ or ‘Indigenous’ refers to all of

Australia’s first peoples (inclusive of peoples of the Torres Straits); or to international contexts regarding

the world’s first peoples. 5 The NT Land Rights Act 1976 had established rights for certain Aboriginal groups in the NT; however,

the PLRA established land rights for a specific collective group of Aboriginal people for the first time

anywhere. 6 The title for this thesis refers to ‘Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara’. Anangu is the Pitjantjatjara term

for ‘the people’, or ‘the human beings who belong to the earth’ (Toyne & Vachon 1984, p. 5), and refers to

Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara and Ngaanyatjarra peoples in the cross-border region of SA, NT and WA.

The term ‘Anangu Pitjantjatjara’ or AP—and (after 2005) ‘Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara’ or

APY—has specific meaning under the PLRA 1981, now the APY LR Act 1981 (as amended in 2005). In the

Act, AP (and now APY) is designated the ‘body corporate’, which comprises all Pitjantjatjara traditional

owners (TOs) and is defined as ‘a member of the Pitjantjatjara, Yankunytjatjara, Ngaayatjarra people…who

has in accordance with Aboriginal tradition, social, economic and spiritual affiliations with and

responsibilities for, the lands or any part of them’ (PLRA Part 1.4) within the SA Lands defined in and

covered by the Act. The Executive Board is elected to carry out the wishes of APY as the ‘body corporate’.

The 2005 Amendments to the Act altered the way the Executive was elected; changed its powers, role and

function; recognised Yankunytjatjara people; and gave the South Australian Government new powers and

conditions under which it could intervene in the affairs of APY. Where this thesis refers to AP, it is referring

to the ‘body corporate’ of TOs as constructed by the 1981 version of the Act; and where it refers to APY,

it is referring to the later 2005 amended version of the Act, which formally included recognition of

Yankunytjatjara peoples.

13

development on, their traditional lands. It also established an Executive Board to carry

out the resolutions of the AP.

In September 1981, SA’s state-wide newspaper The Advertiser proclaimed the

significance of the PLRA 1981 under the headline: ‘Blacks given title to 10 % of South

Australia in historic handing over ceremony…. Aboriginal people now have freehold title

under Australian law to 102 630 square kilometres of the State’ (The Advertiser, 5

September 1981, p.1). The newspaper then quoted Anangu leader Yami Lester saying that

Pitjantjatjara people were ‘happy with the agreement…we will probably make some

mistakes at first, but we want all white Australians to give us a go’ (ibid).

In March 2004, the then South Australian Labor Government’s Deputy Premier Kevin

Foley announced that the Government was installing a former Assistant Police

Commissioner as the ‘administrator’ for the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands. He said that

‘this government has lost confidence in the ability of the Executive of the AP Lands to

appropriately govern their lands…Self-governance in the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands has

failed’ (Foley 2004). The next day, under the headline ‘Self-rule is finished’, The

Advertiser7 said that the ‘Government has lost confidence in the APY [Anangu

Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara] council and has intervened to take control of the

region…effectively ending 23 years of self-determination’ (Kemp 2004, p. 1).

This thesis is a contextualised narrative account and critical analysis of what happened,

how and why in the 25 years between the passing of the PLRA in 1981, its review and

amendment in 2004/5, and subsequent changes to the governance arrangements on the

APY Lands in 2005/6. I argue that these events mark a period of significant change in

public policy concerning state/Indigenous relations and illustrate a substantial shift in

attitude away from ‘self-determination’.8

This thesis documents and analyses the changes in Anangu governance arrangements

during this period. It assesses why and how the PLRA 1981, which was initially viewed

as a major step for self-determination, came to be blamed for the entrenched socio-

economic disadvantage among Anangu. The nature of self-governance as envisaged and

7 The Australian (DiGirolamo 16 March 2004, p. 6) ran a similar story nationally under the headline:

‘(Premier) Rann takes control from blacks’ and in its later edition: ‘Rann takes charge in black lands’,

announcing an end to self-governance. 8 ‘Self-determination’ was adopted as Commonwealth policy in 1972 under the Whitlam government, and

it remained a core tenet of policy until the Howard government assumed office in 1996. It is a core principle

of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. See Sanders (2002), Stokes and Gillen

(2004), Sullivan (1996) and Dodson (1998) for self-determination in the Australian policy context and, for

example, Anaya (1996) and Marks (2007) for international applications.

14

provided for in the original legislation was later portrayed as the ‘problem’ that needed

to be addressed, while issues such as service delivery and citizenship entitlements to

appropriate health, social and economic support were largely obscured.

By analysing the events in this ‘story’ from differing perspectives, this thesis critically

reflects on shifts in the nature of Anangu/state relations in the 25-year period. I argue that

this period marks a major shift in public policy away from the Dunstan era approach

informed by principles and concepts about the potential of land rights, self-governance

and self-determination to empower Anangu lives, to one in which the South Australian

Government perceived an urgent need for government intervention and increased control

over Anangu lives. This thesis explores the changing constructions of these issues in

public discourse and how relevant policy themes embedded in debates on the public

record are framed and then represented in the media.

This thesis explores the role of key stakeholder groups and policy actors. It analyses

issues and events from the differing perspectives of Anangu individuals, communities

and organisations, and state and Commonwealth Government protagonists. It analyses

the voices of statutory bodies such as the Office of the State Coroner and the Human

Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (HREOC), and of professional consultants.

Further, this thesis explores the role of the Coroner as an ‘ombudsman for the dead’

(Charles 2005, p. 77), as well as the effect of the findings of the coronial inquests into

Anangu deaths by petrol sniffing in 2002 and 2005 (SA Coroner 2002, 2005). It also

discusses the media’s influence in generating a climate of ‘moral panic’ (Cohen 1972, p.

9; HREOC 2003, p. 130) around petrol sniffing, and the impetus for intervention in the

governance of the Lands.

To identify biases, this thesis discusses constructions of, and assumptions about, Anangu

peoples contained in public documents, parliamentary debates and media commentary

during this period. It also acknowledges the importance of considering gender in any

critical appraisal of state recognition of APY as a distinct cultural collective with claims

to group recognition through self-governance while simultaneously upholding the

individual citizenship and human rights of Anangu women and children. The role of the

Ngaanyatjarra Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara (NPY) Women’s Council, which aims to

advance the discussion of women’s rights within the context of Anangu land rights, is

also explored.

15

In Growing Up the Country: The Pitjantjatjara Struggle for Their Land, Toyne and

Vachon (1984) tell the story of Anangu’s fight for land rights and their achievement

resulting from the 1981 Act. Neville Bonner’s (1988) Always Anangu (1988) details the

development of the Anangu community’s self-management infrastructure and the

relationship between Anangu organisations and external agencies. In the ensuing decades,

a range of reports and studies have examined the Lands in relation to anthropological,

organisational, environmental, health, economic and social issues. Despite lengthy and

contentious parliamentary debate, numerous government reports and high levels of media

interest in the Lands, little academic literature to date has focused on the details of the

policy, legislative and political contexts of Anangu governance or the PLRA in operation.

This thesis fills the gap by conducting a detailed exploration of the PLRA in operation

through the 25-year period from its origins in 1981 until 2006 and reflecting on shifts in

policy during that time.

By detailing and analysing the events leading up to the review and subsequent amendment

of the Act, this thesis develops new understandings about the relationship between APY

and the state, and it contributes to the fields of public policy, political science and

Indigenous studies. This thesis aims to review and analyse parliamentary debates,

government inquiries, reports, media statements and associated documents on the public

record to reveal:

how Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara have been constructed in a specific

geographic region of South Australia and recognised in legislation and policy as

both a culturally distinct group and a ‘body corporate’ for the purposes of self-

governance from 1981 to 2006

the diverse perspectives of Anangu and non-Anangu, who are engaged in often

competing and contested positions regarding Anangu governance

the effect of Commonwealth/State intergovernmental relations in the changing

policy context in the 25-year period on the PLRA, Anangu governance and the

provision of services to the Lands

the significance of amendments to the PLRA regarding governance arrangements,

election procedures and Anangu/state relations.

1.2 Methodology

This thesis uses a critical policy analysis approach that helps to reveal the relations of

power embedded in the public policy process. It examines the historical accounts and

16

genealogical context of ideas and events to provide ‘a painstaking rediscovery of

struggles together with the rude memory of their conflicts’ (Foucault 1994a, p. 22). A

critical approach seeks to render a ‘problematized phenomenon—a particular policy

practice for example—more intelligible’ (Howarth 2010, p. 325). Such an approach

explores ‘how issues are understood and framed by the various policy communities’, such

as the government, private sector, media and academia, who influence the course of

public policy (Duncan & Reutter 2006, p. 244). Further, it explores how policy comes to

have meaning (Yanow 1996) and how particular interpretations, ‘coherent stories or

accounts’ form shared understandings through discourse (Dryzek 1997, p. 8). A critical

approach views policy-making as interactive and interpretive rather than rational and

instrumental. In this sense, ‘critical discourse rather than instrumental, purposive action’

is the focus (Bobrow & Dryzek 1987, p. 18).

Public policy is a form of politics through communicative practice (Fischer & Gottweis

2012; Colebatch 2009; Yanow 1996, 1993; Shapiro 1992; Habermas 1984). Through

defining ‘what’s the problem represented to be’, policy is framed to respond to particular,

often carefully chosen, interpretations of events (Bacchi 2009, p. 1). Framing is the

process by which media, politicians and political organisations define and construct

issues or events (Lee & Chang 2010; Shapiro 1992; Gamson 1992). The promulgation of

a particular ‘policy storyline’ (Fischer 2003, p. 86) shapes the discursive construction of

the issues that flow from the policy response.

Common perceptions of policy can presume decision-making to be based on rationality.

A critical approach assumes that policy domains are sites of struggle and contestation

between competing interests where power is unequally distributed, and where those with

power shape policy to suit their ends. As Grimley suggests, ‘policy is an expression of

values by a political dominant group’ (1986, p. 20). As Stevenson (2007, p. 3) argues:

Throughout the policy-making process (problem identification, program development and

implementation, and program evaluation), differently situated social identities, such as the state,

capital, workers, citizens, and consumers, etc., engage in a power struggle to define what

constitutes a social problem and, by extension, how it is to be resolved. Success is the creation

of policy agendas that resonate with, and reproduce an identity’s particular worldview and

corresponding set of values. Ultimately, these are ideological struggles, most often discursive

in nature and, although never fully realized, the goal is hegemonic achievement.

Critical policy analysis aims to expose the ideologies and values underlying particular

policy contexts, the process by which problems are identified and solutions proposed, and

the inclusivity or exclusivity of voices in the debate (Shapiro 1992; Forester & Fischer

1993; Fischer 1995; Yanow 2000; Pal 2001; Shapiro 2002). While more conventional

17

approaches to public policy analysis are concerned with what governments do, a critical

approach views what governments refuse to do or choose not to do to be just as, if not

more, important (Bacchi 2000; Pal 2001). Critical analysis can show how people who are

affected by policy changes experience these effects in their daily lives: ‘Policy then is a

set of shifting, diverse, and contradictory responses to a spectrum of political interests’

(Edelman 1988, p. 16).

In this thesis, critical policy analysis is used to examine how government legislation and

policy towards Anangu people changed over time, and how alliances were formed around

conflicting interests, both within and between government/s and Anangu, and within and

between Anangu organisations. In comparing statements on the public record from a

range of actors in the policy process, this thesis reveals competing standpoints and

interpretations of events. For example, the critical policy analysis approach is used to

compare media discourse about petrol sniffing—which was used by the Government to

justify an intervention in 2004—with sources that question the assumptions embedded in

that popular discourse. Thus, alternative rationales for events are made visible.

Documents on the public record form the text—not for one dominant story to be told, but

rather to reveal that many stories can emerge—from the same events during the same

period. It is the web of meanings and perspectives generated between governments and

Anangu people, or Fischer’s ‘policy storyline/s’ (2003, p. 86) that this thesis explores. It

critically examines ‘whose interests’ were served by each interpretation of the policy

issues, as well as what formed the ‘appropriate’ legislative response. This thesis explores

the competing conceptualisations of the relations of power, citizenship and governance

at play during this 25-year period, or ‘the shifting state constructions of Anangu

Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara’ referred to in the title.

Allison and Zelikow (1999) provide a pivotal exposition of critical policy analysis in their

classic case study of decision-making under pressure in the Cuban missile crisis. They

compare and contrast competing perspectives on what the ‘problem’ was represented to

be—in this instance, a significant policy conundrum that challenged US foreign policy in

the 1960s. They explore public policy decision-making by examining the same policy

issue through three different lenses: the ‘rational actor’, ‘organisational process’ and

‘government politics’.

Drawing on ‘the garbage can model of organisational choice’ (Cohen, March & Olsen

1972) and notions of ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1991), Allison and Zelikow (1999)

18

suggest that bureaucracies often generate a self-serving repertoire of options that limit

responses to problems to a pre-existing set of organisational solutions. They suggest that

in the third lens - ‘palace politics’ - the cut and thrust of political leaders jostling for power

and influence determines how problems are constructed, discussed and positioned, and

how solutions are then perceived and enacted (Allison & Zelikow 1999, p. 294). They

illustrate how pressure from incumbent leaders wanting to maintain their own position of

power within a field of competing interests often drove governments into responding to

the politics of a given situation rather than responding from informed and consistent

policy principles (Allison & Zelikow 1999).

Although it dealt with a different time and context, Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) case

study nonetheless provides an interesting explication of what t’Hart (2008, p. 1) refers to,

in an Australian Indigenous context, as ‘crisis exploitation’,9 whereby protagonists frame

policy ‘problems’ as emergencies or ‘crises’ for what are primarily political purposes.

t’Hart (2008, p. 160) argues that framing issues as crises enables political leaders to have

their ‘preferred frame accepted as the dominant narrative’. Grube (2010, p. 559), referring

also to the Indigenous domain, characterises the strategic deployment of carefully crafted

rhetorical framing as an emerging ‘weapon’ of choice in Australian Government policy

interventions.

This thesis similarly argues that unequal power relations can be seen in the ways that

governments and politicians used public discourse to construct issues such as petrol

sniffing and socio-economic disadvantage to obfuscate their own responsibilities for APY

Lands between 1981 and 2006. However, it also contextualises and tempers this assertion

by arguing that simple binaries and assumptions of rights and wrongs are not accurate

ways to analyse Anangu/government relations. This thesis argues that Anangu were

always (and are still) agents in active pursuit of issues and constructions of events in ways

that maximise their collective (and at times individual) agendas.

This thesis shows how problems were constructed and then responded to. In particular, it

illustrates how petrol sniffing became conflated with questions of Anangu governance,

and it explores how, why and in whose interests this occurred. It summarises and reviews

public documents, minutes of meetings, correspondence, Hansard transcripts, speeches

and debates in the Parliament, media reports and other commentary on the public record.

9 See also Boin, A, t’Hart, P, Stern, E & Sundelius, B 2006, The politics of crisis management: public

leadership under pressure, which contains a broader discussion of the themes of the discursive power of

conjuring a ‘crisis’ in policy, which t’Hart (2008) uses to critique the ‘national emergency’ in the Northern

Territory.

19

There have been many parliamentary committees, government inquiries and debates,

select committees and consultant’s reports, as well as the 2002 and 2005 Coronial Inquest

into Deaths by Petrol Sniffing on the APY Lands, each with associated verbal and written

submissions and media discussion. They each provide rich insights into differing and

often competing stances about Anangu governance.

A recorded history of the entrenched conflict that emerged between the Pitjantjatjara

Council (PC), which predated the PLRA, and the AP Executive, which was formed by

the Act, provides an insight into competing Anangu perspectives. Given the nature of the

PLRA as the legislative provision of a State jurisdiction, this thesis also discusses the

limitations of the Act and constraints on Anangu determining their own governance

arrangements.

The embedded political perspectives contained in public record letters, government

reports, minutes of meetings, interviews, ministerial statements and media releases are

used as textual artefacts in this thesis to bring to life the events detailed, and to provide

the body of literature from which the analysis is conducted. According to Yanow (2000,

p. 27), the ‘data’ of interpretive analysis are ‘the words, symbolic objects, and acts of

policy-relevant actors along with policy texts, plus the meanings these artifacts have for

them’. Like Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 238), this thesis aims to ‘tell the story in its diversity,

allowing the story to unfold from the many-sided, complex, and sometimes conflicting

stories that the actors in the case have told’.

The political processes that lie behind policy can be experienced as an intensely personal,

sometimes negative, sometimes persuasive, exposure to power. This thesis aims to reveal

how policy-making processes can obfuscate, obscure and manipulate what is ‘seen’ to be

occurring, yet simultaneously claim to be achieving agreement, compliance and support

for a preferred outcome.

1.2.1 Personal location in thesis

While predominantly analysing documents on the public record, this thesis also draws at

times on engagements I had with relevant people and events. Interpretive approaches

necessitate an understanding of one’s own embodied position within the research and a

willingness to be reflexive and responsive to the opportunities and limitations of such

connections. A critical approach extends this understanding by acknowledging that all

knowledge is mediated by ‘race, gender, time and space’, and that the story we tell can

only ever be ‘a modest, relative, partial, relational, standpoint-based narrative…a story

20

with no claim of authority higher than the stories’ that researchers tell about themselves

(Vannini 2008, p. 816). Politics, and our knowledge of it, is situational; our perceptions

and interpretations of events are shaped by our involvement with, or position in relation

to, them. As Haraway (1991, p. 192) suggests, ‘situated knowledges’ are like maps of

consciousness, reflecting how and why we construct our interpretations of events and the

meanings they hold for us. A reflexive approach appreciates that knowledge is partial,

and not universal (Haraway 1988). Our positionality is contextual and the ‘place from

which values are interpreted and constructed’ (Alcoff 1988, p. 434).

Like Wagenaar, ‘I argue for analytical heuristics that honour the messiness, situatedness

and complexity of the world of public policy’ (2007a, p. 320). I place myself within the

‘story’ of this thesis in two ways: first, by identifying my ‘situatedness’10 as a non-

Indigenous Australian seeking to understand the continued racism and exclusions that

have denied Anangu and many Indigenous peoples both full citizenship and a unique

status as the prior occupants and both traditional and continuing custodians of this

continent; and second, by disclosing my engagement within some of the events occurring

during the time of the narrative within this thesis.

My family history, like that of many Australians, stretches back to the invasion and

convict unsettlement of this country. There is genealogical, colloquial and informal

evidence of family intersections with Aboriginality on both sides of my paternal great

grandparents, but such interconnection has been largely ‘whited out’ by the passage of

time, movement of family and the mores of passing into mainstream Australia over

generations (Ahmed 1999). This lingering consciousness of intersections with

Aboriginality, either directly or through inter-marriage, in my family lineage is a

‘whispering’ in my heart—a sense of a distant but profound connection to Australia’s

often violent history (Reynolds 1998).

My contact with Anangu organisations and leaders through various research projects took

place in the more recent period covered by this thesis and played a direct part in

determining the focus of the thesis. In particular, my early role in preparing a Report to

the SA Minister for Aboriginal Affairs on Community Responses to the Coroner’s

Findings into Deaths from Petrol Sniffing on the APY Lands and Community Capacity

10 ‘Situatedness’ in qualitative research refers to involvement within a context (Vannini 2008). For further

discussion on its relevance to policy analysis, see Jensen and Glasmeier (2010), Wagenaar (2007a, 2007b),

Clarke (2005) and Law (2004).

21

Building (Tedmanson & Maher 2003) provided opportunities for rare and privileged

insights into events at that time.

This experience changed my life forever. It gave me exposure to particular political events

at the time, an awareness of the diverse and often competing perspectives of Anangu in

communities, and some insight into the perceptions and attitudes of policy-makers in

Adelaide. It was a rich insider/outsider view that afforded me some access to how people

perceived, and were perceived by, others (Moran 2010). At times, it provided me with

access to a gaze from within this story as it unfolded; where appropriate, I reflect on this

personal experience.

For example, on the day the Deputy Premier announced that ‘self-governance’ on the

APY Lands had failed (15 March 2004), I was driving in the metropolitan area and heard

the announcement on the radio. The then Chairman of the AP Executive, who was in

Adelaide for meetings, called me immediately, having just heard the announcement

himself. Neither the Chair nor other members of the Executive had received prior warning

of the announcement from the South Australian Government that an Administrator was

about to be installed on the Lands because, in the Government’s view, the self-governance

of the PLRA had ‘failed’. The Chairman asked if I would meet with members of the

Executive and various support organisations rallying to help Anangu source legal

assistance in order to develop and communicate their response. Anangu Executive

members felt that a ‘fight for survival’ had begun.

In the late 1980s and 1990s I had been involved in research, management and community

development positions, including working as a tutor with the Aboriginal Task Force at

the then South Australian Institute for Technology. For a time I was a public servant

working in policy and research positions in both the South Australian and Commonwealth

Governments, including nearly a decade working as a Policy Adviser/Private Secretary

to Ministers in the Hawke and Keating Labor governments. This period included the

‘reconciliation decade’, when significant Indigenous policy debates took place, Mabo,

Wik, the development of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC),

Keating’s Redfern Speech, and the beginnings of the Council for Aboriginal

Reconciliation.

In addition to these professional roles, I had been a political activist for most of my adult

life. In the decade prior to some of the key events covered later in this thesis, I was

President of the South Australian Labor Party, a member of the ALP’s State and National

22

Executives, an ALP Senate candidate and a regular delegate to ALP national conferences

and other Labor fora. SA’s Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation (2002–

2006), Hon Terry Roberts MLC, was a personal friend for many years, until he became

ill with cancer and died in 2006. The years during which the Rann Government’s

contentious approach to the PLRA came to a head were undoubtedly a challenging time

for Terry, who was a progressive politician. Like many who respected and regarded Terry

well, I grieve his death and believe he like others in this story, genuinely did his best for

people on the APY Lands.

Politics is a complex and nuanced business concerning the engagement of people and

power. Seeking to explore its structural twists and turns is not aided by simplistic

moralising judgements about the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’. In politics relating to Aboriginal

affairs, there is the added imperative of finding ways to move beyond the ‘drama of binary

black/white relations’ (Perera 2000, p. 12). Notions of policy ‘success’ and ‘failure’ serve

to animate a neoliberal logic that belies the deeper issues of Aboriginal/state relations

(Howard-Wagner 2012). Therefore, for critical theory understandings, it is important to

consider how issues are constructed, framed and misframed in order to better map the

‘political space from the standpoint of justice’ (Fraser 2010, p. 6).

The early to mid 2000s were a difficult and challenging time both professionally and

ethically. The South Australian Government changed its position on APY matters, partly

as a result of shifts in Commonwealth policy and partly as responsibility for the Lands

shifted from the Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation portfolio to the Department of the

Premier and Cabinet. The extent of the divergence between what Anangu were being told

at the time and what was on record or in preparation elsewhere as possible new policy

directions was disillusioning. I spent time with some of the key Anangu individuals,

groups and organisations throughout this period, along with a number of key stakeholders

and protagonists outside the Lands in non-government and legal sectors who were

engaged in advocacy or legal representation for a range of Anangu communities and

organisations.

It was a volatile and impassioned period of public and private angst for both Anangu and

non-Anangu people. There were also many inspiring people, politicians and government

and non-government activists who engaged in debate about what ‘self-determination’

could or should mean. It was a turbulent time for Anangu leaders, communities, families

and individuals. It was both humbling and instructive to witness how Anangu with

divergent views interacted with one another and shared moments of great humour and

23

great disappointment with each other. Such moments endure as powerful memories and

illustrate the strength of Anangu and their resilience in the face of complex divisive and

unfair circ*mstances.

Insights into such events occurring in the latter part of the 25-year period will be

commented on where appropriate. I wish to acknowledge from the outset the patience,

generosity, good grace and good humour of the Anangu protagonists in this story,

regardless of the ‘side’ or perspective they adopted regarding amending the Act or their

relations with the government. It is to them that I dedicate my thesis.

1.3 Thesis Structure

This thesis explores and analyses the story of the PLRA between 1981 and 2006. Chapter

1 introduces the aims and method of the thesis, outlines its structure and provides a brief

overview of the APY Lands as at 2006. It also provides some background context to the

author’s deep, abiding and passionate interest in this topic and personal ‘situatedness’ as

a witness to aspects of the story as it unfolded. It establishes the framework and context

for this thesis.

Chapter 2 provides a brief history of the period leading up to the passing of the PLRA in

1981. It highlights the importance of Dunstan’s reform agenda and traces the etiology of

the PLRA in the earlier ground-breaking reforms of the Aboriginal Lands Trust Act 1966.

It analyses the PLRA’s significance as the first legal recognition of land rights for a

specific collective of Aboriginal people in Australia. It also suggests the continuity of

Anangu agency, from the mission days and formation of the North West Aboriginal

Reserve to the rise of the PC and the campaign for the PLRA. The chapter explores the

effect of Anangu input into government deliberations at the time, and how many of the

concerns of elders about petrol sniffing and other social needs were overlooked by

governments in the excitement of bipartisan support for such a significant advancement

in Aboriginal land rights. It reveals the optimistic musings of the Working Party on

Pitjantjatjara Land Rights about the ‘genius of the Pitjantjatjara epistemology’

(Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Working Party (PLRWP) 1978, p. 34) and the high

expectations for land rights as a panacea for the ravages of ‘colonial’ contact. The chapter

also outlines the protocols, responsibilities and governance arrangements codified by the

PLRA 1981, as well as the associated Anangu bodies formed around that time.

Chapter 3 explores the first decade of the PLRA. It reveals how the aspirations of the Act

were tested during its first years of operation by complex political and legal challenges

24

and debilitating social issues. The chapter details how, within months of commencing,

the Act’s collective rights provisions were challenged in the landmark Gerhardy v Brown

case and eventually upheld in the High Court as a ‘special measure’. The 1987

amendments to the PLRA are discussed as a response to Anangu concerns about

deteriorating social well-being in their communities. The rise of petrol sniffing is

explored, and several high-level reviews of the Lands are analysed, including one by

Bonner, which recommended action on key governance and administrative priorities to

increase Anangu control.

Chapter 4 argues that the Commonwealth became dominant in AP matters during the

second decade of the PLRA. It suggests that attention to the Lands waned as ATSIC

became an alternative regional focus for policy, resource allocation and governance

issues. The continuing separation of the PC from the AP became a source of tensions in

the complex array of Anangu governance and administrative arrangements, as

rationalisation rather than recognition and representation became the mantra of

governments. The chapter argues that efforts to designate the Lands as a local government

area (LGA) during this decade were motivated in part by concerns over costs associated

with the maintenance of remote infrastructure. A further escalation in petrol sniffing is

analysed, along with the rise of regional Anangu organisations in what, by the 1990s, was

becoming a political economy of competitive contracting for service delivery. The

chapter concludes with an illustration of how increased mining interests in the region

promoted conflict between Anangu organisations and leaders; as a further joint

Commonwealth/state review of AP took place.

Chapter 5 charts the beginning of the third decade of the operation of the PLRA. It reveals

how the conflict between PC and AP, which originated over mining exploration access

on the Lands, escalated into a struggle for organisational ascendancy that destroyed a 30-

year arrangement. Commonwealth and State governments increasingly pushed AP to

liberalise mining access for the economic development of the Lands, and provided

resources to encourage AP into more centralised unitary models of control and decision-

making. The chapter explores the election of Rann’s minority Labor Government and its

renewed efforts to resolve the dispute between PC and AP. Professor Dodson’s pertinent

consultancy report, which comments on AP governance under the PLRA, is critically

analysed. A major focus of this chapter is the continued prevalence of petrol sniffing in

the Lands, and how ongoing efforts by Anangu leaders to address this issue led to the first

25

Coronial Inquest. The findings and policy implications of the inquest set the scene for the

events that form the basis of Chapter 6.

Chapter 6 brings the previous two chapters together and maps the lead up to the crisis in

Anangu–state government relations, which culminated in the events of March 2004. It

analyses the contrived and politically charged ‘moral panic’ (Cohen 1972, p. 9; HREOC

2003) fostered at this time, and argues that the Premier’s office centralised control of AP

policy issues in an effort to limit the political fall-out from intense media scrutiny over

petrol sniffing. A critical lens is used to reveal how putative ‘failures’ of Anangu

governance were discursively constructed and promulgated as the excuse, if not the focus

of blame, for delays in Government funding and service delivery. The chapter then

explores the roles of a succession of external administrators, consultants and advisers—

including Lister, Collins, Costello and O’Donoghue—engaged by the Government in

order to propose solutions to what it argues was purposively framed as an Anangu

‘problem’.

Chapter 7 critically analyses the 2004 and 2005 amendments to the PLRA by comparing

and contrasting the new policy framing with that of the original 1981 Act. The chapter

explores the 2004 Report of the Select Committee on Pitjantjatjara Land Rights and

subsequent debate, and it identifies the political theory assumptions and framing

embedded in the legislative and governance changes. It explores shifts in the

representation of APY in the amended provisions of the PLRA and associated policies. It

asks whether decolonisation is ever possible for Indigenous minorities ‘enclosed within

the boundaries of the state that was the agent of their dispossession’ (Cairns 2003, p. 498).

Drawing on work by Kymlicka, Tully, Taylor, Fraser and Watson on rights, recognition

and misframing, the chapter brings the themes in this thesis together to analyse the

limitations of state-controlled, legislative forms of ‘self-determination’. It considers

Anangu ‘governance’ within the Australian context with reference to the work of Hunt,

Sanders, Maddison and Altman. The chapter analyses how the construction of Anangu

changed during the 25-year period covered by this thesis, from being a collective group

entitled to just ‘restitution…to not only to own but to control their own land’ (Dunstan

1978, p. 2234), to being portrayed as people ‘unable to deliver civil order’ …from ‘a part

of our state that is, quite frankly, a disgrace in terms of governance’ (Foley 2004, p. 1).

Chapter 8 brings together the analyses of the preceding chapters into a composite

synthesis about the shifting state constructions of APY from 1981 to 2006. This

concluding chapter summarises challenges that Anangu communities and their unique

26

State-based Land Rights Act face within the context of state/Aboriginal and Torres Strait

Islander policy-making in Australia.

1.4 APY Lands Context

The APY Lands comprise some 103,000 square kilometres of the north west of South

Australia, originally designated by the PLRA 1981 (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). The Lands

are home to the Yankunytjatjara and Pitjantjatjara peoples and form part of a larger

350,000 sq. km ‘tri-state cross-border region’ that intersects the SA, Northern Territory

(NT) and Western Australian (WA) borders. Yankunytjatjara people customarily

occupied the area closest to the Musgrave ranges around the site of the Presbyterian

Mission established in 1935, which later became known as Ernabella and is now

incorporated as Pukatja. Further north, near Uluru, is the country of extended kinship

groups of the Pitjantjatjara people, who moved into the south eastern Yankunytjatjara

country because the Mission provided supplies and support after the period of early white

contact, while further to the west is Ngaanyatjarra country.

Figure 1.1: Map of Lands tri-State border modified, source APY Lands homepage

(http://www.anangu.com.au/)

27

Figure 1.2: AP Lands map 2001 source, ATSIC and Sinclair Knight Mertz

28

While Yankunytjatjara is a distinct language, it is closely related to Pitjantjatjara, and

speakers of each language generally understand one another. Kinship links and

responsibility for the country for different extended family groups of Yankunytjatjara

Pitjantjatjara (and also for some Ngaanyatjarra) affect internal politics across the Lands.

All Pitjantjatjara, Yankunytjatjara (and Ngaanyatjarra) who are TOs11 of any part of the

Lands are members of the body corporate ‘Anangu Pitjantjatjara’ (AP from 1981) or

‘Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara’ (APY from 2005), as incorporated by, and

defined in, the Act. The construction of ‘AP’ (‘APY’ after 2005) as the body corporate

under SA legislation codified the relationship between Anangu and between Anangu and

one level of the Australian state. This thesis focuses on the implications of this legislative

apparatus constructing Anangu TOs as a corporate body for the purposes of self-

governance and control over development on traditional Aboriginal Lands.

Communities on the Lands include: Amata, Fregon, Iwantja (Indulkana), Kalka, Mimili,

Pipalyatjara, Pukatja (Ernabella), Watarru, Watinuma and Yunyarinyi (Kenmore Park).

Homelands (or outstation groups) on the APY Lands include: Anilalya, Irintata, Kaltjiti,

Murputja, Tjurma, Turkey Bore and Tjutjinpiri. Since 1990, the administrative centre of

the Lands has been Umuwa, which is close to Pukatja and has roads that radiate out,

spoke-like, to other communities such as Fregon, Amata, Mimili and Indulkana. As

discussed in Chapter 3, Umuwa was originally designed as a separate ‘neutral’ location

where non-Anangu staff could reside away from communities at the Anangu people’s

request. Under the 2005 amendments to the Act, the Executive Board comprises 10

members elected from across the Lands for a three-year term. Since the 2005

amendments, the Executive Board has chosen its Chairperson, whereas previously the

Chairperson was elected directly by the APY ‘electorate’.

1.4.1 Demographics

Anangu are highly mobile across the region; they frequently travel and reside between

communities, communities and homelands, and they often move to kinship groups and

family links across the tri-state borders into the NT and WA. Consequently, population

numbers in any one community and/or across the region are, at best, estimates.

However, according to the 2006 Census, there were 2,230 persons usually resident in

Anangu Pitjantjatjara LGA (AP local government area): 49.4% were males and 50.6%

11 The Act specifies that ‘Traditional Owner in relation to the Lands means an Aboriginal person who has,

in accordance with Aboriginal tradition, social, economic and spiritual affiliations with, and responsibilities

for, the Lands or any part of them’.

29

were females. Of the AP LGA population, 84.5% were Indigenous persons, compared

with 2.3% Indigenous persons in Australia and 1.7% in SA. The Lands comprise

approximately 9.3% of the total Indigenous population of SA.

In the 2006 Census, 27.4% of the population usually resident in the AP LGA were

children aged 0–14 years, and 11.7% were persons aged 55 years and over. The median

age was 26 years, compared with 37 years for persons in Australia. For the APY region

during the week prior to the 2006 Census, 844 people aged 15 years and over who were

usually resident in the region were in the labour force. Of these, 35.3% were employed

full time, 53.7% were employed part time, 1.7% were employed but away from work,

4.5% were employed but did not state their hours worked and 4.9% were unemployed.

There were 692 usual residents aged 15 years and over who were not in the labour force.

1.4.2 Communities, councils and homelands

Given the mobility between communities and homelands, as well as in and out of the

Lands itself across to the Northern Territory and Western Australia, the size of the

communities varies greatly depending on the season, work available, access to services

and other social and cultural factors. Pukatja (Ernabella), the site of the old Presbyterian

Mission, is generally accepted as the largest (and oldest) community, with 400–600

residents in 2006. This is followed by Kaltjiti (Fregon) and Amata, with 250–300

residents, and then Mimili and Iwantja (Indulkana), with 150–250 residents. Pipalyatjara

and Kalka have around 100–200 residents, and Watarru has fewer than 100 residents.

Anilaylya Homelands and Turkey Bore Homelands have an estimated 150–200 residents

each, Murputja Homelands has a little less, and Kenmore Park has 100–150 residents.

In 1987, the Australian Government’s House of Representatives Standing Committee in

Aboriginal Affairs published a report entitled Return to Country: The Aboriginal

Homelands Movement in Australia, which defined ‘homelands’ as ‘small decentralised

communities of close kin established by the movement of Aboriginal people to land of

social, cultural and economic significance to them’ (HRSCAA 1987, p. 7). It suggested

that homeland communities demonstrated the strong desire of Aboriginal people to return

to country to ‘undertake their customary responsibilities to their land’ as ‘a reaction to the

stresses of living in settlements’ (HRSCAA 1987, p. 257). According to Edwards (1992),

since the 1970s, Anangu families had been moving away from the communities

established around the old mission site at Ernabella and in other localities. By 2002, there

were more than 110 homelands across the Lands, although some were only intermittently

occupied (Habitat Solutions 2002).

30

The incorporation of local community councils on the Lands pre-dated the PLRA 1981.

The first Anangu community councils were formed at Ernabella and Fregon in the early

1970s. In January 1974, the Presbyterian Church, which had operated the Ernabella

Mission since 1937, gave administrative control of the communities at Ernabella to the

newly incorporated Pukatja Community Council and at Fregon to the Aparawatatja

Community Council (Edwards 1992). Community councils in Amata, Indulkana and

Pipalyatjara were incorporated by the end of 1974.

Seven community councils had been incorporated by the time the PC was formed in 1976,

five years before the PLRA came into effect. Over the 25-year period covered by this

thesis, other communities and homelands were incorporated across the Lands. By 2002–

2003, the region’s then Nulla Wimila Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (ATSIC)

Regional Council provided $11.5 million to 16 community councils and homeland groups

to deliver municipal services to Anangu on the Lands (ATSIC 2002/3, pp. 34–40). The

communities identified and funded at that time were:

Amata Community Inc.

Anilalya Homelands Council Aboriginal Corporation

Irintata Homelands Council Aboriginal Corporation

Iwantja Community Inc.

Kaljiti Community Aboriginal Corporation

Mimili Community Inc.

Murputja Homelands Council Aboriginal Corporation

Nyapari Community Inc.

Pipalyatjara Community Inc.

Pitjantjatjara Homelands Council Aboriginal Corporation

Pukatja Community Inc.

Tjurma Homelands Council Inc.

Turkey Bore & Tjutjunpiri Community Aboriginal Corporation

Watarru Community Inc. Aboriginal Corporation

Watinuma Community Inc.

Yunyarinyi Community Inc.

Each community council was elected annually by their constituent communities. Each

chose a representative Council Chairperson as their elected spokesperson; in most cases,

31

this position involved remuneration and enhanced local status.12 Local community

councils received funding to employ a Municipal Services Officer13 to oversee activities,

manage local service delivery and provide advice and support to the elected body.

The PLRA legislated for the creation of an Executive Board to enact the will of TOs, the

broader body corporate and the land holding group, which had the ultimate legislative

right to determine matters pertaining to the Lands. This Executive was ‘s/elected’ in a

general open meeting of all TOs from across the Lands that was held once a year over a

day or more. The meeting also s/elected the AP Executive’s Chairperson for the year and

discussed cultural issues for the Lands. There was no articulation in the PLRA between

local community councils and the AP or its Executive Board—nor did the latter have any

responsibility for municipal or other local service delivery. The resulting tension between

local community councils, homeland groups and regional ‘governance’ arrangements

such as AP and its Executive, as constructed by the PLRA1981, generated a complex

interplay of local and regional politics that raised issues of representation and

accountability during the period covered by this thesis. These tensions are explored in

coming chapters.

1.4.3 Regional Anangu organisations

In 1976, representatives of the seven incorporated Anangu community councils met as

part of a historic two-day mass meeting with Anangu TOs, which founded the

Pitjantjatjara Council (PC) to act as a representative coalition of Anangu community

interests ‘to relieve the poverty, sickness, destitution, distress, suffering, misfortune and

helplessness of the inhabitants of the Council area’ (PC 1976), and to act as a political

lobby group for land rights in the lead-up to the 1981 legislation. The agreed role of the

PC after the advent of the PLRA was that it would focus on advising and supporting

Anangu throughout the tri-state region on anthropological, environmental and legal

matters. The conflict that developed between the PC and Anangu Pitjantjatjara (AP) in

later years is explored in coming chapters.

Other regional Anangu service agencies were formed during the period of change

between the mid 1970s and early 1980s, and were focused around ideas of independent

12 Status within Anangu communities is primarily related to cultural standing; it is not an attribute of one’s

role within white or ‘piranpa’ (Pitjantjatjara term for non-Indigenous persons) society. For an analysis of

differential cultural role significance and the emergence of community councils, see Rowse (1992),

Gerritson (1982) and Sanders (2002). 13 Municipal Services Officers (MSOs) were usually positions taken up by piranpa; however, by the early

2000s, the Puktaja Community Council had employed Anangu woman Makinti Minutjukur as its first

Anangu and first Female MSO.

32

self-management. In 1980, Anangu women formed the NPY Women’s Council, which

expressed its aims to:

promote women’s membership of and participation in community councils,

ATSIC Regional Councils and other organisations

help individual women achieve further training, education and employment

assist in the establishment of appropriate health, education, cultural, artistic and

social services

promote and support the achievements and authority of women

distribute information about issues of importance to women

promote and encourage women’s Law and Culture (NPY Women’s Council

1980).

The governance of the NPY Women’s Council included representatives from the

Northern Territory and Western Australia, as well as South Australian Anangu

communities. It remains a tri-state body representing Anangu women’s issues across the

region. After the PLRA 1981, the NPY Women’s Council assumed an increasingly

important and prominent role in service delivery and advocacy, particularly in relation to

violence against women, substance abuse and the well-being of families, communities

and children. The Council initially co-located its administrative office in Alice Springs

with the PC and Nganampa Health Council as part of an Anangu resource agency

precinct.

Nganampa Health, an AP-controlled health service, was formed in 1983. It took over

responsibility for the region’s health services from the South Australian Health

Commission in 1985. Until 1992, when Nganampa Health based its administration on the

Lands at the newly created government and services centre at Umuwa, it worked out of

the Alice Springs resource agency precinct, which also housed the PC and the NPY

Women’s Council.

Like the NPY Women’s Council, Nganampa Health has a tri-state presence and services

Anangu communities across the NT, WA and SA. A focus on sanitation, infrastructure,

housing, social and environmental planning, and community development was developed

in 1987 through the Uwankara Palyankyu Kanyintjaku (UPK) public environmental

health strategy, a community planning blueprint for the Lands. In Nganampa’s early

years, distances between Alice Springs and the Lands made liaison and communication

difficult; as a result, it opened offices at Umuwa in 1993. On that occasion, Director

Robert Stevens (Nganampa Health Council 1994, p.7) said:

33

This is a very important day for Nganampa health, and a very important day for Anangu. The

opening of this office means that the administration of health services is now based on the AP

Lands…. It means Anangu can easily come and have meetings and talk about problems with

health services, and we are here on the Lands to fix those problems. Nganampa started ten years

ago. When we started, Anangu said they wanted the kids to be healthy, and for sick people to

be treated on the Lands. Now we have immunisation programs and screening for sickness.

Babies are born on the Lands. …Our health service is Anangu-controlled and we have Anangu

Health Workers who are the first point of contact when people are sick.

Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara (PY) Media is an Anangu media organisation. In the early

1980s, Ernabella Video and Television (EVTV) was formed in Ernabella as a way to curb

the saturation of commercial TV due to the launch of the AUSAT satellite. EVTV became

the place for Anangu to document or record culture. In 1987, members of the AP

Executive determined to extend the services provided by EVTV to all communities across

the Lands.

PY Media was incorporated as the regional body to assist communities to develop local

media centres. In the mid 1990s, PY Media moved to Umuwa to set up a regional office

to enable fair representation for all communities on the Lands. PY Media manages remote

communications projects and new technology developments in the region.

Ernabella Arts celebrated 60 years of continuous operation in 2008. A craft room was set

up in the Ernabella community in 1948 for Anangu women to apply traditional spinning

skills to wool obtained from the sheep run on the Mission station. The traditional spindle

became the logo for the organisation, which has since spawned a vibrant Anangu arts

industry. It is the oldest continuing Aboriginal arts centre in Australia and has encouraged

a range of Anangu arts enterprises that have successfully operated in the region for

decades.

The Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Education Committee (PYEC) was established in the

late 1980s to enable Anangu to provide input into education at the primary, secondary

and tertiary levels on the Lands. SA Government primary schools were developed in the

major Anangu communities from the early 1970s, while secondary schooling was

conducted either in Alice Springs or through an annexe, termed the ‘Wiltja Residential

Program’, at Woodville High School and through billeting arrangements in Adelaide.

In the early 1980s, the predecessor of the further education institutions that now form the

University of SA established a small campus in major Anangu communities to conduct

the Anangu Tertiary Education Program (AnTEP).

The infrastructure of regional Anangu service organisations became stronger after the

PLRA 1981 was enacted. Commonwealth and SA Government funding increased over

34

the next two decades for these agencies to assist in the delivery of health, social welfare,

education, training and communication support services to Anangu communities.14

Anangu community councils received some funding for municipal services, and the PC

received funds for anthropological and legal advisory support to AP.

The complex interplay of governance, representation, funding and service delivery issues

in and between Anangu organisations and in and between regional and local levels blurred

accountability and generated considerable political tensions in the years following the

passing of the PLRA. The following chapters explore this story.

14 In addition to the above arts, media, health, women’s and education services, an Anangu Land

Management organisation formed in the 1990s to focus on land and natural resource management issues

and later an AP Services organisation formed to provide additional accountancy, service and administrative

support to Anangu communities.

35

Chapter 2: Recognising Anangu Land Rights

‘An act of simple justice…’

Don Dunstan (1978)15

2.1 Introduction

Conceptual roots of the PLRA can be traced in the continuum of policy reform that Don

Dunstan forged during the 1960s and 1970s. For Dunstan, advancing Aboriginal social

justice was a longstanding passionate and deeply felt commitment. While an Opposition

frontbencher in 1960, Dunstan was elected President of the Federal Council for

Aboriginal Advancement.16 Throughout the 1960s, he spent time visiting SA Aboriginal

communities, consulting with Aboriginal leaders and elders, and formulating new policy

approaches (Dunstan cited in NMA 2007).

This chapter argues that Dunstan’s suite of Aboriginal policy reforms in the 1960s laid

the groundwork that enabled the PLRA to emerge from the 1970s pan-Anangu cross-

border activism, and that forged the PC as its pivotal force for change. The chapter

explores how such progressive legislation was conceived and then achieved in a period

after the 1967 Referendum when policies favouring self-determination were not out of

step with Commonwealth directions, and when they were strongly supported in SA,

initially on a bipartisan basis.

This chapter also traces the emergence of a politically constructed singular AP identity,

posited as a unitary polity and corporate focus for the purposes of the Act. The

formulation of this new landholding entity, AP, met both government and Anangu

interests by enabling the transfer of Lands. As suggested in this chapter, its establishment

also created a basis for future tensions.

15 In introducing the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Bill into Parliament in 1978, Dunstan referred to the Bill as

both a ‘historic measure’ and ‘an act of simple justice’. For full reference, see Dunstan, HA Hansard, 22

November 1978, pp. 2235–2238. 16 The FCAA (which became FACAATSI in 1964) was formed in Adelaide in 1958 and was a coalition of

Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal activists committed to an agenda of social and civil rights reform for

Aboriginal Australians. Activists from all mainland states formed FCAA as a national pressure group to

campaign for ‘equal citizens’ rights’ for Aboriginal Australians. The two goals of this new body were to:

1) repeal all legislation—federal and state—that discriminated against Aborigines; and 2) amend the

Australian Constitution to give the Commonwealth Government power to legislate for Aborigines as with

all other citizens. For more information on Dunstan and FCAA, see the National Museum of Australia’s

website on Indigenous rights: <http://indigenousrights.net.au/default.asp>.

36

2.2 Dunstan’s Agenda

When Labor’s Frank Walsh formed his government in SA in 1965,17 Dunstan became its

self-styled ‘activist’ Attorney-General who was passionately committed to legislative

reform (Dunstan 1981). Dunstan (cited in NMA 2007) stated:

The moment I got into office, I set about a preparation of an Aboriginal Land Rights measure

and I had the Director look specifically—I sent him overseas immediately to look at the

American legislation, and the New Zealand legislation—and he came back and we discussed it

and said, ‘We’re not going to make the mistakes that those people did, which led to

fragmentation of title and all sorts of difficulties. What we will do is to create’, I told him, ‘we’ll

create a trust for Aboriginal people. They will run the thing, but they will hold the land for all

the Aboriginal people in South Australia. We won’t have any fragmentation of title and it will

be theirs in perpetuity’. And we announced in the first Governor’s speech—as Attorney-General

I had to prepare the Governor's speech—and we announced Aboriginal Land Rights in the first

Governor’s speech. It was headlined!

Three significant Aboriginal Affairs policy reforms followed in quick succession: the

Aboriginal and Historic Relics Preservation Act 1965, which aimed to preserve and

protect Aboriginal cultural sites and artefacts; the Prohibition of Discrimination Act 1966,

which made it unlawful to discriminate against someone ‘by reason only of his [sic] race

or country of origin or the colour of his skin’; and the Aboriginal Lands Trust Act 1966,

which recognised a form of collective Aboriginal land ‘rights’. The move to establish an

Aboriginal Lands Trust was radical and laid foundations for the PLRA 15 years later.

2.2.1 Aboriginal Lands Trust Act 1966

When the Aboriginal Lands Trust Act 1966 passed in December 1966, SA’s Labor

government became the first in Australia to recognise an Aboriginal title to land (Peterson

& Langton 1983, pp. 115–121). In what Attwood (2003, p. 269) would later describe as

‘path-breaking legislation’, the Act established the Aboriginal Lands Trust (ALT)18 with

an all-Aboriginal board to take over the title of existing Aboriginal reserves for the benefit

of SA’s Aboriginal people. The Act also empowered the SA governor to transfer Crown

land reserved for Aboriginal people to the ALT, which was to act on behalf of the TOs of

land covered by the legislation.

The Act stipulated that if an Aboriginal council was already established for an area of

Land, then the consent of that council was needed before a transfer of that land to the

17 When Labor, under Frank Walsh, took office in SA in 1965, it ended a historic 27 years of Thomas

Playford’s Liberal Country League rule. 18 The SA ALT is still a vehicle for Indigenous land control and socio-economic development in SA. In

2009, the SA Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation, Portolesi, announced a review of the

Aboriginal Lands Trust Act 1966, which resulted in the passage of a new Aboriginal Lands Trust Act

2013. Information on this Act can be found at:

<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/sa/consol_act/alta2013237/>.

37

ALT could occur (see ALT Act Part IV:16 (1); Way 1999). The North West Aboriginal

Reserve was specifically identified as a case where the transfer of Land to the ALT would

not occur until a locally constituted Aboriginal council had been formed to consent to, or

alternatively reject, such a proposal.

From a State Government perspective, for the title to be transferred ‘back’, there needed

to be an entity or governance body to which land control could be ceded.19

2.2.2 Incorporating Aboriginal ‘collective’ identity

The passing of the ALT Act (1966) marked a turning point in the South Australian

Government’s approaches towards its Aboriginal populations.20 It was an attempt to

accommodate Aboriginal sociality and connection to country in positive ways, albeit

within a European-based system of governance and laws. For the first time in Australia’s

history (Peterson 1981), it legislatively acknowledged certain qualified ‘collective’ rights

for Aboriginal people as a ‘group’ of people deemed legally competent, active

‘stakeholders’ in their own futures (Kymlicka 1995a).21 Rowse (2012, p. 62) argues that

for the first time:

an Australian legislature grappled with the problem of how to give legal form to a rights bearing

Aboriginal collective—that is, to recognise Aborigines as a ‘people’ and to afford them

institutions of collective deliberation and action.

The ALT was formed as a body corporate managed by a board of Aboriginal

representatives appointed by SA’s governor on the recommendation of the government

to manage the Aboriginal Lands transferred to it. Broader policy-making and

discretionary administrative powers for the welfare of Aboriginal people were retained

by the SA minister. The 1966 Act introduced the concepts of inalienability of collective

tenure into legislation. Dunstan (1981, p. 109) sought a legal mechanism that was:

capable of dealing with the different ways in which Aboriginal groups now operated in relation

to Land without repeating others’ mistakes in applying English common law of land

19 Here the Act states: ‘Provisions with respect to Aboriginal lands, 1966. Aboriginal Lands Trust Act, 1966

No. 87 493 PART IV.: 16. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the Aboriginal Affairs Act, 1962, or any other

act contained, the Governor may by proclamation transfer any Crown lands or any lands for the time being

reserved for Aborigines to the Trust:…Provided further that no such proclamation shall be made in respect

of the North-West Reserve (referred to in subsection (6) of this section) until such a Reserve Council for

that Reserve has been constituted and such Council has consented to the making of such a proclamation’. 20 In terms of Sanders’ (2009) typology of ideological tendencies in Aboriginal Affairs, the new Act marked

a shift away from ‘guardianship’ and towards a more positive understanding of difference. 21 Political theorist Kymlicka (1995) advances a notion of Aboriginal collective rights to self-determination

within a liberal democratic rights framework consistent with the norms of valuing individual rights. He

differs from Taylor (1992) and Tully (1995) in the extent to which his vision of collective group rights is

compatible with concepts of liberal democracy. Hence, I argue Kymlicka’s take on Indigenous collective

rights to be most relevant to the policy framing of this era in SA.

38

ownership…to a people whose relationship to Land could not encompass or be encompassed by

English ownership practice.

The ALT Act proved to be a significant policy and legislative template for the PLRA to

follow. With the retirement of Walsh, Dunstan became the SA Premier in June 1967—a

position he held for only 10 months before the 1968 state elections resulted in a hung

parliament (Parkin 1981). The appointment of Stott as Speaker delivered government to

the Liberal Country League (LCL) under Steele Hall (Blewett & Jaensch 1971). In 1970,

Stott withdrew his support for the LCL and Labor won the ensuing election. In June 1970,

Dunstan resumed office as the Premier—a position he would retain until his resignation

in February 1979. It is during what Parkin (1986, p. 1) characterised as the ‘Dunstan

decade’ that Anangu claims for land rights would achieve political fruition.

The Pitjantjatjara campaign gained increasing traction throughout this decade, not only

among Anangu communities across the Lands, but also in non-Aboriginal and non-

government sectors, church organisations, and political and media circles, especially as

the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 emerged across the border.

The campaign’s origins lay in an interesting mix of political opportunities: the facilitative

interest of a reformist Dunstan government; the post 1967 Referendum context

sympathetic to new ideas about self-determination and self-management; the NT

legislative initiative; and the ‘benevolent’ acquiescence of a rapidly withdrawing but still

supportive Ernabella Mission. It was a historic and extraordinary moment of Aboriginal

political action.

2.3 Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Campaign: ‘Growing up the Country’22

Anangu control of their communities effectively began when Ernabella Mission handed

control to the Pukatja (Ernabella) and Aparawatatja (Fregon) Community Councils in

January 1974. These two Anangu councils had been established in 1973 under the SA

Community Welfare Act 1972 (PLR SC: 68 sub 288). As identified in Chapter 1, by the

end of 1974, Anangu Community Councils were incorporated in areas previously

controlled by the government at Amata, Indulkana and Pipalytjara. In 1976, more Anangu

councils were incorporated at Mimili and Kenmore Park (Yungarinyi), although the SA

Government kept overall administrative authority for the North West Aboriginal Reserve

until the late 1970s.

22 Toyne & Vachon (1984) use this time as the title of their book chronicling the Pitjantjatjara land rights

struggle.

39

When the Presbyterian Church started handing back control to Anangu communities, it

shifted from being the provider of missionary care to a strategic ally in the fight for

Pitjantjatjara land rights. Fuelled by what Toyne and Vachon (1984, p. 41) term ‘Christian

humanism’, the Church actively supported Anangu claims for control of their Lands.

Edwards (1986, p. 485) suggests that Mission overseers were convinced that:

the long history of dispossession of land [that] has taken place in Australia should be reversed

and traditional Land Rights recognised.

Complex and deep relationships had developed through mission–community interactions

in the preceding three to four decades, some of which were intergenerational. As a result,

Anangu looked to the Church to advocate for their self- determination and to support their

land rights campaign (Pybus 2012, p. 260). The mission’s prominent role of authority and

control was still etched into the memories of many Anangu leaders. The role of the

Mission had been, and would continue to be, an important resource for Anangu.

2.3.1 Ernabella Mission

The Presbyterian Church established Ernabella Mission in 193723 with a grant of £1000

from the South Australian Government,24 primarily to shield Anangu from unregulated

incursions into their Lands (Hilliard 1968, p. 84). In this period, surgeon Charles Duguid

visited Ernabella and was disturbed at the level of abuse of Anangu women by itinerant

‘white’ men pursuing dingo scalps or pastoral work, as well as the exploitation of Anangu

labour and potential for an epidemic of communicable diseases. As a result, Duguid

lobbied the South Australian Government and Presbyterian Church for a medical mission

on the North West Aboriginal Reserve.25

Government support for the Ernabella Mission reflected anxiety in sections of the SA

community in the 1930s and 1940s regarding the moral responsibility of Western society

to preserve and protect Aboriginal people (Hilliard 1968; Shepherd 2004; Edwards 1983,

23 At the time, growing public awareness and policy interest in, and concern for, Anangu was being fuelled

by popular speculation that here lived, in the quaint, patronising words of the times, one of the few

remaining ‘tribal groups, of truly primitive, untouched Aborigines’ (Hilliard 1976, p. 84). For example,

anthropologist Cleland led a widely reported University of Adelaide scientific party to investigate Anangu

society in 1933 and reportedly found Anangu to be politically sophisticated and: ‘a very delightful set of

people with evidently a high moral code of their own’ (Cleland 1934, p. 840). 24 The South Australian Government had originally proclaimed an area of 56,271 sq. km adjoining the NT

as the ‘North West Aboriginal Reserve’ in 1921. However, in the ensuing years, various government

expansion schemes meant that pastoral leases and dog scalp hunters made further inroads inside the borders

of the Reserve. By the mid 1930s, much of the area around Ernabella was formally leased by the

government to pastoralists, and the Ernabella rock waterhole had become the centre for the Ernabella

Station, which operated by running sheep for wool and meat, as well as farming wheat. 25 For more historical background to the establishment of the Ernabella Mission, see for example: Hilliard

(1968), Shepherd (2004), Eicklekamp (1999) and/or the comprehensive detail in the Ara Irititja Project

<www.irititja.com/sharing_knowledge/index.html>.

40

1986). Guardianship and government protectionism were dominant policy paradigms in

Aboriginal Affairs at this time. As Sanders (2009, p. 8) suggests:

guardianship enters public policy when for one reason or another governments believe that

particular people within their jurisdictions are not competent judges of their own best interests.

A mid 1959 report by the Aborigines Protection Board states that the Ernabella Mission

gained the South Australian Government’s support to ‘act as an efficient buffer between

the near-primitive natives and white civilization’ (1960, p. 11). In the words of SA’s Chief

Protector of Aborigines, McLean (cited in Hilliard 1968, p. 86):

The aim [of the Mission] is to buffer the contact between the white and native races in such a

way that the clash will not only be gradual but will be in the first instance with the people who

have the welfare of the natives at heart.

This ethos of guardianship shaped Anangu–state relations from comparatively late ‘first

contact’ through to the period of state paternalism26 under mission administration, until

the early 1970s. Such policies envisioned Anangu living on their traditional Lands in

protected, safe and relatively ‘purposeful’ ways (Select Committee on Pitjantjatjara Land

Rights (SCPLR) 2004, p. 29), segregated out and contained within27 their Lands under

forms of governance that differentiated them significantly from other South Australians.28

Under the Mission, education initiatives, medical support, and employment and training

initiatives were introduced, and sheep and horticultural enterprises were established.29

The Mission became a hub for food and support for Anangu, not just in the surrounding

26 See Rowse (2005) for a fuller discussion of the contested debates inherent in suggesting a sequential

time-bound policy shift between the early colonial period of ‘protectionsism’ and ‘guardianship’ and later

mid-twentieth-century policy period known as the ‘assimilation’ era. Rowse’s (2005) edited volume

provides space for competing voices that debate whether a more liberal view of Aboriginal people as ‘equal

citizens’ underpinned the shift towards integration in the ‘assimilation’ period of Indigenous–state relations,

or whether this period was merely the logical continuation of an ongoing colonial project aimed at the

elimination of Aboriginality from Australian society. 27 Exemption certificates were required for people to leave the Lands, and while policies favouring removal

of mixed-race children from their families and communities were not widely enacted in the North West

region, Lowitja O’Donoghue, a Yankunyatjatjara woman, tells of the harrowing effect of removal and

upbringing in a Colebrook home in Adelaide during this era in Grattan (2000); see also Lowitja’s story in

Goold and Liddle (2005). 28 Tindale (1941, p. 74) advocated the segregation of Anangu people, to ‘give them a chance of survival’

and suggested that they could ‘live on their own foods’ as ‘permanent game wardens’, which would then

‘cost the State nothing more than the small amount needed to provide some medical aid and police patrols’. 29 While Christian ministry was part of the Mission, historical records suggest it was a ‘free’ choice option.

In the context of Christian missions of the time, Ernabella Mission has been held to be progressive, as it

focused on working with Anangu leaders, maintaining and spreading the Pitjantjatjara language, and

demonstrating respect for Anangu cultural mores. The Mission provided communal meals and free medical

care, as well as shelter and support in lieu of wages for the Mission enterprises. This regime continued until

1966, when the conversion to a ‘cash economy’ took place in the lead-up to the 1967 Referendum and

associated campaigns for equal wages and greater autonomy for Aboriginal peoples in Australia.

41

area, but also for Anangu throughout the region, whose socio-economic activities it

influenced.

Family income and access to foodstuffs and resources were largely managed for Anangu

by the Mission administration. While the Pitjantjatjara (and to a lesser extent)

Yankunytjatjara languages were preserved and encouraged and Anangu cultural mores

were respected, decision-making was generally centralised to the Mission hierarchy.

Anangu witnesses to the 2002/44 SA Parliamentary Select Committee on Pitjantjatjara

Land Rights (SCPLR) generally recalled the Mission years nostalgically—as a time when

there were work opportunities and when substance abuse was comparatively unknown.

According to Edwards, the Mission ‘functioned for Anangu as a place of purpose and

activity’ (SCPLR 2004, p. 29). Strehlow (cited in Hilliard 1968, p. 11) also paints a

romanticised view of benevolent paternalism, while making a somewhat portentous

observation:

The Ernabella Mission authorities have always realised that permanent segregation of the

Pitjantjatjara folk from the world of white civilisation was impossible, and have done their best

to deal with the educational problems of fitting the people under their care for eventual

integration into the total Australian community. No social experiments are possible without

mistakes, some of which may well have serious consequences, unintended by those who made

them.

State ‘guardianship’ of Anangu through Ernabella Mission30 continued largely

uncontested until campaigns in the mid 1960s for greater Aboriginal self-determination

galvanised Anangu into political action. Within two years of the disestablishment of the

Ernabella Mission in 1974, the concerted APY campaign for land rights intensified as an

increasingly politically aware Central Australian Aboriginal ‘public’ closely observed

how Whitlam’s Aboriginal Land Rights Commission31 was opening the space for further

land claims.

Anangu kinship ties are not confined by, or aligned to, State or Territory borders. To a

people whose cultural, political and social ties spread throughout the tri-state region, the

development of a specific campaign for land rights over the North West Aboriginal

Reserve was integrally tied to, and informed by, the momentum for land rights taking

place in the NT.

30 Rowse (2012, p. 65) suggests that the North West Aboriginal Reserve was effectively outside the state

government’s control at this time; however, as the Mission received funds from the state, I consider it still

constitutes part of the apparatus of state guardianship. 31 Whitlam’s establishment in 1973 of the (Woodward) Aboriginal Land Rights Commission provided the

Commonwealth with the policy mechanism to metaphorically and materially ‘shift ground’ on the issue of

Aboriginal land rights.

42

2.3.2 Anangu leadership

Anangu inter-community dialogue traversed the NT border area and became increasingly

focused on self-determination. Coombs32 (1977, 1994) argued that the emergence of an

increasingly politically active and publicly vocal ‘traditionally’ oriented Aboriginal

leadership in the central desert region was an essential pillar of the cross-border dialogue

fostering both NT and SA Aboriginal aspirations for land rights. Coombs (1994) named

Anangu leaders ‘Ivan Baker, Donald Fraser, Yami Lester and Albert Lennon’33 as being

central to the land rights movement of the previous two decades (Coombs 1994, p. 30).

Until this time, Anangu had been perceived as ‘a dependent and administered people

whose lives were largely controlled’ (Summers 2004, p. 16). However, as Toyne and

Vachon’s (1984, p. 41) account of the Pitjantjatjara land rights campaign vividly portrays,

by the 1970s, Anangu were organised and organising—ready to seize the opportunity to

transform their relations with the state:

Nowhere else in Australia had an Aboriginal group organized itself over such a vast area and

involved so many communities, linked by a common culture and language, to fight for the land

and political power.

Within a decade, Anangu came to be viewed as ‘independent political actors, with the

capacity to operate in the wider political structures in Australia’ (Toyne & Vachon 1984,

p. 41), and:

the relationship between Government and Pitjantjatjara changed from that of guardian and

welfare recipient, to Government and pressure group (Hope 1983, p. 346).

2.4 Pitjantjatjara Council forms

At the invitation of the Amata Community Council, representatives from other

Pitjantjatjara communities met at Amata for two days in July 1976 to ‘discuss affairs of

mutual interest’ (PC Minutes 13–14 July 1976). This gathering of Anangu from both SA

and the NT was regarded as a historic occasion by those who were interested in pursuing

‘ground-up’ self-determination. Attendees were listed in the minutes by place of

residence, but ‘where appropriate the person’s traditional site affiliation [was] given in

brackets’ (PC Minutes 13–14 July 1976). Representatives of the communities of

Ernabella, Fregon, Indulkana, Pipalyatjara, Amata, Wingellina (Irantju), Blackstone

32 In discussing strategic campaigns for greater Aboriginal autonomy, Coombs (1994) also credits the

homelands movement, which encouraged people to return to their traditional lands during the 1970s, as a

significant spur to the aspirations of Aboriginal Australians for legislative recognition of land rights. 33 As upcoming chapters of this thesis reveal, many of these same Anangu leaders and their younger political

‘apprentices’ were to become political activists again, but in different circ*mstances and different policy

settings, in the early to mid-2000s.

43

(Papulankutja) and Docker River were recorded as attending. The meeting’s first action

was to ‘name the body of people meeting: The Pitjantjatjara Council’ and to elect

inaugural office bearers (PC Minutes 13–14 July 1976).

The issues driving the formation of this pan-Anangu PC included both the quest for land

rights and the goal of self-management. According to the minutes of the inaugural

meeting, another key aspiration was to improve the health and well-being of all Anangu.

Land rights were seen as a means of achieving improved well-being for Anangu rather

than as an end in itself. With continued government (and other) support, Anangu wanted

to work towards alleviating problems in their communities. The issues listed by Anangu

for discussion at this ‘inaugural meeting’ included:

community consultation processes

representation and language issues regarding meetings in Adelaide or elsewhere

land rights

role of government departments

human services

ALT

health

radio and communications

permits for entry into country/protocols

roads and infrastructure

self-help/community sustainability

Pitjantjatjara community control over decision-making and services

community councils

governance and management

young people and children

decentralisation and homelands (PC Minutes 1976).

The meeting determined that all matters discussed would be ‘taken back to each

Community for further discussion before being discussed again at a further Council

meeting’ (PC Minutes 13–14 July 1976). It also agreed ‘that each Community should

contribute Ten Dollars towards the expenses of the Council’ which was to compirse the

44

communities represented at the meeting. The assembled 56 Anangu representatives34

decided meetings should be held in the North West region, asserting that there were

problems:

associated with attending meetings in Adelaide and other centres because of language

difficulties and problem of one or two people representing the Pitjantjatjara people. More

meetings should be held in the area where people feel free to speak (PC Minutes 13–14 July

1976).

2.3.3 ‘We want the Land here’35

After lunch on 13 July, Anangu representatives asked the non-Aboriginal people present

to leave so that Anangu could discuss land rights on their own. This discussion was

minuted as follows:

Land Rights. The Pitjantjatjara people claim all of the land from Indulkana to Docker River.

Joseph Mamirnga from Docker River had said that they wanted a title to Mintankura (Blood

Range) so that it could not be taken from them and tourists could not enter it. There was

discussion on the boundaries of Pitjantjatjara land. The following places was (sic) suggested as

marking the boundary: Wingellina, Docker River, Kulgera, Indulkana,Tjiwa Piti, Kalaya Piti,

Kata ala. It was said we must decide on the Northern and Eastern boundary—we can sort out

the Western boundary with the Warburton people. Some suggestion that Areyonga can be

included. Others said this was Aranta land. Donald Fraser said that Ayers Rock should be

included but not Curtain Springs as this was lease. There was a strong suggestion that the whole

area to be regarded as a unit and not divided. Albert Lennon said that he needed more land for

Fregon cattle and wanted to build the Western boundary fence from Erlywanyuwanyu through

kukariwata waranya. This was agreed to by the meeting (PC Minutes 13–14 July 1976).

It was also agreed that land rights should be taken up directly with Premier Dunstan. The

minutes state that ‘the problem of control of the North West Aboriginal Reserve by the

Department for Community Welfare was raised and the opinion expressed that the reserve

should be under the control of Pitjantjatjara people’, and that ‘[a] Pitjantjatjara Lands

Trust should be established’ (PC Minutes 13–14 July 1976).

Anangu wanted the decolonisation of their region and a supported transition to self-

determination. The minutes reveal a strong desire for formal recognition of Anangu land

rights, and their desire to operate their community councils with strength and purpose, to

understand the protocols of community governance, to have ‘Pitjantjatjara people

working alongside’ medical and community adviser staff, and to establish training and

support so that Anangu would eventually be able to take over these positions. In

discussing the issues facing young people and children, the meeting identified self-

determination as a priority in all phases of planning and responding to need:

controls should be exercised by local people rather than white authorities (PC Minutes 1976).

34 Five non-Anangu community advisers were also in attendance at the inaugural PC meeting. They were

witnesses and guests only and on request helped with for example minute-taking and organisational tasks. 35 Baker cited in Toyne and Vachon (1984, p. 53).

45

2.3.4 Underlying tensions within an emerging unity

Some suggest that an outstanding feature of the Pitjantjatjara land rights campaign was

its astute local leadership (Toyne & Vachon 1984; Coombs 1994), while others argue that

it was the passionate ‘determination and unity of Anangu’ (Summers 2004, p. 18). Pybus

(2012, p. 258) argues that the ‘fluid and contingent nature’ of Western Desert language

groups like the Pitjantjatjara and Yankunytjatjara ‘allowed them to invoke traditional

alliances across the North-West of South Australia’, from Blackstone in WA to Docker

River in the NT, in order to found the PC to carry forward the Pitjantjatjara land rights

campaign.

This ‘oneness with a focus on obtaining title to Land’ reveals a coalescence of once-

dispersed kinship, family and even language groups—Pitjantjatjara, Ngaanyatjarra and

Yankunytjatjara—into a ‘single political unit to express common interest’ (Vachon 1982,

p. 482). Anangu wanted to strategically advance a collective position—as ‘one’ in relation

to Land—for which inalienable communal rights and eternal communal obligations held

a deeper cultural significance than Western notions of ‘ownership’ could convey. Yet this

collective strategy to pursue land rights co-existed with the longstanding competitive

dynamics of a localised and dispersed heterogeneity of family/kinship interests in the

region (Yengoyan 1970; Vachon 1982; Edwards 1983; 1986; Sutton, 1998; Holcombe,

2004). For example, while interconnected and with extended familial ties right across the

central desert region, Pitjantjatjara were more closely connected to the area around Uluru

in the NT, and the related language group of Yankunytjatjara families more prevalent

around the South Eastern Musgrave ranges, known as SA’s North West Aboriginal

Reserve. However, Pitjantjatjara and Yankunytjatjara leaders put aside internal

differences to work for their shared common goal of collective land rights.

Edwards (1983, pp. 296–297) suggests that an increase in mining exploration in the region

in the 1970s also triggered Anangu to pull together to forge the PC as a unitary

organisational structure:

in which traditional authority [would be] respected and through which they [could] interact

authoritatively with modern political and bureaucratic bodies.

However, whatever its impetus, this unifying move also consolidated the prominence of

Pitjantjatjara over Yankunytjatjara in the tri-state region:

a modern identity was being forged in response to the contemporary land rights movement. With

the new Council named as the Pitjantjatjara Council and with Pitjantjatjara having become

‘lingua franca’, it appears that the Pitjantjatjara had become the dominant group in the area

(Pybus 2012, p. 258).

46

National and local media attention directed towards the Pitjantjatjara land rights

campaign also helped to galvanise public support for Anangu (Toyne & Vachon 1984;

Summers 1980, 1981). Within two years of the first meeting of the PC, Dunstan’s Bill

was to be introduced.

Figure 2.1: Premier Don Dunstan (centre) and the Minister of Community Welfare, Mr

Payne (far left) talking to Anangu leaders at a campfire conference to discuss land rights

(The Advertiser, 7 May 1977, p. 3). Reproduced courtesy of the SA State Library.

2.4 Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Working Party

Dunstan established the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Working Party (PLRWP) in March

1977 in response to persistent campaigning by the PC. It provided the intellectual and

policy framework for subsequent bipartisan acceptance of legislation that acknowledged:

a) the rights of Anangu as a cultural minority within SA to enact their culture on their

own terms; b) that recognition of prior ownership (custodianship) and right to control of

Anangu Lands was central to that culture; and c) that such land was not ‘waste’ but land

occupied by peoples meaningfully engaged in their culture and livelihoods prior to

European settlement.

47

Dunstan appointed Christopher (Chris) co*cks SM to chair the six-member PLRWP36 with

terms of reference:

to examine the feasibility of establishing by legislation a separate Pitjantjatjara lands Trust to

cover the North West Reserve, Everard Park, Indulkana, Ernablella, Fregon, provided that the

inalienability of the land is firmly established and the arrangements do not contravene the wishes

of any of the Pitjantjatjara communities. In doing so, to have regard to the question of mineral

rights; to consider the inclusion of Yalata in such an arrangement, should the Yalata community

indicate its interest in such a proposal; [and] to propose such consequent amendments to the

Aboriginal Lands Trust Legislation or the introduction of new Legislation as may be appropriate

(PLRWP 1978, p. 2).

Kunmanara37 Minutjukur, an Anangu elder and TO, was appointed ‘official’ observer for

the PC. This formal inclusion of an elder was a radical step at the time.

The Report of the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Working Party, given to Dunstan in June

1978, reveals much sensitivity in the committee’s engagement with, and deliberations

about, Anangu cultural perspectives and context. This embracing of what the Working

Party understood to be a Pitjantjatjara ‘world view’ is reflected in its subsequent

recommendations for specific legislation to advance Anangu rights. The discussions and

debates used by the PLRWP to illustrate and justify its recommendations provide insights

into the policy rationale that underpins the framing and intent of the PLR Act 1981, as

originally proposed by Dunstan.

The Working Party argued that for Western European culture, land ‘productivity’ had

been an article of faith for several thousand years, reflecting a settler culture with its tenets

of ‘sovereignty’, ‘commercial transactions’, ‘possession’ and wish to ‘accumulate

consumerables’, ultimately legitimised by the ‘quintessential powers of the Crown’

(PLRWP 1978, pp. 22–23). The Working Party reported that one of the major issues faced

in negotiating the land rights framework it proposed was the lack of visibility of

Aboriginal culture and the widespread misunderstanding of the centrality of land to

Pitjantjatjara peoples.

36 The members of the PLRWP were HJ Copley, Regional Director, Northern Country Region, Department

for Community Welfare; D Hope, Senior Lecturer, Aboriginal Task Force, SA Institute of Technology; R

Howie, Solicitor, Central Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service; BC Headland, Aboriginal Advancement

Committee Adelaide (Secretary); and E Johnston, Law Department, Adelaide (Consultant). HC Coombs,

then with the Centre for Resources and Environmental Studies, and N Peterson of the Anthropology

Department at the ANU, were invited to a meeting of Anangu and the PLRWP in October 1977 to assist

their deliberations, as was J Long, the then Deputy Secretary of the Commonwealth Department for

Aboriginal Affairs and Chairman of the Commonwealth Working Party on Uniform Land Rights and

Uniform Services for the Central Australia Reserves. Former counsel assisting the Woodward Aboriginal

Land Rights Commission, G Brennan QC, was also consulted on what form the Pitjantjatjara lands rights

might take. 37 ‘Kunmanara’ is a term Anangu use in place of a deceased person’s name, which is not to be spoken.

See the Ara Irititja Project glossary for more common Pitjantjatjara words,

<http://www.irititja.com/sharing_knowledge/glossary.html>.

48

It argued that Western European notions of urban progress and ‘productive’ use of land

resources had come at a high price for many, citing the practice of child labour, rural

exploitation and poverty as examples that are often overlooked in the assumptions of the

superiority of Western European culture (PLRWP 1978, pp.22-23).

Conversely, the Working Party eulogised what it termed ‘the genius of Pitjantjatjara

epistemology’ and argued that if adequate access to shelter, food and health were not

disrupted, then many Anangu were better served by their culture than in the mainstream

in terms of ‘aesthetic satisfaction and individual equanimity’ (PLRWP 1978, pp. 33–34).

The Report outlined aspects of Pitjantjatjara epistemological understandings of human

relationships to country38 and contrasted these to Western European traditions regarding

knowledge, Christian beliefs, enlightenment and romantic vision:

The Pitjantjatjara have developed an intellectual position whereby knowledge of the land is a

continuous verification of belief about it….

The genius of the Pitjantjatjara epistemology is that although there is a profound distinction

between sacred and secular ritual and content, there is no special doctrine about the nature of

the belief that has to be suddenly invoked in order to be able to cope with spiritual or ritual

matters. As there is no need for a man (sic) to have to decide whether he will have faith in an

unseeable and unverifiable mystery there is no agony of disbelief. The entire landscape contains

the totality of simulacra which verify not merely some particulars then stop, but the whole

cultural inheritance from the merest anecdote to the most profound ritual….

The European may be anxious to commence mining, but the Pitjantjatjara may be in a state of

speechless panic not only is he unable to reveal its true nature to an uninitiated man, but even if

he could what would he say? …It is this context that we see an indisputable need for the

Pitjantjatjara not only to own their own land, but to be facilitated to be in full control of access

to it (1978, pp.33-34).

From this excerpt, it might be suggested that Kunmanara Minutjukur sensitised the (all

male) members of the Working Party to Anangu cultural perspectives. This was likely

reinforced by the Working Party having extended interactions with members of the PC.39

It also reveals the depth of the Pitjantjatjara case being argued to frame legislation that

would reflect an appropriate respect for the continuing culture of Pitjantjatjara.

The Working Party advocated policy change to enable Pitjantjatjara peoples to regain

control, not only over their traditional lands, but also their lives. It recommended not only

the transfer of the land title to the North West AAboriginal Reserve to the Pitjantjatjara

peoples, but also that they should have ‘full powers of management of their Lands’

38 For example, the Working Party referred to Indigenous sustainable farming techniques such as ‘firestick

farming’ as a contrasting adaptation to land use, ‘where land was systematically worked for economic return

by exploiting the seasonal potential of given areas of land by the controlled use of fire’ (PLRWP 1978, p.

21). 39 Minutjukur ensured regular exchanges between members of the Pitjantjatjara Council and the Working

Party.

49

(PLRWP 1978, p. 7). It argued for recognition of Anangu ‘ownership’ of their lands and

rights to decide who could have access to their country and what could take place on it:

As a Working Party we wish to stress the need to accept that the Pitjantjatjara have a right to

their land in any and every sense that we understand, and in many senses that we do not begin

to understand (PLRWP 1978, p. 36).

That TOs would want the restoration of their rights over management and control of

Anangu country is framed in the Working Party’s deliberations as uncontroversial;

indeed, it is referred to as an ‘indisputable need’ (PLRWP 1978, pp. 34–35). The

assumption that this was a widely accepted and uncontested policy norm remained a

constant feature of discussions at the time of the Bill’s introduction into Parliament in

1978, and in its later passage to enactment in 1981.

2.5 Party Politics and Converging Opinions

When Dunstan introduced the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Bill into the Parliament of SA in

November 1978, he referred to it as a ‘historic measure’ (Dunstan 1978, p. 2235). Citing

the PC’s representations to the government seeking ‘freehold title’ to their Lands,

Dunstan stated that ‘they specifically requested the formation of a Pitjantjatjara land

holding entity’ (Dunstan 1978, p.2235). He then explained how the Bill would ‘establish

such a land holding entity, to be designated Anangu Pitjantjatjaraku—meaning simply

the ‘Pitjantjatjara Peoples’’. Dunstan (ibid) framed the Bill as his government’s response

to a resolute campaign by the Pitjantjatjara people for recognition of their land rights:

The Bill gives full support to the clear aspirations of the Pitjantjatjara, not only to own but to

control their own lands (author emphasis).

Dunstan (1978, p. 2235) went on to describe the Bill’s provisions in terms of

reasonableness and ‘restitution’:

I am sure that all reasonable South Australians would agree that after land alienation on the

massive scale seen since first settlement, the restitution of the comparatively little land

remaining to its original owners would seem the only principled course to adopt.40

Recalling the Commonwealth’s Aboriginal Land Rights Commission41 and the

Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, Dunstan described the Bill as ‘an

act of simple justice’ (Dunstan 1978, p. 2236). He explained the PLRWP’s detailed

recommendations for how the South Australian parliament could enact legislation to

40 Moreover, the Bill was seen as a means of ‘rationalising the diverse forms of tenure attaching themselves

to the lands scheduled in this Bill and at the same time providing a form of tenure consistent with that now

being proposed in the Northern Territory as a result of Commonwealth initiatives’ (Hansard, 22 November

1978, p. 2235). 41 Aboriginal Land Rights Commission (1973) First Report and (1974) Second Report (Justice Woodward,

Commissioner), commonly referred to as the ‘Woodward Royal Commission’.

50

transfer the land title of the North West Aboriginal Reserve back to the Pitjantjatjara

people (PLRWP 1978, p. 7).

Dunstan’s speech provides insights into the South Australian Government’s policy

thinking at the time. It reveals a government that was keen to develop a new cross-cultural

policy paradigm, and that aimed to reconcile quite different conceptualisations of land

ownership through legislation. According to Dunstan (1978, pp. 2235–2236), the Bill

aimed to encompass, through a single Act, ‘the diverse and sometimes novel

considerations embodied in the reality of Pitjantjatjara ownership’.

First, Dunstan (1978, p. 2236) argued that the government accepted the ‘traditional view

of ownership…that the whole of Pitjantjatjara land belongs to all Pitjantjatjaras’:

Given the acceptance of this notion by the Government, it would not have been sufficient simply

to issue title under the real property Act as this would have left unresolved questions as to who

was a Pitjantjatjara, and what, if any, special rights and responsibilities needed to be spelt out

in order to render ownership as close as possible to the Pitjantjatjara notion and at the same time

take into account the context of a modern, western State.

Second, he argued that the Bill provided for a new and specific form of land ownership,

as well as new policy provisions targeted to a specific cultural and language group as an

alternative to that provided by the ALT Act 1966. Dunstan (ibid) outlined how, in keeping

with the recommendations of the Commonwealth’s Aboriginal Land Rights Commission

Second Report (1974), the Bill would help ‘preserve’ and ‘strengthen’ Anangu

connections to country and thus support:

a scattered but culturally hom*ogenous group; their remoteness and separation from urban

interests, aspirations and cultures all [adding] credence to the need of creating a new land

holding entity.

Third, Dunstan (1978, p. 2236) asserted that this act of ‘restitution’ was a ‘principled’

way for governments to recognise the ‘fundamental and inalienable role’ of Pitjantjatjara

peoples in SA, and to ‘provide a better basis for the future’. With an eye to history,

Dunstan (ibid) claimed that his government was ‘no smoother of dying pillows’, and that:

[this legislation] will give South Australia an honourable place in international eyes with regard

to the relation of government to the treatment and status of ethnic minorities.

Dunstan (ibid) also suggested that the Bill contradicted a ‘widely held notion that the

North West Lands were “wasted”’. The PLRWP had argued that the notion of ‘waste’

was a ‘Western European’ concept embedded in a culture ‘with an urban, extractive and

agricultural tradition’ (PLRWP 1978, p. 21). Dunstan argued that anyone who assumed

that Aboriginal people had failed to make good use of their traditional lands should

carefully consider the Pitjantjatjara people’s deep relationship with the land.

51

Sentiment in favour of the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Bill introduced in 1978 was not

confined to Labor; it was also shared by SA’s opposition. Following Dunstan’s first

reading, debate on the Bill was adjourned until early 1979, when Shadow Minister Harold

Allison (1979, p. 2507) outlined the Liberal party’s response:

I support the Bill. The principle of land rights for Aborigines and in particular this legislation,

the Anangu Pitjantjatjaraku is a principle which the Liberal Party has supported and one which

the Federal Liberal Party has been exemplary in implementing legislation for example in the

Northern Territory…. We recognise that tribal Aborigines attach a tremendous importance to

land.

Allison (1979, p. 2508) argued that the Bill was a ‘historic recognition of damage done

over 200 years of occupation of Australia’. However, he expressed uncertainty as to

‘whether the granting of land rights’ would arrest this damage (ibid)). Within a week of

the Liberal party’s response, and with the Bill still under active discussion, Premier

Dunstan suddenly resigned in a dramatic televised appearance from hospital.42 Even this

extraordinary turn of events did not derail the Bill’s passage. The following week it was

sent to a Select Committee with Allison’s affirmation of its importance as a ‘public Bill

that affects a particular group’s special rights’ (Allison 1979, p. 2508).

While indicating that there would be debate on the details and amendments proposed

through the Select Committee process, Allison (1979) declared the Liberal party’s support

for the policy intent of the legislation. However, with what might now seem like

perceptive foresight, Allison (1979) identified a cluster of issues not settled by legislation.

First, Allison argued that the Act’s relationship to the Commonwealth legislative and

policy context might become an area of difficulty. Second, he suggested that issues of

‘identification’—that is, who constituted the Pitjantjatjara body politic—might be an area

lacking clarity, which could prove problematic. Third, he took issue with rights conferred

regarding the control of access to the Lands on the basis that it might exclude other

Aboriginal people not recognised as part of APY, and on the basis of mining or other

commercial operations of significance to SA. Fourth, Allison (1979, pp. 2508–2509)

highlighted concerns about implicit assumptions that the legislation could solve health

and social welfare issues:

In health and education I hope to ask whether this Bill will improve the present standards of

health and education among the Pitjantjatjara?… Among health problems that immediately

spring to notice are the under nourishment among children, glue sniffing by young people in

Aboriginal communities and the obvious problem of alcoholism. Whether this legislation will

prevent or retard these diseases is open to question…. Will this legislation effectively bring

42 See recollections by Kelton (2006) for an account of Dunstan’s televised resignation. This was a dramatic

and memorable time and, due to political involvements at this time, I was personally privy to Dunstan’s ill

health and some of the events surrounding his resignation and its announcment.

52

those problems to a halt? If not, is there any improvement in the legislation that could be enacted

in order to assist the tribal leaders and the Pitjantjatjara Council to tackle the problem head

on…?

Hence, amid growing cross-party support for the recognition of land rights, there were

also expressions of concern. Labor’s Len King, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs in the

early 1970s, had also urged caution with what he saw as a key policy dilemma:

how to enable Aboriginal people, if they wished, to retain their heritage and maintain a separate

cultural identity and at the same time provide the educational opportunities necessary to take an

equal place in the wider community (King 1970).43

King’s (1970) particular concern was the potential for unintended social and

intergenerational consequences if land rights alone were relied on to ameliorate living

conditions:

it is inevitable that as the children are educated many…will reject tribal conditions and practices

and particularly tribal conditions. This will undoubtedly produce social

difficulties…Government [will need to]…ease the pain of the tension which must necessarily

develop (King 1970).44

Interestingly, Allison (1979) and King’s (1970) caution that land rights alone should not

be assumed to be a panacea for social issues echoes that of Anangu at the inaugural PC

meeting in July 1976.

2.6 The Act Passes through the SA Parliament under a Tonkin Liberal

Government

The Select Committee on the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Bill (1978) reported to Parliament

in May 1979 and recommended only minor amendments to the draft Bill. However,

before a vote could be taken on the legislation, an election was called by the new Labor

Premier Des Corcoran, which Labor lost.

In September 1979, Premier David Tonkin and his new Liberal government took office.

The PC and Anangu communities maintained their concerted lobbying for land rights. In

February 1980, meetings about the future of the stalled legislation commenced between

the Tonkin Liberal government, the PC and representatives of the incorporated local

Anangu Community Councils of the time.

Mining interests pushed hard with the Tonkin Liberal government to weaken aspects of

the proposed legislation, especially those relating to the royalties to be given to Anangu,

the permit entry provisions and leasing arrangements for the mining of the opal-rich

43 Also cited in Summers (2004, p. 18). 44 Also cited in Hope (1983, p. 282).

53

Mintabe and other mining fields on the Lands. Attention turned to protecting mining by

ensuring that the government could overrule the PLRA where it impeded mining or other

non-Anangu community interests in the Lands. Anangu remained pragmatic in

negotiations, intent on securing the best possible chance for a swift passage of the Act.

Anangu were also strategic in seeking to avoid any fracture in bipartisan support for the

legislation.

On 2 October 1980, the Chairman of PC, Kunmanara Thompson, and Premier Tonkin

signed their historic agreement on the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Bill. The new Bill, which

only slightly lessened Anangu control over the circ*mstances in which mining

exploration could proceed, was introduced to the House of Assembly later that same

month.

Debate during the second reading of the Bill in November 1980 was both constructive

and tense. Labor felt a sense of pique that Dunstan’s Bill was now being hailed as a

Tonkin government success, but at the same time they maintained a bipartisan spirit of

cooperation to ensure the passage of the Bill. However, some differences were beginning

to emerge between Labor and Liberal regarding the extent of self-determining powers

afforded to Anangu by the legislation.

John Bannon, who had assumed parliamentary leadership of Labor after its defeat by

Tonkin’s Liberals at the election, was now the opposition leader. Bannon supported

Tonkin on the importance of the Act, not just to Pitjantjatjara, ‘but also because of the

whole question of relationships with Aboriginals in this State’ (Bannon 1980, p. 2184).

Bannon (1980, p.2184-5) charted Aboriginal–state relations in SA and paralleled aspects

of the intent of the PLRA with the original vision of the ‘Letters Patent’:45

The issue of legally recognising the inalienable right of Aboriginal title to their tribal land was

first raised here by European powers as early as 1835. In that year Lord Glenelg Secretary of

State for the Colonies stated that the land rights of Australia’s Indigenous people should be kept

inviolate. He was referring particularly to South Australia in the context of the South Australia

Act and the Letters Patent.

Bannon underscored Dunstan’s record of establishing progressive legislation, including

ground-breaking measures such as the Aboriginal Lands Trust Act 1966. He pointed to

the continuities in the policy trajectory of the Dunstan government’s legislation during

45 Berg (2010) provides a full account of the Letters Patent in relation to SA Aboriginal land rights issues,

which is also a useful guide to the historical context of Aboriginal–state relations in SA. Attwood (2013)

provides a detailed analysis of conflicting interpretations of the Letters Patent.

54

this period, arguing that this composite policy platform had provided the foundation for

the development of the PLRA.

In highlighting the work of the 1978 PLRWP led by co*cks, Bannon (1980, p. 2186) paid

tribute to then Minister Ron Payne and Dunstan, suggesting that they had, along with

Anangu leaders, been the architects of the legislation:

I believe that it will prove a culmination of Don Dunstan’s initiatives going back as far as 1965.

The Bill would not have been introduced had it not been for the work put in by former Labor

administrations, together with the raising of public opinion and sensitivity which has been

shown in this State.

After further debate between the self-congratulatory and the politically fractious, the Bill

was referred to another SC in late November.46 The Bill was subsequently passed by both

the House of Assembly and the Legislative Council. On 19 March 1981, the Pitjantjatjara

Land Rights Act 1981 became law.

When the Act passed with the support of both the Labor and Liberal parties, major

community celebrations took place on the Lands. Later that year, Tonkin travelled to the

Lands for what the media reported as a ‘historic handing over ceremony’:

The Premier, Mr Tonkin, yesterday formally handed the title to a tenth of South Australia to the

traditional owners of the area the 3 500-strong Pitjantjatjara community. In a simple ceremony

at Ernabella, he presented the certificate of title to the Pitjantjatjara Council,47 representing the

Pitjantjatjara Aboriginal people. It is the first agreement of its kind to be reached in Australia.

Yesterday’s ceremony, which followed the recent proclamation of the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights

Act, means that the Aboriginal people now have freehold title under Australian law to 102 630

square kilometres of the state. This area is equivalent to the combined area of Austria and

Hungary…. [Dr Tonkin] paid tribute to former Premier Mr Dunstan for what he described as

‘the kindling of interest of the people and politicians of [South Australia] in the lot of the

Pitjantjatjara’. Replying to Mr Tonkin, a tribal elder, Mr Yami Lester, said the Pitjantjatjara

people were happy with the agreement eventually worked out…. ‘We will probably make some

mistakes at first, but we want all white Australians to give us a go’ (Adelaide Advertiser 1981,

p. 1).

The foyer to the APY offices and meeting rooms in Umuwa are still decorated with a

photographic display of scenes of celebration on the Lands at the time of the formal

recognition of Anangu land rights.

46 One point of difference was that the redrafted Tonkin Act provided for a 21-year Mintabe mining lease

compared to the 15-year lease proposed by Dunstan and preferred by the PC. The final Act provided for a

21-year lease as preferred by the Liberal government of the day (see Part 3 Div iv 28 (1)). 47 It is interesting to note here that this report suggests the title was handed to the PC rather than AP,

although the photo suggests otherwise.

55

Figure 2.2: Premier David Tonkin with Chairman of the Pitjantjatjara Council, Kunmanara

Thompson, signing the Land Rights Act agreement, 2 October 1980. Messenger Press collection

(copyright). Reproduced courtesy of the SA State Library.

2.7 The 1981 Act

A short summary of the key provisions of the Act in its original form concludes this

chapter.

2.7.1 Anangu as ‘body corporate’

In its original form, the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 established a body corporate

of AP that comprised all TOs, including Yankunytjatjara and Ngaanatjara people, within

what had been previously designated as the North West Aboriginal Reserve:

Traditional in relation to the lands means an Aboriginal person who has, in accordance with

Aboriginal tradition, social, economic and spiritual affiliations with, and responsibilities for, the

lands or any part of them (PLRA 1981, Part 1 Clause iv).

This definition is important because elsewhere in the Act, TOs comprise the body

corporate, which owns and controls the Lands. In Part 1 Clause 6, the Act specified the

functions of the body corporate as being:

56

a) to ascertain the wishes and opinions of traditional owners in relation to the

management, use and control of the lands and to seek, where practicable, to

give effect to those wishes and opinions

b) to protect the interests of traditional owners in relation to the management, use

and control of the lands

c) to negotiate with persons desiring to use, occupy or gain access to any part of

the lands

d) to administer land vested in ‘Anangu Pitjantjatjaraku’.

The 1981 Act empowered the body corporate of AP to grant a lease or licence, for any

period it thinks fit, to a Pitjantjatjara person or an organisation comprising Pitjantjatjaras;

to grant a licence for a period not exceeding 50 years to any agency or instrumentality of

the Crown; and to grant a lease or licence to any other person or body of persons for a

period not exceeding five years. It also gave AP the power to:

appoint and dismiss staff

enter into contracts

receive and disburse monies

acquire by agreement, hold or deal in or dispose of land outside their lands

obtain advice from persons expert in matters with which they might be concerned

establish offices

make a constitution relating to the conduct of meetings of Anangu Pitjantjatjara;

establish procedures to be followed in resolving disputes and any other matter that

may be necessary or expedient in relation to the conduct or administration of the

affairs of Anangu Pitjantjatjara.

2.7.2 Consultation and consent of traditional owners

On consultation with TOs, the 1981 Act specified in Part II Clause 7 that:

Anangu Pitjantjatjaraku shall, before carrying out or authorizing or permitting the carrying out

of any proposal relating to the administration, development or use of any portion of the lands,

have regard to the interests of, and consult with, traditional owners having a particular interest

in that portion of the lands, or otherwise affected by the proposal, and shall not carry out the

proposal, or authorize or permit it to be carried out, unless satisfied that those traditional

owners

(a) understand the nature and purpose of the proposal

(b) have had the opportunity to express their views to Anangu Pitjantjatjaraku and

(c) consent to the proposal.

57

The Act also specified that an ‘annual general meeting’ (AGM) of AP would be held

‘once in every calendar year and not more than fifteen months apart’. It enabled a ‘special

general meeting’ of AP to be called at any time if ‘not less than ten members of Anangu

Pitjantjatjaraku make a request to the Executive Board’ for such a meeting.

2.7.3 Executive

The Act also established an Executive Board of AP (AP Executive) that comprised a

‘Chairman’ and 10 other members elected at the AGM. It specified that the people elected

must be part of the TO group that comprised the ‘body corporate’ and would be part of

the AGM. Part II of the Act specified that a person had to be a Pitjantjatjara person to be

a member of the Executive Board, that the Board had to meet for the transaction of

business at least once every two months, and that:

11. (1) The Executive Board shall carry out the resolutions of Anangu Pitjantjatjaraku

(2) The Executive Board shall act in conformity with the resolutions of Anangu

Pitjantjatjaraku and no act of the Executive Board, done otherwise than in accordance with

a resolution of Anangu Pitjantjatjaraku, is binding on Anangu Pitjantjatjaraku.

The 1981 Act also specified that the Executive Board should keep proper accounts for the

body corporate of AP and be audited and reported on at each AGM. It required the

Executive to generate a Constitution for the conduct of its own affairs, which would be

submitted to the SA Corporate Affairs Commission for approval. Further, the 1981 Act

gave powers to AP to propose amendments at any time to alter the Constitution by

submitting it to the Corporate Affairs Commission for approval.

This nexus between the ‘Approved Constitution’48 that AP was required to create and

submit to the SA Corporate Affairs Commission, and the functions and powers of AP

established by the Act itself, including the election of its Executive Board at an AGM,49

is an important issue that will be returned to in the following chapters of this thesis. What

appeared to be a small detail in 1981 became contentious years later, when the

Constitution developed by AP and approved by the SA Corporate Affairs Commission

became a point of bitter conflict with the Government.

The form of ‘self-determination’ codified in the 1981 Act occurred within a spirit of

cooperation and shared purpose between Anangu and the government, and between the

Labor and Liberal parties that comprised the successive governments of the time. The Act

did not provide constitutional recognition of sovereignty, nor independent rights as in a

48 See Part 2 Div V 14[1–5] of the 1981 Act. 49 See Part 2 Div IV 9[4] of the 1981 Act.

58

treaty. While giving Anangu land rights through a major land grant held in a collective

title through Anangu as a corporate entity—a radical decolonising move in itself—the

PLRA was a legislative construct of a state parliament (within the Commonwealth of

Australia) and subject to its edicts.

Governance arrangements on the Lands also informally included the PC, the pre-existing

peak Anangu regional body; other regional Anangu organisations covering the Lands

(such as the NPY Women’s Council, Nganampa Health Council and PY Media); and

local Anangu community councils incorporated under state non-profit legislation (elected

by communities and predating the PLRA). However, none of these were mentioned in the

legislation, beyond a provision that the PC be enabled to act for AP until its Executive

Board was established (at its first AGM) as the organisational entity advising and acting

on behalf of TOs.50 Questions of representation, relationships and leadership between a

plethora of representative agencies and structures were to loom large in the future of

Anangu polity, as will be discussed in coming chapters.

2.7.4 Permit access

The Act vested the North West Lands in AP as the body corporate and made special

provisions for the area known as Granite Downs.51 All Pitjantjatjaras, including the

Yankunytjatjara and Ngaanatjara people who were TOs, were to have unrestricted access

to the Lands. It was an offence under the Act for any person who was not a Pitjantjatjara

to enter the Lands without the permission of AP. Requests for permission to enter the

Lands had to be made by application in writing to the AP Executive Board, setting out

the purpose, period, time of entry and location of visit.

This provision did not apply if the person entering the Lands was a police officer acting

in the course of their official duties, a Member of Parliament of the state or

Commonwealth Government, a person accompanying a politician in the course of their

candidacy, or a person ‘acting upon written authority of the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs

who enters the lands for the purpose of carrying out functions that have been assigned to

a Minister or instrumentality of the Crown or a Department of Government’ (PLRA 1981,

50 Part 2 Div IV 9[6] of the 1981 Act stated: ‘Until the first annual general meeting of Anangu

Pitjantjatjaraku, the body presently known as the Pitjantjatjara Council shall perform the functions and

duties of the Executive Board’. 51 As part of the bipartisan agreement that saw the passing of the 1981 Act, amendments were made to

Dunstan’s original 1978 proposed legislation to make specific provisions for Granite Downs and Mintabe

areas where the (non-Anangu) presence for mining and pastoral ventures had long been established.

59

Part II Clause 19(7)). The permit provisions were soon challenged in the ‘test’ case of

Gerhardy v Brown, which is discussed in Chapter 3.

2.7.5 Mining and development

Part II, Division III of the Act provides for mining operations on the Lands. It established

that it is illegal for any person to enter the Lands to carry out mining operations or intent

for that purpose without permission of the Anangu TOs and approval of the Minister. It

specified that an application for permission to carry out mining operations could only be

made by a person who had applied for a mining tenement in respect of the Lands and had

been notified by the Minister of Mines and Energy that this was approved. Any such

application had to be made in writing to the AP Executive, and detailed information had

to be provided to the Minister of Mines and Energy in support of the application.

The Act [Part 11 Div 111] then specified that AP could:

grant its permission unconditionally

grant its permission subject to such conditions (which must be consistent with the

provisions of this Act) or

refuse its permission as it thinks fit.

The Act provided that once an applicant had been notified of a decision, AP needed to

inform the Minister within seven days. If the applicant was not informed of a decision in

a timely manner52 or was refused or placed under conditions they found unacceptable, the

applicant could request the matter to be referred to an arbitrator, who would be a judge

with the powers of a Commission of Inquiry under the Royal Commissions Act. In a

strong directive, the Act specified that in arriving at a determination, the Arbitrator must

consider the effect of granting the mining tenement upon:

the preservation and protection of Pitjantjatjara ways of life, culture and tradition; the interests,

proposals, opinions and wishes of the Pitjantjatjara people in relation to the management, use

and control of the lands; the growth and development of Pitjantjatjara social, cultural and

economic structures; freedom of access by Pitjantjatjaras to the lands and their freedom to carry

out on the lands rites, ceremonies and other activities in accordance with Pitjantjatjara traditions;

the suitability of the applicant to carry out the proposed mining operations and his capacity, in

carrying out those operations, to minimize disturbance to the Pitjantjatjara people and the lands;

the preservation of the natural environment and the economic and other significance of the

operations to the State and to Australia (PLRA 1981, Division III Clause 15):

Royalties paid in respect of minerals recovered from the Lands would be paid into a

separate fund maintained by the Minister for Mines and Energy. Of these monies, one-

52 Specified in the act to be ‘one hundred and twenty days’.

60

third was to be paid to AP; one-third to the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs to be applied

to the advancement of Aboriginal South Australians generally, and one-third to be paid

into the general revenue of SA.

Another section of the Act dealt with issues relating to the precious stones mining field

of Mintabie and the establishment of a Mintabie Consultative Committee comprising two

Anangu nominated by AP as body corporate, a member of the Mintabie Progress

Association, a person nominated by the Minister for Mines and Energy, and a member of

the police force. These were to be appointed by the Governor, who would also nominate

the Chair from among the two Anangu nominated.

2.7.6 Government access for the ‘advancement of Pitjantjatjara people’

The Act made explicit provisions for the Crown to continue to occupy parcels of land for

the purposes of health, education, welfare or the ‘advancement of Pitjantjatjara people’,

and to do so for up to 50 years without paying rent or compensation. In addition, the Act

enabled the Commissioner of Highways to carry out road works and similar infrastructure

services.

Finally, in Part IV, the Act specified a process for dealing with disputes between any

Pitjantjatjara person and AP. A ‘tribal assessor’ would be appointed by the Minister for

Aboriginal Affairs with the approval of AP and would hold office under terms determined

by the Minister within the public service conditions of the Public Service Board (PLRA

1981, Part IV Clause 36). These provisions suggested that the South Australian

Government was accepting, if not asserting, that it retained responsibility for the

provision of state social services such as health, education, welfare and infrastructure to

Anangu as citizens. State service providers and public servants could continue to ‘occupy’

and visit the Lands without permits.

61

Chapter 3: The First Decade: ‘And Now We Live in Two

Ways’53

‘Community control in the last decade has been characterised by two interrelated developments. These

are the proliferation of Aboriginal organisations (incorporated) and the accompanying growth in the

administrative class of outsiders to operate them’

Neville Bonner, 198854

3.1 Introduction

The Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act (PLRA) came into operation in October 1981.55

Within months, a legal challenge emerged to test its s19 permit provisions. The Supreme

Court of South Australia initially upheld this challenge, before the High Court of

Australia ruled in 1985 that these PLRA provisions were a ‘special measure’. The case,

known as Gerhardy v Brown, became a test of ‘special measures’ under the

Commonwealth’s Racial Discrimination Act 1975 and an important affirmation of

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander collective rights in Australia.

Meanwhile, in 1983, an area of land to the south was being prepared for Aboriginal

ownership under the Maralinga Tjarutja Land Rights Act 1984. This gave Anangu in the

Lands an opportunity to reflect on their own land rights and reiterate some outstanding

issues while supporting the claims of Maralinga Tjarutja. Combined with a South

Australian Government review of human services delivery to the Lands in 1986, this led

to some significant amendments to the PLRA in 1987, which shifted its focus from

corporate to more public governance.

A number of regional Anangu service organisations (see Chapter 1) came to prominence

in the 1980s. They gained funding and status as demand grew for specialised services to

deal with petrol sniffing and other problems. In the later years of the decade, two high-

profile reviews of the Lands were undertaken at both the Commonwealth and state levels.

These reviews are discussed in the context of various assessments of the first decade of

the PLRA.

53 Kunmanara (cited in Trudinger 1991, p. 48). 54 See Bonner (1988, p. 21). 55 Symbolically, the Act (which was assented to on 19 March 1981) took operational effect on the first

anniversary of the day that Premier Tonkin and PC Chair Kunmanara Thompson signed the agreement to

create the PLRA (2 October 1980). For more information, see ‘Documenting Democracy’ at

<http://foundingdocs.gov.au/item-sdid-46.html> or Reynolds (1992).

62

These developments in the 1980s are discussed in this chapter as part of an ongoing quest

by Anangu for greater certainty and stability under the PLRA, against the background of

a shifting policy landscape at the state and Commonwealth levels.

3.2 Gerhardy v Brown: Private or Public Land? ‘Discrimination’ or

‘Special Measure’?

In February 1982, Robert Brown, an Aboriginal man from New South Wales, was

charged with entering the AP Lands without permission (Rees 1983). In the ensuing court

case, the prosecution, led by policeman Gerhardy, contended that the Pitjantjatjara Lands

were like a ‘private house’, the ‘private property of the Pitjantjatjaras’ and that Brown

had broken the law by entering the Lands without a permit (Rees 1983).

Judge Millhouse of the SA Supreme Court rejected this notion, arguing that whereas

people buy private houses, the PLRA provides ‘that a group of people, on the basis of

race, shall own a tract of land’, and that ‘everyone who is not a Pitjantjatjara (with some

exceptions) needs written permission’ to enter under s19 (Rees 1983). Millhouse found

this to be quite different to private ownership of land or houses, in which people are

entitled to enter but might then be ordered to leave by owners, at which point they would

become trespassers. Millhouse found that the AP Lands were actually ‘public’ lands given

by statute to what, in his terms, was a ‘poorly defined’ racial group, and that every person

outside that racial group was being discriminated against in contravention of the

Commonwealth’s Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (RDA).56 Thus, in his view, the PLRA

was invalid.

On appeal57 in 1985, the full bench of the High Court58 unanimously found that the PLRA

including its s19 was valid as a ‘special measure’ under s9 of the RDA (Gerhardy v Brown

(1985) HCA 11[51]; ALB 1985, 20, p. 3). In the process, they spelt out four criteria that

must be satisfied for a law (or executive action) to be a valid ‘special measure’:

first, it must confer a benefit on some or all members of a class

56 The Australian Constitution holds that when a State law is inconsistent with a Commonwealth law, the

latter shall prevail and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency be invalid. 57 The matter was removed to the High Court when ‘the South Australian Attorney-General, the

Commonwealth Attorney-General and the Anangu Pitjantjatjara intervened in the proceedings’ (ALB

1985, 20:2) pursuant to s40 of the Judiciary Act, re causes involving interpretation of the Australian

Constitution. See Rees (1985) and HREOC summary

<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/guidelines-understanding-special-measures-racial-

discrimination-act-1975-cth-2011>. 58 Comprised of: Chief Justice Gibbs, and Justices Mason, Murphy, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson.

63

second, the membership of the class must be based on race, colour, descent

(national or ethnic origin)

third, the sole purpose of the measure must be to secure the adequate advancement

of the beneficiaries so that they may enjoy and exercise equally with others human

rights and fundamental freedoms

fourth, the protection granted by the measure must be necessary to ensure that the

beneficiaries may enjoy and exercise equally with others human rights and

fundamental freedoms.

In a lengthy judgment, Justice Brennan also determined that ‘a measure could not secure

the advancement of its beneficiaries if it was not desired by them’ (Gerhardy v Brown

(1985) HCA 11[51]; 20, p. 3). The judgment by Brennan in Gerhardy v Brown

emphasised the importance of recognition being given to the wishes of members of

specific population groups in determining whether a ‘special measure’ would secure their

advancement (Burnside 2009).59 Given how strongly Anangu campaigned to gain land

rights, the PLRA (and its s19 permit provisions) was clearly something ‘desired’ by them

to advance their collective human rights and freedom.

Gerhardy v Brown was later viewed as an important threshold case that not only tested

the PLRA’s relationship to the Commonwealth RDA, but also established precedence

about what constitutes a ‘special measure’ for the advancement of Indigenous peoples.

The High Court was not drawn into the issue of whether the Lands were public or private.

It simply ruled that the PLRA and its provisions enabling Anangu to control entry to their

Lands was valid as a ‘special measure’ in terms of the RDA. Millhouse’s original

judgement had suggested that by defining all Anangu as the ‘body corporate’ for the

purposes of enabling them to control who entered the Lands and what development took

place there, the PLRA established a form of ‘corporate’ land and governance structure

that was neither fully public nor fully private.

59 Burnside (2009) has suggested that in some circ*mstances—for example, when initiated by Aboriginal

communities—restrictions on alcohol can constitute ‘special measures’. The HREOC (1995) used the High

Court’s ruling in Gerhardy v Brown to support this assertion. In response to concerns expressed by the NPY

Women’s Council, among others, the HREOC considered issues of racial discrimination, human rights and

restrictions on alcohol in some Aboriginal communities, concluding that the ‘longstanding policy of the

Pitjantjatjara affiliated councils that alcohol should not be available to members living within communities’

was not unlawful (HREOC 1995; Burnside 2009, p. 3).

64

As the next two sections of this thesis demonstrate, this corporate land and governance

structure had important implications for questions of social control on the Lands, which

led to amendments to the PLRA in 1987.

3.3 Emerging Issues under the PLRA: 1983–1986

While Gerhardy v Brown was making its way through the courts, land to the south was

being prepared for recognition as Aboriginal land by the South Australian Parliament

under the Maralinga Tjarutja Land Rights (MTLR) Bill.60

The AP Executive took this opportunity to make a submission to the Select Committee

examining the MTLR Bill in which they not only supported the claims of the Maralinga

Tjarutja, but also reflected on the two years’ operation of the PLRA. Two issues in

particular were raised—mining and social problems—one of which was reasonably

simple and the other more complex.

In previous years, a company called Hematite Petroleum had been trying to obtain

permission to look for oil on the Lands, but had thus far been unsuccessful (Chaney 1984,

p. 468; O’Neil 1995). A number of other mining companies supported Hematite’s claim,

stating that while ‘the mining industry supported the ownership of Aboriginal lands by

the traditional owners’, it considered the PLRA a ‘disincentive for the proper growth and

development of the mining industry in this State’ (SC MTLR 1983, p. 8). The mining

lobby argued against the right of communities to claim financial compensation at the

exploration stage, and with the need to negotiate with communities at both the exploration

and mining stages. As a result, the lobby argued that the Maralinga people should not be

given the same powers over mining as Anangu had achieved under the PLRA.

The AP Executive strongly rejected this argument, arguing for the maintenance of their

existing powers in relation to mining and stating in their submission to the SC that being

able to control what occurred on their freehold land was a core tenet of Anangu land

rights:

We are proud of our freehold land and have benefited greatly from taking control of it. We feel

our future is more certain now than it was before when we lived on leases and reserves. You

60 The Maralinga Tjarutja Land Rights Act 1984 was modelled closely on the PLRA (1981), with the Select

Committee noting that ‘the principles laid down in that Act found wide acceptance by the Parliament, the

Aboriginal people and the general community’ (SC MTLR, p. 12). However, the Maralinga Tjarutja Act

1984 was less stringent regarding entry to the Maralinga Lands, for example enabling Aboriginal people

from other areas to enter without application for a permit, providing they were invited by a Maralinga

Tjarutja TO, as defined in the Act. Unlike the PLRA, it also specifically required a confidential register of

‘sacred sites’ to be kept.

65

have recognised properly our ownership of our traditional land…we expect long term benefits

from this (SC MTLR 1983, sub 12).

The SC reported that it had ‘spent much time deliberating on these issues’ and agreed

with the PLRA’s mining provisions. The SC MTLR (1983, p. 10) also argued that the

nature of the exploration activity meant that it was likely to cause even ‘greater

disturbance to Aboriginal interests and way of life than the more limited mining

operations’; thus, negotiation and recompense at the exploration stage was important. It

stated that in all evidence from Aboriginal people:

the question of controlling access onto the freehold land was regarded as fundamental to the

question of ensuring a ‘strong law’ over the land (SC MTLR 1983, p. 3).

However, the SC noted its concern about another issue that Aboriginal people raised in

evidence to it: ‘the control of liquor on the land…and they have asked for strong and

effective statutory powers for that purpose’ (SC MTLR 1983, p. 11).

While arguing for maintenance of the Act’s powers in relation to mining, AP’s

submission to the SC flagged the urgent need for changes to the PLRA to strengthen AP’s

ability to control and manage social order. Anangu expressed alarm about the over-

consumption of alcohol and escalating incidences of petrol sniffing in their communities

and explained that they were worried about how best to manage social order on the Lands.

AP’s submission poignantly stated:

Not all problems are solved by granting a title. You will still see around you things that cause

us unhappiness. Some children are sniffing petrol, some of the young men are being arrested

and taken to gaol. We still have serious sickness and our kids have much to learn before they

are able to properly deal with Europeans and takeover this country later on (SC MTLR 1983,

sub 12).

Those framing the 1981 PLRA had not foreseen the need to give powers to regulate civic

order to AP or its Executive. The Act was first and foremost a ‘land rights’ Act. It

established that the Lands were under the control of AP for development and land

management purposes, but was silent on what governance arrangement would control

civil order on the Lands. That is, while clear on ‘outsider matters’, the 1981 Act was not

clear on ‘insider matters’. It provided no guidance about what, in LGAs, would be deemed

civic order or public offences, such as the handling of public drunkenness, civil

disturbances and maintenance of good order. Although police could still enter the Lands

if matters got out of hand, the Lands were in effect a non-regulated civic order

environment.

The Outback Areas Trust Act 1978 provided a framework for such issues in the

unincorporated areas of South Australia’s ‘outback’. However, as PLRA architect

66

Dunstan was later to point out, this Act ‘specifically excluded application to Aboriginal

reserves, the Maralinga Lands and the Pitjantjatjara Lands’ (Dunstan 1989, p. 17). The

Lands therefore occupied an ambiguous position—neither fully private nor fully public,

and without clear regulation of civic order. While AP could control who entered the Lands

and for what purpose, and police could intervene on criminal matters, issues of basic civil

conduct were left in a void.

In June 1983, a General Meeting of AP made the decision to pursue amendments to the

PLRA to strengthen Anangu control over behaviour on the Lands (AP Executive Minutes

1983). Negotiations began with Bannon’s Labor government in relation to amending the

Act to strengthen its provisions regarding the civil conduct of people on the Lands. These

negotiations were part of ongoing efforts by Anangu to achieve more practical self-

governance controls on the Lands and greater clarity about what assistance South

Australian Government agencies would provide to help communities cope with

burgeoning social issues such as the supply and use of intoxicating substances.

3.3.1 ‘Things that cause us unhappiness’:61 alcohol and petrol sniffing

Anangu continued to raise concerns about the supply and misuse of intoxicating

substances with the government before, during and after the passage of the MLRA. As

Anangu explained in their submission on the MLRA, despite pride in the PLRA and

positive gains made, alcohol abuse and petrol sniffing were ‘things that cause us

unhappiness’ (SC MLR 1983, sub 12).

The PC resolved at its General Meeting in 1983 to make the Lands a ‘dry area’.

Accordingly, ‘roadhouses near the Pitjantjatjara Council communities and the

Pitjantjatjara lands should not be allowed to sell grog to Anangu (Aboriginal people) for

consumption on or off the premises’ (PC 1991; RDC 1995, sub 1.7, pp. 43–44).

In October 1984, the South Australian Government, ‘with the advice and consent of the

Executive Council and upon recommendation of Anangu Pitjantjatjara’, recommended

passage of the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights (Control of Alcoholic Liquor) Regulations 1984

under the PLRA.62 This would ensure that ‘no person shall while he is on any part of the

Lands bring, be in possession of or consume any liquor, nor sell or provide or supply

liquor’. Given contemporaneous discussions about amending the PLRA to provide for

by-law-making powers, this draft regulation was not proclaimed and thus lapsed after

61 AP Submission (12) to the Select Committee on the MLRA (1983). 62 Regulations under the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981, No. 206, 25 October 1984.

67

three years. However, this lapsed regulation sought by AP is indicative of the collective

intent by Anangu to find ways to prevent the harm caused by alcohol supply and use.63

In addition to these attempts to make the Lands a ‘dry area’, another problem was the sale

of alcohol to Anangu at Curtain Springs, just outside the Lands over the NT border.

Despite the PC reaching an informal agreement with the Curtain Springs Roadhouse in

1985 not to sell alcohol to local Anangu, the supply of alcohol to people entering the

Lands continued unabated.

Kavanagh (1999) later described Anangu efforts to restrict the availability of alcohol and

manage petrol and other substance issues in communities throughout the 1980s as

‘testament to their courage to persevere’ and a ‘bitter struggle’ marred by ‘frustration,

legislative indifference and deep tragedy’.

Frustrated in their attempts to gain the voluntary cooperation of alcohol suppliers, Anangu

persisted with efforts to gain formal regulatory control through amendments to the PLRA.

They hoped that this would strengthen their power to stop the trafficking of intoxicating

substances to their people. Petrol sniffing was of particular concern because of the

fatalities and brain damage affecting young Anangu. While observed in communities as

early as the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Wallace 1977; Hope 1983; Brady 1992), petrol sniffing

was gaining wider public attention and becoming more visible as an ‘issue’ in the 1980s.

Constructing ‘petrol sniffing’ as symptomatic of a decline of social order in remote

Aboriginal communities, periodic media attention often sensationalised the issue in

graphic ways. In December 1984, a series of articles in The Advertiser began with elder

and TO Kunmanara Minutjukur (a former Pitjantjatjara Council Chairman) discussing

programs he had initiated to support petrol sniffers. He also described how petrol sniffing

was killing his son. The article detailed several deaths by petrol sniffing that had occurred

during the year. Minutjukur described how he worked to find ‘somewhere safe away from

petrol sniffing’ for young people from the local communities to recover: ‘I wanted my

son to stay alive’ (The Advertiser 1984a, p.3).

A front-page article three days later reported on serious brian injuries and health issues

confronting a young petrol sniffer from Indulkana, and others ‘with no hope at all’ (The

Advertiser 1984b, p.1). Five days later, following more reports of local deaths from petrol

63 The 1995 Alcohol Report by Australia’s Race Discrimination Commissioner contains a detailed summary

of PC’s Submission, which chronicles the tireless efforts of Anangu to curtail alcohol consumption on their

Lands.

68

sniffing, headlines on the front page of The Advertiser’s Saturday Review claimed that

many young Anangu were ‘sniffing at death’. Describing such young Anangu as ‘zombie-

like with glazed eyes and numbed brains’ rummaging around the ‘homes of the

Kunmanara, the ‘no-name’ people’ the article was accompanied by graphic photographs

and lengthy poignant accounts of desperate young people ‘begging for food’ and a

mounting toll of death, misery and despair (The Advertsiser, 1984c; Daly 1984).

Photos of children on the Lands sniffing fumes from cans generated a public outcry. The

Department of Aboriginal Affairs announced support for the Healthy Aboriginal Life

Team (HALT) program,64 a community development-based response, immediately

following this burst of media publicity, which received a further funding boost in the

following couple of years (Burnett 1986; Franks 1989). SA’s Health Minister, the Hon.

John Cornwall, announced that the South Australian Government would build a

rehabilitation facility for petrol sniffers on the AP Lands ‘within twelve months’ (Burnett

1986).

At the Commonwealth level, a 1985 Senate Select Committee produced a report entitled

‘Volatile Substance Abuse in Australia (1985),65 which highlighted petrol sniffing issues

in remote Aboriginal communities during the early 1980s. The Inquiry emphasised the

importance of the ‘homelands movement’—that is, the return of people to their traditional

country and away from crowded communities—as ‘the only apparent solution to petrol

sniffing in the long term’ (Commonwealth of Australia Senate Select Committee on

Volatile Substance Fumes 1985, p. 200). It also noted that there would need to be

increased human service provision in primary health care and education facilities to

accompany the homelands movement.

A Commonwealth House of Representatives Committee Inquiry into the homelands

movement followed in 1987.66 While it also called for improved human services delivery,

64 Originating in 1984 in Yuendumu in the NT, and then spreading into WA and the SA APY Lands, the

HALT program provided counselling support based on ‘family mapping’ and the engagement of ‘traditional

authority figures’ to encourage local responsibility for sniffers (Franks 1989; HALT 1988). 65 Two decades later, the final report of the National Inhalant Abuse Taskforce, National Directions on

Inhalant Abuse (2006, p. 9), criticised the 1985 Senate SC for not recommending enough practical action

and lacking in national leadership. 66 In 1987, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs released the Return to

Country Report (often referred to as the Blanchard Report). The Committee recommended: that government

policies and service delivery (including the provision of infrastructure, education, housing and health) be

revised to support homelands; the continuation of funding for the establishment of new homelands; funding

for homelands resource centres to deliver services to homelands; and the extension of CDEP to all

homelands.

69

responsibility for services such as education, primary health care and welfare lay

primarily with the South Australian Government.

In 1987, the SA Coroner found that four Anangu men (aged between 17 and 30 years)

had died in 1983–1984 as a direct result of petrol sniffing. This bore out concerns

expressed by Anangu leaders and increased pressure for greater human services

assistance for Anangu communities.

The SA and Commonwealth agencies’ increased interest in substance abuse on the Lands

introduced a new set of challenges. As analysis by Rowse (1992), Robbins (1993), Lea

(2007), Dillon and Westbury (2007) and Austin-Broos (2011) suggests, government

engagement in remote community contexts is a complex, if not fraught, process. Different

Commonwealth and state agencies adopted differing approaches to engagement, with

some preferring to work with regional Anangu organisations and others preferring to

focus on direct service provision at the local level. As Robbins (1993, p. 71) points out,

there were also:

differing interpretation[s] of agreed policy objectives by state and federal bodies [and

the]…intrusion of a political imperative into the longstanding agenda of administrators.

Petrol sniffing, like alcohol supply, cut across state and territory boundaries (SA, WA and

NT). With little to encourage intergovernmental or even interdepartmental cooperation,

various Commonwealth, state and territory agencies acted independently of each other in

a race for quick policy responses. d’Abbs and MacLean (2008, p. 125) observe that:

Prior to the beginning of the 21st century, governmental responses were largely restricted to

making the occasional one-off grant to non-government agencies, often in reaction to a media-

driven crisis…. Coordination between the Australian and state and territory governments was

almost non-existent.

The era of self-determination in Aboriginal Affairs67 also pressured government agencies

to investigate community views and incorporate them in the design and delivery of

services. Departments increasingly sent staff into communities to consult with

community leaders on complicated issues in what were culturally unfamiliar settings. The

intrusion of new visitors and services into the communities at times precipitated new

tensions and uncertainties.

67 A useful summary of the emergence of the concept of, and policies for, ‘self-determination’ in Australian

Aboriginal Affairs can be found in Sanders (2002).

70

3.3.2 Proctor review of the delivery of human services

In May 1986, the South Australian Government established a review of the delivery of

human services to Aboriginal communities with terms of reference were to:

examine aspects of the existing arrangements for the delivery of human services to the

Aboriginal community in South Australia and to prepare recommendations on ways to effect

improvements (Proctor 1987, p. 8).

The Review Committee was chaired by Treasury official Ian Proctor and comprised

senior Aboriginal officers from across the SA public service, including Peter Buckskin,

Paul Hughes, David Rathman, Les Nayda, Tim Agius, John Moriarty, Sandra Saunders

and Marg Hampton.

The Review, which consulted widely and took public submissions, reported to the Hon.

Greg Crafter, Minister of Education and Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, and the Hon. Dr

John Cornwall, Minister of Health and Minster for Community Welfare. It made

recommendations not only about the delivery of human services to the AP Lands, but also

to communities under the MLRA 1984 and Aboriginal Lands Trust Act 1966.

The Proctor Review argued that three factors impeded accountability for effective public

administration to Aboriginal communities: i) the relatively small number of Aboriginal

voters and the ‘general lack of understanding in the bureaucracies of Aboriginal culture,

preoccupations and capacities’; ii) the ‘blurring’ of financial and program responsibility

for Aboriginal health, education and welfare issues across a number of state and federal

government agencies; and iii) the ‘the inappropriateness of current underlying

demarcations in the white bureaucracies for addressing the needs and concerns of

Aboriginal people’ (Proctor 1987, pp. 10–11).

In relation to the last point, Proctor (1987, p.11) suggested that an example was the poor

understanding of the interrelationship between people’s commitment to country and their

health and well-being:

Perhaps the clearest example of this lies in the relationship between Land Rights and health, a

relationship which is clearly interactive in the view of many Aboriginal people but which is

addressed as distinct ‘legal’ and ‘health’ issues in government portfolios.

For example, the separation of legal issues from health issues was common to both the

Commonwealth and state governments. Conversely, Anangu viewed land rights as

intrinsic, if not vital, to social and emotional health and well-being. The Proctor Review’s

analysis of the silo effect of portfolios provided insights into how the cultural context

(and misunderstanding) could bedevil policy and program administration.

71

The large number of government agency dealings was a frequently raised issue of

concern. This was particularly so for Anangu, who felt that respect for their rights, privacy

and clearly stated visitor protocols was often lacking:

The Committee has been advised that there were approximately 3,000 visitors to the

Pitjantjatjara Lands (total population 2,500) in 1986. The difficulties for the Aboriginal

communities themselves occasioned by this pattern of ‘consultation and co-ordination’ have

grown to the point where the Chairman of the Anangu Pitjantjatjaraku…has written to all

relevant Commonwealth and State Departments and agencies requesting significant changes in

the present approach to their dealings with the Aboriginal communities on the Lands (Proctor

1987, p. 41).

This letter from AP Chair Yami Lester,68 cited in full in the Proctor Review report,

strongly asserted AP’s authority as the landholding body under the PLRA. Lester

reminded Commonwealth and state agencies that AP ‘is concerned with all matters that

arise on the Lands…[and] has special duties and responsibilities in relation to the Land’

(Proctor 1987, p. 133). Lester particularly complained of disrespectful practices by

government visitors to the Lands:

Over the past couple of years there are increasing numbers of Government (both State and

Federal) Departments and their employees visiting the…Lands. Many of these visits occur

without notice to Anangu Pitjantjatjaraku. People arrive in communities, talk to the adviser or

some Anangu who happen to be around and leave. They treat the communities as if they are a

number of separate country towns that are not connected to each other. They ignore the existence

and duties of Anangu Pitjantjatjaraku (Proctor 1987, pp.133-4).

In a rush to respond (or be seen to be responding) to escalating problems caused by petrol

sniffing on the Lands, many government ‘outsiders’ visiting Anangu communities

consulted service providers about Anangu, but by-passed AP and its Executive. Lester

was keen to assert AP’s authority as not just another Anangu service provider, but as the

key representative body with responsibilities and duties under the PLRA.

What departments and public servants may have viewed as honouring a need to consult,

Anangu perceived as disrespectful to their long-fought-for collective governance

arrangements. The influx of ‘outsider’ officials appears to have caused concern,

uncertainty and confusion in communities and, even worse in the view of the AP

Executive, it flouted their authority.

The Proctor Review highlighted differences in approach to human service delivery

between the state and Commonwealth governments, pointing out the latter’s particular

tendency to ignore the role of the AP Executive. It critiqued how both levels of

68 The1986 letter co-signed by then AP Chairman Yami Lester and AP Administrator Gray Lewis to

Commonwealth and State agencies was dated 16 October 1986 and on AP’s letterhead.

72

government approach service delivery to the Lands, describing it as a ‘poorly

coordinated…fragmented…chaotic…patchwork of arrangements’ (Proctor 1987, p. 39).

Citing different departmental attitudes about whether regional Anangu agencies should

act as coordinating ‘umbrella’ organisations,69 the Review argued that competing policy

objectives created service delivery tensions on the Lands. For example, Proctor (1987, p.

28) argued that the Commonwealth was concentrating its responses on ‘petrol sniffing’

in 1986 at the local community level and ‘precluded dealing with what are…termed

“umbrella organisations”’:

In this State there has been a clear divergence in the view of the Commonwealth and State

officers involved in developing the [petrol sniffing] program as to the appropriate program

vehicle in the Pitjantjatjara lands as a result of the new policy on [against] ‘umbrella

organizations’.

Conversely, the South Australian Government was promoting an ‘umbrella’ (or

coordinating) role for AP and its Executive, and it contested the Commonwealth’s

approach, which at the time focused on more direct engagement at the local or community

level. However, the Commonwealth Government was exerting an increasing influence in

Aboriginal Affairs both nationally and locally by strongly asserting its role to ‘exercise

responsibility for policy, planning and coordination’ and expecting state government

departments and local governments to implement ‘Commonwealth policies in the course

of their functional responsibilities’70 (Proctor 1987, p. 16).

The South Australian Government wanted the Commonwealth to assume increased

responsibility for ‘financing such activities [which] are at present the responsibility of the

States and their Authorities’ (Proctor 1987,p.17). The Proctor Review complained that

the Commonwealth:

now provides the greater part of its financial assistance directly to Aboriginal people,

communities and organizations rather than…through the States (Proctor 1987, p. 18).

In this tug of war between the Commonwealth and state governments, AP and other

regional umbrella organisations were effectively sidelined. By sidestepping a structure

that the South Australian Government had established through the PLRA, the

Commonwealth was adding new layers of complexity and tension to governance

arrangements on the Lands.

69 The Proctor Review cited AP, the PC and Nganampa Health Service as examples of such general-purpose

broad regional or ‘umbrella’ organisations. 70 This refers to the demarcation of responsibilities struck in the Aboriginal Affairs’ Arrangements with

States Act 1973, which followed the 1967 referendum and enabled the Commonwealth to legislate for

Aboriginal people.

73

Calls for better planning and centrally driven coordination often mask thinly veiled issues

about power, resources and control. The State Government’s lament, as expressed in the

Proctor Review, was that the Commonwealth was bypassing the State and the Aboriginal

governance infrastructure it sponsored, as well as meddling locally without ‘coordinating’

with others. The Commonwealth was not only avoiding engagement with AP, its

Executive and Anangu ‘umbrella’ bodies, but it was also sidestepping arrangements that

the State government had created. It wanted to direct the South Australian Government.

When focused on the issue of ‘poor coordination’ of government service delivery, the

Proctor Review cited the Miller (1985, p.25) Report’s71 claims that ‘a total lack of

planning [is] occurring not just between the relevant agencies and departments (of

government) but with the communities’ in remote areas.

Miller was concerned about a lack of training in management, organisational and

governance issues for Aboriginal people in remote communities, arguing that local

Aboriginal community councils were ‘overloaded’ and local workers were

‘overwhelmed’ (p. 65). Drawing further on Miller, Proctor argued that, for remote

communities to achieve a sustainable level of self-sufficiency:

it is essential that the extent of the responsibilities of existing Aboriginal Councils be

acknowledged and that these Councils are provided with a legal and resource base from which

to perform them…. The Miller report saw the solution to the problem in broader groupings of

Aboriginal communities and in fact cited the Pitjantjatjara Council as a possible model….

Anangu Pitjantjatjaraku and Maralinga/Tjuruta are other possible models (Proctor 1987, p. 84).

Finally, the Proctor Review recommended a review of community management and an

exploration of the benefits of introducing ‘culturally appropriate’ models of local

government into the Aboriginal Lands (Proctor 1987, p. 4). The potential for AP to

become a regional local government authority appealed to this Treasury-driven Review

as a possible means of securing more stable governance and funding.

3.4 Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act Amendment Bill 1987: Moving towards

Public Local Governance

Labor’s Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, Greg Crafter, introduced the Pitjantjatjara Land

Rights Amendment Bill into the SA House of Assembly in March 1987 and tabled the

Select Committee Report on the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act Amendment Bill 1987 the

next month.

71 The Report of the Committee of Review of Aboriginal Employment and Training Programs (1985)

became colloquially known as the ‘Miller Report’.

74

The SC proposed bipartisan acceptance of amendments to the PLRA based on the

evidence of departmental officials, mining representatives and legal advisers, and on the

advice of Anangu community and AP Executive witnesses. The input of AP’s Gary Lewis

(co-signatory to the Lester letter cited above) was noted and favourably acknowledged in

the SC’s Report.

Lester and Lewis, TOs who with others had been key protagonists in the original struggle

for land rights, pushed hard to strengthen Anangu governance by extending the AP’s role

to regulating civic behaviour in communities. The Proctor Review had highlighted

concerns about the Commonwealth bypassing the Executive and other regional umbrella

bodies. Lester and Lewis had written to protest about Anangu being bypassed, arguing

that the government should work closely with AP and its Executive. They advocated

strengthening the Act to assist Anangu efforts to control substance abuse and improve

Anangu governance.

The SC recommended a series of amendments to enable AP to make bylaws to control

the entry, supply or use of proscribed substances onto the Lands, and to regulate other

aspects of civic behaviour, such as prohibiting drunkenness when driving, and gambling

or fighting in a ‘public place’.

Other amendments also sought to: clarify the name from Anangu Pitjantjatjaraku to

Anangu Pitjantjatjara (AP); make it an offence to breach permit conditions; establish a

Pitjantjatjara Lands Parliamentary Committee; and specify that costs for anthropological

and associated services incurred by AP in assessing mining applications would be borne

by the mining company involved and later deducted from the compensation payable to

AP if mining proceeded.

The bylaw amendments signalled a shift away from a form of corporate self-regulation

towards more of a ‘local government’72 style regulatory framework. The leader of the

Opposition in the Upper House, Martin Cameron (Legislative Council 1987, p. 4049),

noted this shift when he directly compared AP to a local government authority:

it is very similar to local government because in our society local councils make decisions for

themselves. The introduction of legislation which empowers them to make by-laws is a very

72 Local government in Australia is conceived of as a third tier of government; however, it is actually

legislated for and administered by state governments, which are defined within the Australian Constitution,

while local governments are not. Local governments receive funding via Commonwealth and state

governments, and also through raising their own revenue through rates, but always within legislative and

administrative delegations of state governments. As a sphere of government, local governments have

limited powers in their own right, but have referred or delegated powers according to specific state-based

legislation. Attempts to galvanise sufficient support to include local governments in Australia’s

Constitution have been unsuccessful to date.

75

important matter which has our full support. I congratulate the Aboriginal people for seeking

that right.

Australian Democrat Elliott (Legislative Council, 1987 p. 4051) also suggested that:

What we are seeing now is a progression towards a form of local government and I hope that

trend continues.

As with the original PLRA in 1981, Parliamentary debate on the PLRA Amendment Bill

in 1987 was congratulatory, non-partisan and amicable. All contributors praised the

amendments as a reflection of Anangu commitment to good governance and self-

determination on the Lands. For example, Minister Crafter (House of Assembly 1987 p.

3994) referred to the amendments to give bylaw-making powers as a:

very clear indication of the confidence of the Parliament in the ability of the people to make

decisions with respect to such important matters as solvent abuse…control of alcoholic liquor

and gambling.

Crafter (House of Assembly 19 March 1987, p. 3567) had earlier emphasised that the

amendments to the PLRA ‘do not change the general principles of the Act but…do make

the Act more effective’. Interestingly, Crafter (ibid) also cautioned at this time against

trying to manage difficult ‘social issues’, such as petrol sniffing, through ‘what is

substantially land rights legislation’. He spoke of the ‘dangers’ of including too many

social measures to ‘deal separately with this group of people living in our State’ (ibid).

He argued that other legislation, such as the Controlled Substances Act and the

Community Welfare Act, should be used to help regulate substances in communities, and

that engaging police and other government agencies to assist Anangu with problems

caused by petrol sniffing were important elements of a long-term strategy. Crafter argued

that petrol sniffing and related social issues were part of the state’s broader mandate to

support the well-being of all of its citizens, rather than something that the PLRA should

be expected to resolve.

Others in the debate (e.g., Arnold House of Assembly 1987, p. 3624; Cameron Legislative

Council 1987, p. 4049) also viewed petrol sniffing as a serious and ‘intractable’ problem

that required concerted long-term government attention, while ‘commending’ Anangu

efforts to manage such difficult problems. Both sides of the House praised AP leaders for

being proactive in seeking amendments to the PLRA to better equip them to deal with

substance abuse and social order in communities.

76

The establishment of a Pitjantjatjara Lands Parliamentary Committee (PLPC)73 was also

represented as a way for the parliament to more directly support Anangu efforts:

Too often we tend to act too remotely from the real issues that we debate in this House [so we

will] create a committee so we can have direct dialogue with the Pitjantjatjara Council74 and

the people on an annual basis and report back to Parliament on any amendments and

recommendations that they believe will enhance the operations of the legislation to the benefit

of the whole community (Arnold 1987, p. 3624).

The PLPC was intended to ‘fulfil a most useful function [and] important role in the

administration of [this] legislation’ (Gunn House of Assembly 1987, p. 3625). The

Committee was discussed as a way for the parliament to ensure accountability from the

‘bureaucracy’ for progress on the Lands because, as Gunn (1987, p. 3625) claimed:

the bureaucracy, well-meaning as it may be, is usually slow to act and cumbersome, whereas

members of Parliament are directly answerable to the people and can raise matters of concern.

A provision in the amendments specified that the functioning of the PLPC and the overall

progression towards self-determination for AP should be reviewed after five years. The

tenor of the parliamentary debate (SA Parliament House of Assembly and Legislative

Council Hansards 8–9 April 1987, pp. 3994–4048) suggests a bipartisan awareness of the

evolution of Anangu/state relations, and openness to the prospect that further

opportunities might arise over time for staged amendments to the Act to gradually devolve

more powers to AP.

Contributions to the debate by Cameron (Legislative Council 1987, p. 4050), for example,

also reveal a view of the PLPC as formalising a ‘special’ relationship between Anangu

and non-Anangu leaders so matters of importance could be discussed together through

this forum, rather than politicians engaging in ‘fly in fly out…[where] we assume at the

end…that we know what is best for them’:

an excellent group of people operate [on]the Pitjantjatjara Lands…members from both sides of

Parliament will benefit from the discussions and the interest generated by their being members

of the [Pitjantjatjara Lands] Committee and visiting the Lands.

73 The PLPC, initially Chaired by Aboriginal Affairs Minister Crafter and comprising Liberal opposition

MPs Arnold and Gunn and Labor’s Robertson, reported to parliament in 1988, 1989, 1990/90 and 1991/2;

a fifth report for 1992/3 was prepared but never tabled, as Parliament was prorogued. In March 1992, both

Houses of Parliament, pursuant to Section 42c (11) of the Act, resolved to continue the Committee’s

operation for a further five years; however, the Committee ceased meeting, and this section of the Act

expired on 18 June 1997 (Annual Report of the Aboriginal Lands Standing Committee 2003/4). 74 The author’s emphasis points out the confusion of the speaker between the AP and the PC. This issue is

explored further on the next page.

77

3.4.1 Confusion between PC and AP

Despite the positive approach by the South Australian Government and opposition, AP

and its Executive were often spoken of interchangeably with the PC, as if they were all

one and the same organisation. While the PC played a role in advocating for the 1987

amendments, they were formally negotiated with the AP Executive, and AP’s powers

under the 1981 Act’s provisions were enhanced by the amendments. Confusion between

PC and AP and its Executive, as illustrated by the quotation from Arnold above, was a

worrying precursor to tensions between the two bodies, which intensified in the 1990s

(see Chapter 4).

Conflating these two bodies was a common error made by politicians, bureaucrats and

commentators alike from the outset. While the 1981 legislation envisioned that the PC

would only act for AP until its Executive became operational as a governance body in its

own right, many politicians confused Anangu governance arrangements from the Act’s

inception.

Speaking in the House of Assembly on 3 March 1981, then Premier Tonkin referred to

the PC as that which would ‘become Anangu Pitjanjatjaraku’ (Tonkin, House of

Assembly 1981, p. 3379). Despite the work of SCs and intense scrutiny of the PLRA,

many in Parliament were still unable ‘to distinguish effectively between the two bodies

when the Act was amended in 1987’75 (SC 2004, p. 20).

The PC had spearheaded the campaign for land rights and was the vehicle through which

Anangu achieved their goal. Premier Tonkin handed the historic deed to the PC in 1981,

as reported in media coverage of the day: ‘in a simple ceremony at Ernabella, he [Tonkin]

presented the certificate of title to the Pitjantjatjara Council, representing the Pitjantjatjara

Aboriginal people (The Advertiser, 1981, p.1, ‘Blacks given title to 10 % of SA: historic

handing over ceremony’ 1981, p. 1).

The PC also continued to have an influential role in Anangu politics after 1981 as a

powerful tri-state organisation in its own right, receiving major funding to deliver services

to communities in the tri-state region, including to continue servicing AP.

75 For example, see comments made by Hon. PB Arnold (Hansard, House of Assembly, 31 March 1987,

pp. 3623–3624), Hon. Gunn (Hansard, House of Assembly, 31 March 1987, p. 3635), Hon. GJ Crafter

(Hansard, House of Assembly, 8 April 1987, p. 3994).

78

However, the PC was not mentioned in the PLR Act76 and did not have any governance

powers in relation to the Lands. Meanwhile, AP was steadily growing in stature in the

years after 1981, as the legislatively recognised body corporate of all TOs of the Lands.

The 1987 amendments further strengthened the powers and stature of AP and its

Executive. However, many Members of Parliament, including Arnold (House of

Assembly, 31 March 1987, pp. 3623–3624), Gunn (House of Assembly, 31 March 1987,

p. 3635) and even Minister Crafter (House of Assembly, 8 April 1987, p. 3994), did not

readily distinguish between these two bodies. This muddling of corporate identities by

parliamentarians and others seemed to embed itself unchecked in subsequent discussions.

Compounding this predilection on the part of policy-makers for conflating Anangu

representative bodies by using ‘PC’ as a generic term for all Anangu governance was the

tendency for key Anangu leaders, who had been instrumental in forming the PC in 1976

and key figures in campaigns to achieve the PLRA in 1981, to be active in both the PC

and AP (and its Executive). Anangu politicians understandably followed the money (and

power) story and gravitated to the positions where they thought the decisions were being

made about their communities.

People who were active across the organisational and public politics of the region

included Yammi Lester, Kunmanara (Punch) Thompson, Gary Lewis, Donald Fraser,

Owen Burton, Leonard Burton, Danny Colson, Lee Brady, Frank Young, Alec Baker,

Ivan Baker, Kunmanara Minutjukur, Yanyi Baker, Kunmanara Wilson, Kunmanara

Nyaningu, and the de Rose and Singer families, among many others. Yankunytatjara and

Pitjantjatjara family groupings sought ongoing active representation. They were agentic

and engaged people.

While little different to most local, regional or state contexts, where political activists

often occupy more than one sphere of influence, the political activism and often dextrous

manoeuvring of Anangu in occupying different roles and positions and adopting different

positions according to circ*mstances—for example, where governments were

channelling funding and attention—may have confused those piranpa77 who preferred to

76 The confusion around the PC and APY Executive appeared to have taken hold in the minds of many SA

MPs from the beginning. For example, on 3 March 1981, speaking in the House of Assembly on the PLRA,

when Tonkin referred to the PC as that which would ‘become Anangu Pitjanjatjaraku’ (Hansard, p. 3379),

it appears many Liberal and Labor members believed that the PC would become/act as the AP referred to

in the legislation. However, the PLRA established a new and separate body for the Lands that would be

linked in some ways to the PC, but that would be separate from it. It would have a different role, a different

constituency and would be formed through a different nomination and election process. 77 Piranpa is a Pitjantjatjara term for non-Indigenous, or ‘white’, persons.

79

simplify and unify Anangu diversity by rolling everyone up neatly into ‘the PC’. Others

may have actively privileged the PC over AP, as the former was the more established,

predictable and familiar body.

Another source of the confusion was that PC continued to be funded to provide legal,

anthropological, and road and land maintenance services to AP throughout the 1980s. The

Lands were becoming a crowded organisational space, with Commonwealth and state

government officials working with some local and/or regional organisations and not

others.

Confusion about the role of AP and its Executive, along with differing views about the

extent to which AP was (or should be) the ‘peak’ representative body on the Lands (see

detailed examples in footnotes above), would have ongoing and eventually more serious

and damaging ramifications for the Anangu body politic. This was one of a number of

concerns highlighted in two high-profile reviews of the Lands in the late 1980s.

3.5 High-profile State and Commonwealth Reviews in 1987–1988

Much was happening in, on and about the AP Lands during 1987–1988, at the cusp of the

national ‘bicentennial’ celebrations of Australia’s white settlement.78 The Proctor Review

was published in March 1987, and the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act Amendment Act

1987 was assented to in April 1987 and became operative in June, just before the

‘Committee of Review on Environmental and Public Health on the AP Lands’ provided

its report, entitled ‘Uwankara Palyankyu Kanyintjaku (UPK): A Strategy for Well-

being’,79 to the SA Minister of Health, Hon. John Cornwall.

Early in 1987, the Commonwealth Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA)

commissioned former Queensland Aboriginal Senator Bonner to conduct a ‘strategic

review’ of the AP Lands, which he reported in early 1988. In June 1988, the South

Australian Government commissioned former Premier, and originator of the PLRA,

78 1988 was colloquially termed the ‘year of mourning’ by many Aboriginal commentators. For example,

see Editorial, Sydney Morning Herald, 19 January 1988, and ‘Indigenous protest’, Museum Victoria,

<http://museumvictoria.com.au/collections/themes/2835/indigenous-protest-1988-australian-

bicentenary>. 79 The Committee of Review on Environmental and Public Health on the AP Lands, which became known

as the ‘UPK Report’, was an important public health, housing and social planning project jointly

conducted by Nganampa Health and the SA Health Commission. The UPK Report remains a powerful

community development resource for Anangu. For more detail, see

<http://www.nganampahealth.com.au/programs/upk.html>.

80

Dunstan, to consult with Anangu80 communities about the ‘development of culturally

appropriate local administrative structures’ (Dunstan 1989, p. 5).

Reviews and committees of inquiry have a long tradition in public policy. As a well-used

‘familiar policy technology’ (Colebatch 2009, p. 34), they are part of the armoury

deployed to collect, sift, sort, classify and order the putative ‘facts’ in the rational

problem-solving sequence that is characteristic of normative policy-making. In this

rational problem-solving normative approach to policy, teams of ‘experts’, such as

academics and senior, well-respected administrators, are regularly enlisted by public

policy-makers into reviews or asked to comment on pre-selected (and often sensitive or

contentious) policy issues. Heclo (1974) suggests that a form of ‘collective puzzling’

animates the normative policy-making process (Heclo cited in Colebtach 2009, p. 30):

What is of collective concern? What is known about it? Who are the experts? What is normal

and what is deviant? What is an appropriate response? What is the place of public authority in

bringing this response to bear?

An instrumentalist conception of policy as a top–down, technical, rational and action-

oriented tool that assists (government) decision-makers to ‘solve’ problems and effect

change (Shore & Wright 1997) is simplistic in its pursuit of both problems and solutions.

It belies the complexity and multi-layered intersectional dimensions of policy-making

and the plurality of ways of conceiving of the policy-making process (e.g., Shore &

Wright 1997; Fischer 2003; Considine 2005; Colebatch 2009; Fischer & Gottweis 2012;

Bacchi 2012).

As Edelman (1988, p. 12) suggests, problems find their way into discourse and gain life

as policy ‘issues’ that need attention because they reinforce ideologies—not simply

because they exist or are important to social welfare. The development of the PLRA, its

subsequent amendment in 1987 and the issues of governance, relationships, power,

representativeness and complex social problems that began to surface in the mid to late

1980s necessitated a ‘collective puzzlement’ (Heclo 1974, p. 305) well beyond the scope

of most commissioned inquiries.

Colebatch (2009, pp. 24–30) points to a typology of three broad approaches to the analysis

of policy-making and clusters them under the headings of ‘authoritative choice’, ‘social

interaction’ and ‘social construction’. He suggests that most public inquiries and reviews

fit the ‘authoritative choice’ account of policy-making by acting primarily as an aid to

80 Dunstan’s brief included making recommendations regarding local governance arrangements for the

areas covered by the PLRA, MTLRA and ALT.

81

government decision-making, and they are preoccupied with sifting information to

identify the problem, and then recommending what is perceived to be the ‘right’,81 or

preferred, course of action to correct, manage or respond to the perceived ‘problem’.

Reviews and inquiries can also provide opportunities for competing, and even conflicting,

perspectives to be aired, new voices to be heard and alternative scenarios, options and a

diverse range of possible responses to be explored.

The various inquiries on or about the Lands in the late 1980s generally fit the

‘authoritative choice’ approach. For example, the Proctor Review had a Treasury official

and other senior departmental ‘experts’ assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of

governmental service delivery, while the Dunstan Review had a well-regarded past

Premier consulting on governance models to recommend government action on what he

perceived to be the best options. However, the Commonwealth’s Bonner Review is

perhaps better understood when viewed as a mix of Colebatch’s (2009, p. 30) ‘structured

interaction, policy-making as negotiating’ and ‘social construction, policy making as

collective puzzling’. In this review, policy-making is tempered by reflections about the

Anangu social and cultural contexts in ways that distinguish it from other reviews of or

about the Lands at that time.

Bonner (1988, p. i) summarised the terms of reference he was given as a broad brief:

to radically examine the system through which external resources are provided to [AP]

communities and report on the effectiveness of its contribution to Aboriginal self-determination.

Bonner first engaged respected Anangu elder Andrew Japaljarri Spencer as his cultural

adviser. He also engaged with a key group of tjilpi and pampa tjuta (elder Anangu men

and women) and the ‘special contribution’ of younger men and women he named as

‘Kunmanara George, Kunmanara Fraser, Gary Lewis, Yami Lester, Ms Tjikali Collins,

Ms [Kunmanara] Wilson, Mr Frank Young, [Kunmanara] Thompson, Mr Ivan Baker, Mr

Kunmanara Stevens and Mr Shannon Lester’ (Bonner 1988, p. iv). Bonner then set out to

consult by travelling around communities with the HALT82—funded by the government

to work with communities on HIV/AIDS, petrol sniffing and alcohol abuse issues—and

undertaking direct discussions with Anangu in communities. By seeing how a community

81 Colebatch (2009, pp. 24–29) provides a useful schema of three types or ways of giving an account of

policy-making: the ‘authoritative choice (policy making as deciding)’, ‘structured interaction (policy

making as negotiating)’ and ‘social construction (policy making as collective puzzling)’, and suggests that

most accounts of policy-making are a mix of these types to varying degrees. 82 For more information on this program, see HALT (1991) and Divakaran-Brown and Minitjukur (1992).

82

development program was received ‘on the ground’, Bonner was looking beyond second-

hand accounts of life on the Lands.

While recommending courses of action, in the normative ‘authoritative choice, policy

making as deciding’ (Colebatch 2009, p. 24) style, Bonner did more than this; he nuanced

his policy advice with comments about Anangu culture and his awareness that local

context influences implementation. Bonner (1988, p. i) described his main aim and

guiding overall priority as focusing on Anangu concerns and ‘the problems they raised’:

I learned that poor health remained endemic within communities; that the level of literacy and

numeracy remained too low for people to effectively administer their life needs in the

contemporary economy; that resources were not deployed and managed in accordance with

authentic decision-making processes; that outsiders exerted an extraordinary degree of control

over the current infrastructural development and way of life; that economic life was almost

entirely reliant on the proceeds from government welfare or community development programs

and that petrol sniffing and alcohol abuse are chronic and entrenched forms of dependency in

these communities.

Critical policy theorist Bacchi (2012, p. 1) suggests that policy-making is about ‘making

politics visible’. Similar to Colebatch (2009), Bacchi’s (2009) Foucaludian approach

asserts that the social construction of problems and the socio-political context in which

they are played out are key elements of the policy-making process: ‘What’s the problem

represented to be?’ By understanding how problems are ‘produced’, it is possible to view

the policy-making process as one that makes certain issues more ‘visible’ than others—a

process that is always taking place within a contested and politicised context in which the

dominant voices are those that are more often heard (Bacchi 2009, 2012).

Of the AP Lands reviews and inquiries occurring at this time, Bonner’s is most notable

for its sensitivity to differing perceptions of what constituted ‘problem/s’ on the Lands,

and for noting that different types of ‘policy interventions’ and ‘policy instruments’ are

advantageous for different groups depending on the ‘rhetorical elements of problem

construction’ (Linder 1995, pp. 208–230).

Bonner (1988) dealt with a number of key themes and issues. One was petrol sniffing and

the spectre of potentially tragic intergenerational issues he saw resulting from this

problem. Another was Anangu governance and the lack of external support available to

assist Anangu with issues of self-management. Bonner (1988) analysed the vulnerabilities

in Anangu governance arrangements arising from what he perceived to be inherent

tensions between the mores of collectivist desert cultures and the contemporary demands

of hierarchical and institutionalised politics.

83

In Bonner’s (1988, p. ii) view, Anangu faced an ongoing ‘social trauma associated with

the transition from nomadic to settled life’. He suggested that the mores that sustained

past ‘traditional’ lifestyles were not easily adaptable or ‘designed to stabilise a permanent

settlement’. Citing Myers (1986, p. 260), he argued that Anangu sociality was

traditionally geared towards dispersed ‘regional system[s] through time’, and that the

‘executive decision-making necessary for the effective management of centralised

resources has no cultural basis’ for Anangu (Bonner 1988, p. ii).

Contrary to ‘romantic’ notions of Aboriginal communality as simplistically all-sharing,

Bonner (1988) suggested that for central desert communities in particular, ‘relatedness’

is a strong cultural value necessitating family groups to responsibly provide for their own.

He argued that a complex intersectionality of a need for both ‘relatedness’ (within

families and between clan groups) and ‘autonomy’ (resource independence of extended

family groupings) coexisted in balance in collectivist desert cultures.83 Reciprocity of

exchange was of course key to maintaining this balance. Bonner (1988) argued that

tensions between closeness and autonomy shaped the dispersed nature of Anangu

political life,84 and that these qualities were not easily reconcilable with Western political

models of governance, which were linear and more based on control than reciprocity. In

appraising Anangu governance in the first decade of the PLRA, Bonner (1988, p. iii)

argued that:

the authentic political organizational structure of [Anangu] communities has not adapted itself

to effectively transact business in the contemporary economy and society.

Bonner (1988) highlighted that institutional governance arrangements were not working

well for Anangu. He recommended that both the Commonwealth and South Australian

Governments provide more governance and operational support to Anangu to help realise

the ‘self-determination’ intended by the PLRA.

Bonner (1988) recommended that each family group, skin group and clan be viewed as a

‘unit’ that could be ‘heard’ within a modified democratic system of suffrage so that each

family grouping had a ‘vote’ or say in whatever was established to enable all kinship

voices to be heard in decision-making. He recommended that the powers and role of AP

and its Executive be clarified, that the functions and accountabilities between levels of

AP governance structures be established in ways that would also take into account the

views of elders—the ‘tjilpis and pumpas’ (old men and old women)—as ‘they are the

83 ‘Ngapartji Ngapartji’ is a Pitjantjatjara expression meaning ‘I give to you, you give to me’, which

captures the key cultural principle of reciprocity and interdependence. 84 Sanders (2004) provides a useful discussion of the benefits of ‘dispersed’ governance.

84

holders of knowledge enshrining the values of Aboriginal culture’, which underpin

‘authentic community control’ (Bonner 1988, p. 19).

Bonner’s (1988) views largely reflected those of AP leaders Lester and Lewis, who

advocated for a strengthening of AP’s role and greater recognition by governments of the

importance of Anangu involvement in all levels of decision-making. However, Bonner

was also concerned with internal AP governance—particularly the roles and

responsibilities of regional organisations such as the PC, Nganampa Health and the NPY

Women’s Council, as well as the relationship between these ‘umbrella’ organisations and

the body corporate AP and its Executive.

Tri-state Anangu bodies such as the NPY Women’s Council85 and Nganampa Health

Council,86 which formed in 1980 and 1983 respectively, had become influential in social

well-being, health and welfare and had assumed new service delivery roles in addition to

advocacy work. Meanwhile, the Ernabella Video and Television Service, which was

founded in the early 1980s in Pukatja, grew into a major regional media organisation and

was incorporated as PY Media in 1987:

Hence in a period of seven to eight years, Ngaanyatjarra, Pitjantjatjara and Yankunytjatjara

people had built structures which would allow[ed] them to manage their Lands (Last 2001).

The NPY Women’s Council, Nganampa Health Council and PY Media joined the PC and

AP to form a burgeoning institutional infrastructure that increasingly mediated

government–Anangu interactions. This growth in regional Anangu service organisations

marked both a maturing and diversification of Anangu self-management and the

emergence of a crowded and increasingly competitive organisational field on the Lands

during the 1980s.

Bonner (1988) emphasised minimising the number of external government agencies

interacting with Anangu communities, and he recommended the provision of specialist

support to assist Anangu to develop capacities in administration, community development

and community safety. In particular, Bonner (1988, p. 27) recommended that

governments urgently consult with Anangu ‘on the development of a culturally

appropriate local government model’.

85 As outlined in Chapter 1, the NPY Women’s Council was formed in 1980 to represent the interests of

Anangu women across the tri-state region (SA, NT and WA). 86 Nganampa Health was formed in 1983 and took over responsibility for the delivery of health services on

the AP(Y) Lands from the South Australian Health Commission and the Pitjantjatjara Homelands Health

Service in 1985.

85

Just after Bonner provided his Report to the Commonwealth DAA and the Hawke

government, Bannon’s state government appointed Dunstan87 to consult with Aboriginal

communities on the ‘development of culturally appropriate local administrative

structures’ in the areas covered by the ALT—that is, the Maralinga Lands and the

Pitjantjatjara Lands (Dunstan 1989, p. 5).

Dunstan (ibid) noted how diverse concepts such as ‘local government’, ‘community’,

‘self-management’ and ‘self-government’ raised many questions about ‘cultural match’:88

No matter how ‘culturally appropriate’…[will] community government…result in a departure

from [Aboriginal] traditions and be an imposition of white values and notions of administration?

How much autonomy could realistically be provided [to Aboriginal communities] given

bureaucratic requirements for accounting and audit? Are Aboriginal communities in SA ready

for self-management and ‘Aboriginalisation’ of their administrative structures? Or [will]

community government mean a continuation of reliance on or even proliferation of white

advisers?

Dunstan (1989, p. 6) suggested that while the answer to these questions was

‘unpredictable’, ‘experience has tended to show that Aboriginal communities work best

when decisions are made locally’. He recommended the introduction of a limited form of

‘community government’ in close consultation with those affected that would be flexible

enough to accommodate the different circ*mstances of communities.

Dunstan (1989, p. 6) also recommended that change be introduced slowly, with adequate

financial, training and personnel support, and he cautioned that ‘communities and

government must understand that mistakes will be made’.

In his Report in July 1989, Dunstan (1989, p. 7) observed that ‘Land Rights alone will

not result in any real economic betterment’. He highlighted the deteriorating socio-

economic situation facing Anangu communities near the end of the first decade after the

enactment of Land Rights:

One can only unhappily note that the physical condition of the Pitjantjatjara people living on

the Lands…has if anything deteriorated since 1979…rather than improved. The situation on the

Lands detailed in the Bonner and UPK Reports can only give cause for dire concern. Land rights

are essential to Aboriginal culture. Economic betterment, however, is another and in most cases

separate question, and there the provision of training (in management, accounting, marketing,

technical expertise relevant to the enterprise) and the provision of discretionary capital are

fundamental requirements (Dunstan 1989, p. 7).

87 Government official Sue Briton-Jones, who had also served as a South Australian Government

representative on the Bonner Inquiry, which was conducted one year before Dunstan’s consultancy Report,

served as Dunstan’s key research assistant and policy adviser (for this task) during this time. 88 ‘Cultural fit’ is one of the principles used by the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic

Development; see <http://hpaied.org/about-hpaied/overview>. For further discussion on the links between

the Harvard Project’s findings and issues of Australian Indigenous governance, see Sullivan (2006, 2007).

86

Dunstan (ibid) observed that ‘solutions so far have often emanated out of competitive

bureaucracies which are remote and unco-ordinated’. Like Proctor (1987, p. 46), Dunstan

(1989, p. 7) also argued that the complex, chaotic and poorly coordinated state of

government service delivery and resulting interagency tensions were hindering rather

than helping Aboriginal communities:

Until such time as rationality can be introduced into the division of responsibilities between the

Commonwealth and State, the problems of lack of co-ordination, overlapping and duplication

of functions and inability of communities to manage their affairs effectively will continue.

Echoing Proctor (1987), Dunstan (1989, p.7) argued for ‘a clearer delineation of

Commonwealth and state government responsibilities in Aboriginal Affairs’. He

recommended more flexible funding arrangements by Commonwealth and state agencies,

as well as block grants and three-year funding cycles to better ‘enable Aboriginal

communities to devise their own solutions’ (Dunstan 1989). This seemed to be a ‘rational

choice’ if sustainable outcomes were to be achieved.

Like Bonner (1988) and Proctor (1987), Dunstan (1989, p. 7) mirrored Miller’s (1985)

earlier view that self-sufficiency and independence would improve if Aboriginal

communities were given ‘access to the financial, administrative and professional

resources of the kind available to local governments’.

Each review believed that devolving a range of powers to AP by establishing it formally

as a local government was a way to overcome the confusion surrounding state and

Commonwealth services and lines of accountability, while simultaneously enabling AP

to exercise more local authority in their own right.

Dunstan (1989) was also particularly concerned about the lack of a focus for policy-

making at the state government level. Further, there was a lack of clarity about the roles

of the Commonwealth and state governments, and workers within one community were

at times working to different and even competing policy objectives.

He also identified that the office of AP, based in Alice Springs, had approximately five

people employed for the purposes of administering the PLRA, whereas the co-located PC

had 16 staff (Dunstan 1989, p. 16). This stark difference in the resourcing of PC compared

to AP will be returned to later in this chapter in a discussion of AP’s eventual shift to its

purpose-built premises on the Lands.

Dunstan (1989, p.26) was also concerned about what he perceived to be a proliferation of

‘white advisers’ in Aboriginal Affairs, and he was sceptical of the tendency to overlay

87

local Aboriginal decision-making mores with bureaucratic demands. He commented on

the presence of many non-Indigenous staff, or piranpa, in influential positions in

communities, and he recommended increased support for Aboriginal training and

employment as a priority for realising self-determination on the Lands (Dunstan 1989).89

In his report, Dunstan (1989, p.27) described attending a General Meeting of AP at

Pipalyatjara on the Lands, where those present indicated that they did not want to be

consulted any further on ‘community government’ because they were ‘presently

preoccupied with [discussions about] ATSIC and the Treaty’.90 Dunstan (1989, p. 27)

argued that communities were poorly represented at this meeting:

The influence of white advisers from AP and the Pitjantjatjara Council on the debate at that

meeting was obvious. Thus the views expressed by AP are not necessarily indicative of a

consensus of opinion of community members. Permission to discuss the issues with individual

communities was not forthcoming.

Bonner (1988, p. iii) had signalled similar concerns about the number of piranpa external

advisors taking up positions in Anangu organisations since the advent of the PLRA,

arguing that:

as a consequence, control of resources and the political decision-making associated with their

distribution has continued to reside in outsiders who are employed by community-based

organizations.

Government staff often turned first to such professionals for advice or links when looking

to engage in the region, as they spoke English, understood bureaucratic policy contexts -

and they were familiar as piranpa too. However, Dunstan’s (1989) comments above

illustrate a further level of frustration about what he perceived as an increasing ‘gate-

keeping’ role being assumed by some advisers and workers on (and off) the Lands. All

of the reviews at this time commented on the increasing level of external pressure on the

Lands (and the growth of influential government advisers) in ways that resonate with the

letter earlier cited, by AP’s Lester and Lewis.

Equally mixed feelings were expressed in the reviews about the rapid development of

‘umbrella’ organisations. One of Bonner’s (1988, p. vi) terms of reference asked him to

comment on ‘the degree to which self-management by communities is being achieved

including the appropriate role in this process for Community Advisers funded by DAA91

89 Here, Dunstan (1989, p. 49) cited a positive example of how ‘the provision of police aids, nominated by

the local community, trained by…the Police Force has proved a successful and useful development in the

Pitjantjatjara Lands’. 90 The ATSIC was established by Hawke’s Labor government through its ATSIC Act 1989, which came

into effect in March 1990. 91 The DAA was the Commonwealth agency that commissioned the Bonner (1988) Review.

88

and “umbrella organisations”’. Bonner (1988) saw potential for tensions to emerge

between Anangu regional ‘umbrella’ organisations and locally elected community

councils, which were effectively pitted against one another in pursuit of government

funding. He argued that such tensions were exacerbated by the lack of clarity of the

respective roles of Anangu-controlled regional ‘umbrella’ organisations such as

Nganampa Health, the NPY Women’s Council, PY Media, and particularly AP and the

PC. Bonner (1988, p. 47) highlighted that:

The role of AP is ambiguous…and the Review has framed recommendations on the basis that

the role of AP remains confined to co-ordinating regional policy without eroding community

autonomy.

He recommended that AP assume the coordinating role for all essential services delivery,

play a key role in education policy development, and assume responsibility for the

regional coordination of health supplies and related support. His plan was for AP to be

the key regional policy body, with Anangu organisations such as Nganampa Health, the

NPY Women’s Council and PY Media being the ‘service delivery’ bodies operating

within policy settings established by AP.

As different family or kinship groups were associated with different organisations, such

a normative and hierarchical ‘rationalisation’ would alter the internal power balances and

(informal) resource sharing between communities and clans. Bonner (1988) was aware

that such a unified structure of governance would need to be phased in over time.

Bonner (1988, pp. 48–49) recommended that the PC be renamed to better reflect its tri-

state specialist services role. He suggested that the name ‘council’ was misleading, as the

organisation was basically a resource agency rather than a representative ‘governance’

council, which he argued was AP’s role. He recommended that the PC move towards a

model of charging a fee for service to provide support to regional and local community

organisations.

With respect to the NPY Women’s Council, Bonner (1988, p. 57) recommended

amendments to the PLRA to formally acknowledge the role of women in Anangu life and

ensure their representation in regional decision-making on the Lands, asserting that:

many external funding agencies and some advisers do not understand the dimensions of the role

of women in traditional Aboriginal communities…it is imperative that the system through which

resources are provided allow women to realise their potential as resource managers and nurturers

of community well-being.

While recommending ways to strengthen the influence of women, Bonner (1988) also

suggested that Anangu women should consider whether the resources available to the

89

NPY Women’s Council were being effectively utilised. Bonner recommended that both

AP and the NPY Women’s Council should employ their own female staff to ensure the

employment of Anangu women in positions of influence across the Lands and especially

in key governance structures. He argued that specialist regional coordinating positions for

women in each [my emphasis] body would maximise Anangu women’s voices in policy

(Bonner 1988, pp. 57–58). He favoured strengthening women’s voices in all fora rather

than channelling support for women through a separate regional body.

However, the NPY Women’s Council had formed with the specific aim of ensuring

Anangu women’s voices were heard through their own tri-state organisation that operated

separately from, but parallel to, the PC. As Nganyinytja92 explained:

So I said to the women, ‘Eh, we should become separate’. I suggested this because we had been

told to be quiet and leave. We all had something to say, about caring for our children and

families, about our aspirations to have good lives. We wanted to talk about issues to the

government. We wanted to talk together to give a strong message. That’s why we formed

Women’s Council (NPY 2010, p. 2).

During the 1980s, the NPY Women’s Council had grown considerably, not just in

budgetary terms, but also in status and influence, largely due to its proactive role

regarding alcohol and other substance abuse issues. Bonner (1988) argued that a tri-state

body that was based in Alice Springs and employed mainly piranpa was no longer the

most effective option for women on the Lands. He suggested that the interests of AP

women would be better served through the employment of Anangu women, the formal

integration of Anangu women’s issues into regional governance arrangements, and the

encouragement of their own local income-generating activities.

In what was a forward-thinking but likely (sadly) unrealistic suggestion at the time,

Bonner argued for a form of affirmative action in which Anangu women’s roles and status

would be ‘identified’ in the PLRA and all associated community council legislation

(Bonner 1988, p.58).

Unlike Bonner’s (1988) radical approach to internal governance issues, SA’s Proctor

Review was more concerned with creating a more orderly and streamlined bureaucratic

service system. The South Australian Government supported a stronger coordinating

‘umbrella’ role for AP operating among, rather than substituting for, other powerful

service-specific tri-state Anangu bodies such as the NPY Women’s Council and

92 Information on the early days of NPY and the role of senior Anangu law woman Nganyinytja (OAM) is

available at <http://www.npywc.org.au/about-npywc/history/>.

90

Nganapma Health. Conversely, the Commonwealth did not fund ‘umbrella’

organisations—only projects in individual communities.93

The 1980s policy climate was shifting towards an increased Commonwealth presence,

which further complicated an already complex policy and service delivery environment.

Proctor’s Review argued that a ‘chaotic’ state of service provision was impeding

Aboriginal community advancement. Itidentified three ‘urgent’ areas for the SA

Government’s attention: first, the developing role of the Commonwealth and changed

Commonwealth–state relations with respect to service provision; second, the changed

role of the state government and growth in the number of South Australian Government

departments providing services; and third, a growing public policy emphasis on changing

‘the nature of the relationship between Government Departments and agencies and the

Aboriginal community for whom services are being provided’ (Proctor 1987, p. 13).

Dunstan (1989) also focused on lines of accountability rather than Bonner’s (1988)

suggestions for building Anangu capacity through developing new cultural modes of

governance. Dunstan considered it inappropriate to have multiple communities on the

Lands—all with separate local government status (Dunstan 1989, p. 19). Instead, he

favoured a regional model that would recognise AP as a substantial local government.

Dunstan (1989) advised the Bannon government that: i) Aboriginal communities under

the ALT, MLRA and PLRA were not receiving local government services comparable to

other members of the SA community, ‘nor in accordance with need’; ii) self-management

structures were unsatisfactory, and additional funding, bylaw-making powers and support

for enterprise development through CDEP was required; and iii) the South Australian

Local Government Grants Commission should establish a government system based on

the discrete, regional or mainstream options discussed in the report, ‘ensuring that the

system take into account disability factors and properly applies the principle of horizontal

equalisation’. Dunstan (1989, p. 64) also recommended that legislation be prepared to

enable communities to ‘opt for…local government in a manner and at a pace which…best

suited their needs and aspirations’.

The Dunstan (1989) Report was a further stage on from the earlier Proctor (1987) and

Bonner (1988) Reviews. It articulated some similar concerns about a lack of policy

coordination and the chaotic, ‘maze’-like nature of government service delivery to the

93 See Robbins’ (1993) study of petrol sniffing Commonwealth/state ‘coordination’ issues in Central

Australia in the late 1980s fordetail on how divergent approaches impeded service delivery at this time.

91

Lands. But while Proctor (1987) argued for Commonwealth/state rationalisation and

Bonner (1988) pushed for cultural appropriate governance to enhance self-management,

Dunstan (1989) canvassed practical options for the introduction of a form of Aboriginal

local government within the SA policy context.

3.6 AP’s Response to the Dunstan Report

The Commonwealth was becoming increasingly influential in the Lands in the 1980s, as

evidenced by the Bonner Review. However, it was the Dunstan (1989) Report that AP

gave a written response to. Dunstan was an important figure as the PLRA’s instigator,

and in the 1980s he was still a ‘king maker’ in SA politics.

In May 1990, AP indicated that it welcomed Dunstan’s (1989) recommendations. They

argued that ‘various local government type options put forward in the Dunstan Report…in

some respects [coincide with] the present and pre-existing policy of AP in relation to local

government’; however, AP also pointed out the danger they perceived in ‘self-

determination being confused with self-sufficiency’ (AP 1990, p. 1).

They also argued for stronger, more ‘cohesive’ and ongoing funding to support the service

delivery and governance needs of Anangu communities and homelands (AP 1990). AP

pointed out that, following the 1987 amendments, bylaw-making powers had been made

available for the control of alcohol consumption and gambling on the Lands, which could

readily be expanded to include other local government-type functions.

AP’s response drew heavily on its prior contribution to the 1987 Committee of Review

on Environmental and Public Health on the AP Lands Report to the SA Minister for

Health—‘Uwankara Palyanyku Kanyintjaku (UPK): A Strategy for Well-being’—which

recommended the expansion of AP’s role to enable it to become:

a) a coordinating and resource body to Anangu communities in housing, essential

services, health, education, welfare and other services on the AP Lands

b) a regional management body for the AP Lands in administering and provision of

services….[responsible for] health, welfare, education and TAFE, building and

public works, air transport, enterprises, legal and anthropological services; the

planning, provision and maintenance of all housing and permanent structures on

the AP lands; essential services, water, sewerage, electricity and refuse disposal;

the operation and management of all community stores (UPK 1987, p. 3).

AP’s response can be considered a bid to become a peak governing ‘umbrella’ body on

the Lands, not only for land management and permits, but also for human services, as

Bonner had also advocated. At the time, these services were being managed by other

‘umbrella’ Anangu bodies, such as NPY and Nganampa Health, which were not

accountable to governance structures established by the PLRA.

92

AP (1990, p. 4) argued that it was already performing many of these local government

functions and that, in the Executive’s view, the PLRA 1981 made it clear that:

AP is the body designed to have control over the AP lands [and that] any derogation of that

control by way of imposition of a separate local government body with the consequent potential

conflict of powers would not be in the best interests of traditional owners.

This accorded with Dunstan’s (1989) view that AP was in effect a regional local

government, but one without the formal status and funding of a local government. AP

argued that while there was a ‘proliferation of Aboriginal groups and service providers

operating on the AP Lands’, this was in fact a demonstration of ‘a very important part of

self-determination’ and a response to the need for autonomy and flexibility, as well as

being symptomatic of the many sources of funding available from Commonwealth and

state governments for various service functions (AP 1990).

In a subtle and nuanced way, AP argued that it did not want to take over other Anangu

regional organisations; rather, it wanted to act as a means of bringing the dispersed

governance of the Lands together: ‘AP is certainly the most appropriate body on a

regional level to coordinate this flexible arrangement’ (AP 1990).

By referring to the PLRA’s empowerment of Anangu decision-making regarding

development on the Lands, along with the range of Anangu organisations that had grown

up around the same period, the response paper argued that:

by increasing its [AP’s] local government type functions and powers…great flexibility would

be achieved and maintained [in ways] totally consistent with the ideals of Anangu self-

determination (AP 1990, p. 5).

The response paper reveals AP’s increasingly assertive claim to being the ‘peak’ Lands

governance body. Both the Bonner (1988) and Dunstan (1989) Reviews added weight to

the perceptions of AP as the key regional Anangu entity on the SA side of the tri-state

border, separate from the PC. The response paper also emphasised that the planned

relocation of the AP office onto the Lands—for which the Commonwealth had promised

funding—was a key part of AP separating out in order to no longer be a cypher of the PC,

but a key Anangu regional body looking to work closely with its constituency:

The proposed relocation of the AP office away from Alice Springs to a more central location on

the AP lands by August 1990 should enhance the responsiveness of that office to local needs

and ensure a sufficient degree of control at a local community level (AP 1990).

3.7 AP Moves to the Lands: Tensions with the PC Emerge

Relocation to Umuwa and away from Alice Springs and the PC was nevertheless a big

step for AP, which until this time had enjoyed an almost symbiotic relationship with the

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PC—the crucible in which it grew (SC 2004, p. 17). For more than a decade, the PC had

been AP’s organisational arm, acting for and on behalf of Anangu on the Lands. When

co-located with the PC in its Wilkinson Street, Alice Springs compound, AP was also in

close proximity to Nganampa Health, the NPY Women’s Council and a range of other

Anangu services.

Despite its unique legislative status, AP was effectively embedded as part of the PC’s

stable of serviced and resourced agencies. Despite its separate role and organisational

presence, it had continued to be dependent on the larger resource agency it had grown

from. During the first decade of the PLRA, there was no funding from the Commonwealth

or state governments for AP to operate separately from the PC; thus:

Pitjantjatjara Council staff administered the granting of permits to enter the AP Lands. In

addition, the Council’s lawyers and anthropologist continued to act for Anangu Pitjantjatjara,

including overseeing negotiations between Traditional Owners and mining companies (SC

2004, p. 17).

Dunstan (1989) had highlighted the disproportionate level of staffing provided to the PC,

which had over three times more staff than AP. While the PC had a larger tri-state area to

cover, its superior level of Commonwealth funding secured a burgeoning legal and

anthropological team which meant it dominated AP’s capacity to support Anangu

regarding development matters on the Lands. However, by 1989, the Commonwealth had

agreed to provide enough funding to enable AP to ‘employ a secretary and senior project

adviser and to assume, among other things, responsibility for the permit system’ (PLPC

1989/90, p. 6). The following year, the Commonwealth delivered on its promise to fund

offices for AP to be built on the Lands (PLPC 1990/91, p. 2).

Colloquially referred to as the ‘Canberra of the Lands’,94 Umuwa95 was selected by

Anangu as the site for the new purpose-built AP administrative offices that were intended

to co-locate major service providers and corral outsider piranpa visitors away from

communities. The new AP offices were established on an independent site in a location

that was easily accessible to most of the main communities, but that was also separate

from where Anangu families lived, so communities continued to have some privacy away

from an influx of piranpa outsiders.

94 Reference to ‘Umuwa’ as the ‘Canberra of the Lands’ or APY ‘capital’ is common in local community

discussions and is an expression frequently used by locals—both Anangu and piranpa, in personal

communications with the author. 95 Umuwa was built in 1991 and AP moved there in 1991. Next, PY Media moved from Ernabella (Pukatja),

and Nganampa Health established an office there in 1993. APY Land Management services and a range of

government offices have since been established at Umuwa, which is a central point or ‘capital’ for

governance and service providers on the Lands.

94

Mission days were in living memory for elders; hence, a purpose-built administrative base

or hub that was away from communities was preferred. Umuwa was considered a

‘neutral’ place where people from every community could join together, and/or meet

visitors, without any community or kinship group being favoured or people intruding on

others’ customary Lands. Managing any potential local community or kinship rivalries

through creating ‘neutral’ places for meetings has a traditional basis in Anangu culture.

Although situated closest to the largest community of Pukatja (Ernabella), Umuwa was

accessible from every direction and to every community on the Lands.

The PLPC96 suggested that this relocation of AP onto the Lands was ‘in line with

objectives set at the time of the land handover in 1981’ (PLPC 1991, p. 2). As the PLPC’s

1990/91 annual report to parliament explained:

Currently the Director and Administrator are in residence at Umuwa and other staff including

the Administrator of the Nganampa Health Service plan to transfer to the lands, during 1991/92.

Your Committee believes that this move will bring about more effective oversight of the lands

and will become the focus for planning and co-ordination of services (PLPC 1991).

Anangu sought to consolidate their advancement by bringing regional Anangu agencies

and AP together in a new administrative capital at Umuwa, located closer to communities

and thus might be more likely to enact their wishes as envisioned by the PLRA.

Figure 3.1: Offices of Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara at Umuwa. Source: APY

Lands (http://www.anangu.com.au/)

However, while day-to-day relationships between key players began to gradually change

after AP relocated to Umuwa as an independent identity for the Lands on the Lands, AP’s

structural dependence on the PC remained much the same. AP’s reliance on the PC and

its staff was not easily disaggregated when the legal, administrative and anthropological

96 The PLPC was established by the PLRA Amendment Act 1987 to monitor progress under the PLRA. The

PLPC was chaired by the Minister and included two MPs from the government and two from the opposition.

Its operations were to be reviewed after five years.

95

expertise to manage applications for mining exploration remained with the Council based

in Alice. Even after AP’s relocation to Umuwa and its assumption of the role of managing

general permit requests:

the Pitjantjatjara Council continued to service Anangu Pitjantjatjara with respects to its legal

and anthropological requirements, in particular the processing of applications for mining

exploration licenses (PLPC 1991/92, p. 2).

3.7.1 From open to closed communication

However, at the everyday level, the move altered how Anangu in AP and PC interacted:

The establishment of the administrative centre inevitably affected the ease with which Anangu

Pitjantjatjara staff could communicate with the Pitjantjatjara Council on a day to day basis (SC

2004, p. 18).

Insights into how the shift changed dynamics between key Anangu individuals are

obtained by reflecting in more detail on the changes to the communications environment

after the move to Umuwa. The original means of communications between organisations

in Alice Springs, Anangu leaders and other local people on the Lands was CB radio,

which enabled open and instantaneous discussion: ‘day-to-day communication with the

AP Lands was maintained via the use of a sideband high frequency radio system’97

(Rainow, pers. com. 2006):

Anangu have long recognised the importance of being able to communicate effectively over

vast distances (Nicholls 2009).98

Radio enabled Anangu communities ‘to monitor regional negotiations and encouraged

transparency in matters of governance’. As PY Media (2006, p. 10) observed:99

This broadcast made their work public. Everyone knew what the workers on the Land were

involved with. This allowed all community members to be informed of the decisions being made

about services.

During earlier decades, two-way high-frequency (HF) radio, known as the ‘Pitjantjatjara

bush radio’, enabled people to converse over long distances. Discussions were publicly

available and widely accessible—everyone knew what everyone else was saying.

Decision-making and dialogue, including conflicts and disagreements, were all largely

played out ‘in the open’,100 and Anangu could talk among themselves, spread news and

share decision-making processes, even across long distances.

97 Pers. comm. with Stephan Rainow, Public/Environmental Officer UPK, Nganampa Health Council, 20

March 2006, Alice Springs. 98 See Anangu paper tracker at <http://www.papertracker.com.au>. 99 For a summary of PY Media and others’ reports of the effect of HF radio and its loss when telephone

replaced radio as the key medium of Lands communication, see Report of the Select Committee on

Pitjantjatjara Land Rights (2004, pp. 36, 218). 100 See PY Media (2005) and Sidey (1986).

96

Nicholls (2009) suggested that the use of the ‘bush radio’ played an important part in the

campaign for land rights.101 As Anangu leader and TO Owen Burton (2006, p. 9) recalled

in a submission to a Commonwealth Inquiry into community broadcasting:102

Every morning everyone would get up and turn on the HF radio before they did anything else.

They would tune in to any number of the conversations taking place. If someone were sick they

would listen and then pass on the information to the doctor or nurse…. When discussions about

land rights began…[HF] radio was already there. We started using the radio to send out

messages to everybody…Donald Fraser started using the radio to broadcast news when he was

chairperson of Anangu Pitjantjatjara Council. Later, Yami Lester, a Yankunytjatjara elder,

became the chairperson of the Council and took over the radio responsibilities. He delivered the

‘Pitjantjatjara News’ every morning. Radio gave out news across the land. People across the

Lands were listening to the news, and public discussions about Freehold Land.

Through such open communication across wide distances, Anangu could speak in their

own language/s (Yankunytjatjara/Pitjantjatjara/Ngaanyatjarra and other Western desert

dialects) and decipher what was going on and what decisions they wanted to make

through regular, inclusive multi-layered discussions (Burton 2006).

The roll-out of telephone connectivity replaced the HF public ‘bush radio’ network by

the beginning of the 1990s. Along with the physical shift of AP away from the PC and its

Alice Springs resource base, it disrupted relational dynamics and altered how business

was conducted and how people communicated to make decisions.

One commentator later summarised that:

We really ran into trouble with this telephone. Because Anangu cannot read or write, everything

is through the mouth. When the radio stopped and everyone was one-to-one on the telephone,

people suddenly did not know what was going on any more (SC 2004, p. 37).103

The telephone individualised communications that were previously conducted en masse,

openly and communally. As later suggested by PY Media citing Scales,104 an

anthropologist with the PC, this shift in communication contributed to a growing tension

between protagonists in the various Anangu regional organisations:

Anangu culture is an oral culture. HF radio broadcasting suits an oral culture. The biggest thing

about the HF radio was that it was public. There were not misunderstandings. Information was

not kept privately. It was disseminated out there-whether it was public or private information….

The telephone stopped that totally…everyone became a lot more private and held on to

information usually for reasons of power. Radio is democratic; the telephone and fax are

autocratic. People could gain power by holding information back, information that was only

learnt if you were holding the telephone receiver cited in (PY Media 2006, pp. 10–11).

101 Establishing a ‘radio link-up’ was discussed at the inaugural meeting of the PC (PC Minutes, 13–14 July

1976). 102 Burton (2006, Sub 51). 103 Scales (cited in Parliament of South Australia 2004). 104 Scales (cited in PY Media 2006).

97

Personal relationships between Anangu leaders shifted as people gravitated more towards

one or the other organisation. In contrast, the role of piranpa staff—especially those with

professional law, administration, community work or anthropological qualifications in

the PC—remained relatively constant as an influential source of advice for Anangu.

Despite the advent of AP as a creation of the PLRA, PC remained the dominant agency,

as a pivotal hub for Anangu relationshsips and caucasing on critical policy and political

issues across the region.

It is relatively easy to see how and why the Anangu initiated and well-established tri-state

resource body, the PC, comparatively well funded (primarily by the Commonwealth) and

with a strong record of representing the interests of Anangu from WA, NT and SA,

remained influential. The PC had after all been the driver for the PLRA whereas AP was

a top–down construct of the State-based PLRA and hence reliant on the SA Government

for its existence. In comparison, the PC grew out of grassroots Anangu action, had a long

history in the region and a team of influential and well-qualified piranpa staff.

Dunstan (1989) had also identified the inequities in power and resources between AP and

the PC, and the potential for difficulties to arise from AP’s continued dependence on

anthropological and legal advice provided by the PC. While the pursuit of organisational

clarity can be critiqued for being simplistic, normative and functionalist, analyses in both

Bonner (1988) and Dunstan’s (1989) Reviews pointed to the emerging imbalance of

power between these two key Anangu organisations, as inequities in resourcing and

recognition promoted the PC’s role and tended to stymie AP’s growth. The conflation of

the PC and AP created ambiguity for some Anangu, public servants and politicians, and

it continued to do so long after AP’s shift to Umuwa.

3.8 Reflecting Back on the First 10 Years

3.8.1 Celebrating the first decade: Anangu aspirations for the next decade

Critical issues regarding substance abuse, AP’s developing role in governance and

funding for basic services on the Lands were simmering just out of sight as major

celebrations took place to mark the 10-year anniversary of the PLRA at the end of 1991.

During the celebrations, TO Gary Lewis, AP’s Director since 1985, spoke of the growth

in administrative demands on Anangu since the passing of the Act:

I receive mail from eighty different government departments…and an uncountable number of

individuals and other organizations wanting to deal with AP in one way or another’ (Lewis cited

in Trudinger 1991, p. 63).

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Lewis had worked with others to see AP’s administration shifted from Alice Springs to

Umuwa on the Lands in time for the celebrations. He reflected as follows:

Now the office is situated close to the people where it is easy for people to come together to

discuss business and for the AP Office to serve the people.

For the future 10 years I’d like to see more Anangu working in their own organization to work

for their own people. We already see old people going back to their own country to look after

their land. Anangu are already working in their offices without white advisers in some

homelands. In ten year’s time the AP office should have more Anangu working like this. We

can do this if we work together and support each other for the next 10 years like we did when

we fought for the Land Rights (Lewis cited in Trudinger 1991, p.63).

Elder Kunmanara Nyaningu (cited in Trudinger 1991, p. 46) echoed the need for

continued development of Anangu administrative and financial governance:

In the years back then we were continually speaking to the Government and to lawyers and

initially…the government were handling all our finances. But later on the communities and the

councils became established, and the council, the Pitjantjatjara Council which had by then

started, was planning how Anangu Maru were to handle their own financial affairs…because of

that the Government drew up the Land Rights Act and it was given back to the Anangu

Pitjantjatjara. So now the AP looks after the Land. And now it is 10 years on.

So what do we see for the future?…everyone keep up the good work…for the next 10 years you

can continue to develop…in a similar way as to how a football player learns to play the rules of

football…and AP that is, us, are like a government.

All the small councils make up one big one. And that is how we are like our own Anangu

Government. It has a lot of responsibility for many things and we from big communities and

from homelands have many, many things we want to hand down for our children, that the men,

women, old men and old women want to remain protected.

Themes about the protection of the Lands, the development of self-governance and the

continuity of Anangu custodianship featured strongly in the 1991 celebrations, which

reflected on the first decade of the Land Rights Act and contemplated the next decade.

Tjikalyi Colin (cited in Trudinger 1991, p. 48) also expressed pride in the progress that

‘pumpas’ (women elders) had made since the passing of the Act:

I’m thinking about this lovely land of ours. When the people live on their own land they are

happy, strong and healthy. In the olden days the government held the whole of this land and

kept it as if it was their own. But no it was our land, the Pitjantjatjaras and Yankunytjatjaras. A

long time ago it belonged to grandparents and further out than that to their fathers, mothers and

children. These people were without the Government and without Whites [stet] and they were

happy…. Recently Whites came on to the land of the Anangu and they established large

settlements and did all sorts of activities for the Anangu to stay here…that was the Whiteman’s

way and now we live in two ways. The Government, having said it was theirs, sent a lot of

whites into the Lands. They came to set up all these activities and look after Anangu. The

Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara people strongly thought about and wanted to get their own land

back. Having talked about it a great deal we got it. And then we were happy. Now we, Anangu

are happy to be living on our own land. In order to get the land we set up the Pitjantjatjara

Council. We appointed Anangu bosses to look after this land of the Anangu. Also to speak with

a loud voice to the Government.

Then we set up the Anangu Pitjantjatjara and similarly put Anangu Executives into position.

They, those good people, now work hard strongly and well…after us in years to come the

children can live in their own land and work strongly and happily…I believe that the land of the

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Anangu is very beautiful. We are happy and are able to do many good, worthwhile activities on

our own land.

This mood of pride, excitement and sense of achievement was in line with the general

national and state policy context at the beginning of the second decade of the PLRA.

However, AP was still struggling to find its place among the many other regional service

bodies that had grown up in the Lands with the funding and program support of many

Commonwealth and state government departments. Behind the celebrations, many

Anangu (and piranpa) were disquieted by mounting social problems in their communities

and the lack of consistent, timely support to address these issues.

Figure 3.2: Celebrations of 10-year anniversary of the PLRA (Koori Mail, 20

November 1991, pp. 12–13)

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Chapter 4: The Second Decade

‘We took our eye off the ball for a while and problems emerged again’.105

4.1 Introduction

As the second decade of the PLRA was dawning across the Lands, what some called a

‘revolution in Aboriginal Affairs’ was taking place at the national level106 (Pratt 2003, p.

3). Aboriginal leaders and Commonwealth Government officials were preoccupied with

the establishment of ATSIC, a statutory body designed to bring together representative

and executive functions in Indigenous policy.

This chapter argues that ATSIC’s layered governance arrangements, including regional

and zone elections, iconic personalities and complex administrative machinery, sucked

energy away from remote regions like the Lands. The level of the South Australian

Government’s interaction with Aboriginal communities decreased during this time and

attention to the escalating health and social well-being issues on the AP Lands suffered.

This chapter reveals how ATSIC and the Commonwealth assumed greater influence over

the Lands, as the main funders of services in the region. Meanwhile, the South Australian

Government was preoccupied with the fall-out from the collapse of its State Bank in 1991,

the resulting resignation of Labor Premier Bannon in 1992 and the electoral defeat of

Labor in December 1993. The State Bank collapse was one of the biggest events in SA’s

history and left the state with billions of dollars in public debt. This chapter argues that

the associated political and economic instability in SA, coupled with a protracted dispute

over the Hindmarsh Island (Kumarangk) Bridge, all but erased the grander social

reforming ideas of the Dunstan era.

105 See reflections of the SA police (SAPOL) regarding the late 1990s in evidence summarised in Report of

the Select Committee on Pitjantjatjara Land Rights (2004, p. 41). 106 Here, Pratt (2003, p. 3) draws on a contemporaneous article written by Rowse (1990). However, the

extent to which the coming of ATSIC marked a significant shift in Commonwealth policy is a contentious

issue. When signalling his intent to establish ATSIC, Commonwealth Aboriginal Affairs Minister Gerry

Hand called it ‘the most far reaching and innovative reform in Aboriginal policy since the Commonwealth

became involved’ (Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 11 December 1987, p. 3152).

However, when later discussing how ATSIC would consolidate a number of the functions of precursor

bodies into one, Labor Prime Minister Hawke suggested that it was simply ‘the logical and appropriate next

step for the advancement of both the great principles of self-management and ministerial accountability’

(Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 15 August 1989, p. 42). For discussion on the policy

continuum leading up to, and including the establishment of ATSIC, see Sanders (1994).

101

In the second half of the 1990s, petrol sniffing again escalated on the Lands, resulting in

trauma for Anangu families and social distress in communities. This chapter shows that

as a result of the sudden increase in attention to petrol sniffing in Central Australia at this

time, tri-state Anangu organisations such as the NPY Women’s Council and Nganampa

Health grew steadily in stature and funding through working with the Commonwealth

Government on substance abuse and related health and welfare issues.

Recognition of AP’s local government status reached another level in the 1990s, but this

was insufficient for helping AP to cope with escalating social problems, as it had no brief

or resources for managing social issues. While bylaws were utilised and Avgas and other

solutions were trialled, social problems resulting from petrol sniffing became still more

entrenched. Despite a lack of cooperation by local alcohol supply licensees, an important

report by Australia’s Race Discrimination Commissioner affirmed Anangu rights to

alcohol restrictions on their Lands (HREOC1995).

With its brief to act on behalf of TOs, AP was weakened by external pressures and

deepening internal tensions and uncertainties regarding the role of the PC, and mining

issues exacerbated tensions between and within these two peak Anangu bodies. This

chapter reveals how ‘pro-mining’ and ‘pro-PC process’ groups emerged within the AP

Executive at the end of the 1990s.

The latter part of the 1990s saw the end of the Hawke/Keating Labor era (1983–1996),

and a Howard coalition government was elected to national office, heralding a shift in

policy away from self-determination towards ‘practical reconciliation’. An ‘operational

review’ of AP, which was funded by the Commonwealth Government and conducted

jointly with the South Australian Government, made recommendations for the

empowerment of AP at this time, which closely echoed those of the Proctor (1987),

Bonner (1988) and Dunstan (1989) Reviews a decade earlier (see Chapter 3).

This chapter argues that during the second decade of the operation of the PLRA, the South

Australian Government, then challenged by financial and other pressures, took its ‘eye

off the ball’ (SC 2004, p. 36) in relation to petrol sniffing and other challenging issues,

and it failed to heed AP’s continued appeals for assistance.

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4.2 ATSIC Takes Centre Stage

After more than two years of consultations and negotiations with Aboriginal people,

including those on the AP Lands, ATSIC became a reality in March 1990.107 ATSIC’s

structure involved a network of 60 elected regional councils. Between 1990 and 1993,

one of these councils (Indulkana) corresponded well with the AP Lands (Sanders 1994;

Pratt 2003; Pratt & Bennett 2004).

Initially, there were two ATSIC Councils—the Indulkana (Ngintaka) and Leigh Creek

Nulla Wangaka Tjuta—covering the Lands, as well as the wider North Western region of

SA. In the first ATSIC elections in 1990, 12 Anangu representatives, including one

woman, were elected in the Indulkana ATSIC electorate.

Changes to the ATSIC legislation in 1993 reduced the number of regional councils from

60 to 36, and Indulkana (Ngintaka) and Leigh Creek (Nulla Wangaka) Tjuta were

amalgamated under the new banner of the Port Augusta (Nulla Wimila Kutju) Regional

Council of ATSIC, which covered a much larger area and did not correspond as well to

AP’s boundaries.

Within the larger regional electorate, two AP areas denoted as Indulkana and Amata were

initially entitled to elect six representatives (four and two respectively) in 1993 (see Table

4.1). This dropped to only four (two in each) in 1996, 1999 and 2002. While the first

council included an Anangu woman (Sylvia de Rose) among its 12 elected

representatives, when the number of positions to be elected was reduced in 1993, no other

Anangu women were elected.

TO and Anangu elder Lester, who had been instrumental in the formation of the PC and

a driving force behind the PLRA campaign, was a South Australian Zone Commissioner

for the area from 1990 to 1993 (ATSIC 1995). While active together with Thompson,

Lewis, the Burtons and others in the early PC and AP councils, Lester was also

preoccupied with ATSIC matters during this decade. The Lands’ representation on the

Regional Council decreased from 12 to four between 1990 and 1996; however, the locus

of ATSIC’s regional power became concentrated around the Port Augusta and (inner)

107 The Hawke government’s intention to establish ATSIC was announced in December 1987 in a statement

entitled ‘Foundations for the future’ by the new Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Gerry Hand. An SC inquiry

into the proposal and Aboriginal Development Commission dismissals followed. Passage of the ATSIC

legislation was delayed until after the SC reported in 1989. It eventually passed the Parliament of Australia

in late 1989 and became operational in March 1990.

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Northern country areas, while its influence in policy, administration and funding was

consolidated in metropolitan Adelaide.

Table 4.1: ATSIC AP Lands’ Representatives 1990–2002

1990 1993 1996 1999 2002

Indulkana Punch Thompson

Sylvia de Rose

Gerry Moody

Donald Fraser

Arthur Stewart

Ivan Baker

Wilton Foster

Colin Brown

Danny Colson

Tjampu Smith

Lee Brady

Leonard Burton

Indulkana

Yami Lester

Gary Lewis

Punch Thompson

Danny Colson

Amata Wilton Foster

Leonard Burton

Indulkana

Yami Lester;

Punch Thompson

Amata

Lee Brady

Tony Adamson

Indulkana

Bernard Singer

Donald Fraser

Amata Leonard Burton;

Frank Young

Indulkana

Bernard Singer,

Donald Fraser

Amata Leonard

Burton; Frank

Young

Source: ATSIC Electoral Newsfiles No. 11, December 1990; No. 39, February 1994; No. 60, December

1996; No. 93, December 1999; No. 108; April 2003.

The Port Augusta Nulla Wimila Kutju Regional Council covered a large area of diverse

contexts and needs, from country to regional to remote, and from the West Coast to the

‘iron triangle’ to the more remote Maralinga and AP Lands. Those who were fluent in

English and familiar with government bureaucratic and administrative processes and the

politics of ‘grantsmanship’ were more likely to exert influence in the region than others

(Burgoyne pers. com. 2012).108 More importantly, there was no formal link between the

Nulla Wimila Kutju Regional Council of ATSIC with its Anangu representatives and AP

or its Executive. The Lands felt increasingly marginalised.

In a submission to a 1993 Review of ATSIC, AP pushed for an accountability link to be

established between the Lands and ATSIC, suggesting that an AP Commissioner was

essential to creating greater alignment between the self-determining powers of ATSIC

and those envisaged for Anangu under the PLRA (ATSIC 1993, p. 60). Anangu argued

that they were not receiving their fair share of funding and support from ATSIC, and they

wanted their authority under the PLRA to be formally acknowledged (ATSIC 1993).

Looking back at this 1990s period, it appears that over time, Anangu, who had been major

players in the 1980s as creators of the bold and historic PLRA and who were used to

108 Peter Burgoyne was the regional councillor for ATSIC Ceduna (Wangka Pulka South) from 1996 to

1999 and an experienced administrator as CEO of the Port Lincoln Aboriginal Community Council. He

completed a Masters in Aboriginal Studies in 2004 and examined ATSIC voting patterns and resource

distribution in regional SA.

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enjoying a unique dialogue (mandated by legislation) with the South Australian

Government, became comparatively minor players in the complex machinery of the

national ATSIC, overshadowed and outvoted by other voices and other localities.

The emergence of ATSIC as the major player in Aboriginal Affairs drew attention away

from state-based issues and local concerns and consumed the energy of many local leaders

and communities. State government bureaucracies tended to withdraw from their

previous, more direct, engagement with AP issues, as the Commonwealth and ATSIC

loomed large. ATSIC’s increasing dominance added to what was already becoming a

crowded governance and service delivery field.

Having a national Aboriginal-controlled organisation through which to voice issues and

obtain support was consistent with Anangu aspirations for self-determination; however,

in effect, ATSIC’s dominance through the 1990s created yet another regional body with

different dynamics, politics, goals and accountabilities for Anangu to navigate. Without

any acknowledgement of the PLRA or structural interface with AP, the ATSIC Regional

Council formed yet another layer of governance for Anangu to negotiate.

4.2.1 Politically engaged Anangu—same people, different organisations?

The complex articulations between AP, the PC, the ATSIC Regional Council and

Anangu-controlled regional service provider organisations—some tri-state and some SA-

specific—created many opportunities for misinformation, misunderstandings, confusion

and tensions, but also continuities and collaborations. This complex context produced an

effective, active and adept Anangu leadership elite that operated in what was becoming

an increasingly crowded and competitive space, as well as an increasingly

Commonwealth-dominated one.

Many of the same Anangu leaders who were active in the 1980s PLRA campaign—the

PC and AP—reappeared as elected ATSIC representatives in the regional councils

covering the Lands in the 1990s (see Table 4.1 above), and many also played key roles in

developing and managing the increasingly sophisticated network of Anangu regional

service providers that emerged during these two decades. The names of prominent

Anangu regularly reappeared in the political life of the Lands, with particular family/clan

or language groups congregating around the specific key agencies they had contributed

time and support to building. For example, as illustrated by Table 4.1 Thompson, Lewis,

Fraser, Singer and Burton were names recurring acorss the years as ATSIC

representatives for the Lands. People closely rletaed to each of these family groups tended

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to cluster together around not only ATSIC, PC and AP structures but also key Anangu

agencies - such as the Singers with their long history with Nganampa Health and the

Frasers with PY Media for example. It was customary for family and kinship groups to

work hard to secure resources for their immediate clan while then also sharing a

distribution of excess resources equitably acorss Anangu communities. Such customary

resource sharing along familial lines was continuing to play out subtly as new power bases

around Anangu organisations took shape on the Lands.

This was an informal proportional representation or sharing of positions along cultural

and kinship lines that was not necessarily visible to ‘white fella’ outsiders, but that was

characteristic of a preferred dispersed local governance network of leaders and key

families (Smith 2008, p. 212). It is also not uncommon in other localities,109 especially in

rural and remote contexts, for active leaders to be engaged in multiple roles in multiple

organisations, some voluntary and same paid (Hunt 2008; Smith 2008, 2010). Sanders

(2004, p.15) suggests that ‘power sharing, responsiveness and autonomy’ are often a

preferred mode of dispersed community governance in remote community contexts.

Sanders argues this may reflect the ‘value placed on autonomy within Aboriginal society’

(ibid). As Rowse (1992, p.89) observes ‘self-determination’ in this context may be as

much about autonomy from each other, as from non-Indigenous people and governments.

Anangu remained persistent and ingenious at locating as many different vantage points

as possible from which to engage in political advocacy. Communities were engaged in

local politics and were politically active, as illustrated by the high voter turn-out of

approximately 34–48% of the eligible Lands population in the five regional ATSIC

elections that took place between 1990 and 2002, compared to an estimated 11–14% for

the metropolitan area during the same period.110

This high voter turn-out for the Lands in ATSIC regional council elections indicates that

there was no lack of interest by Anangu in governance issues or funding and policy

concerns of importance to their region.

109 See also Bern’s 1989 analysis of comparable inter-family politics in the NT. 110 The high participation rate in regional ATSIC elections compared to the much lower turn-out for

metropolitan Adelaide was based on Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) data provided for ATSIC

regional elections taken and extrapolated from AEC Newsfile, No. 39, February 1994 (ATSIC elections

1993).

106

4.2.2 Growth in regional organisations—crowded and competing

Added to the mix with ATSIC, the PC and AP was the rapid growth in the 1990s of the

specialised regional Anangu service provider agencies—each with an elected Anangu

Board and often piranpa staff working closely with an elected Anangu chairperson. As

discussed in Chapters 1 and 3 of this thesis, the NPY Women’s Council, Nganampa

Health, PY Media and later AP Services were all powerful examples of the proactive

drive of Anangu towards self-determination and self-efficacy. These Anangu-specialised

regional service organisations grew in experience, funding, prominence and power during

the 1990s, and joined the PC and AP as parts of a dispersed local governance network on

the Lands.

Mike Last, who was closely connected with the PC for many years, documented the rapid

growth in Anangu service agencies during this period—some with a tri-state brief and

others focused on AP Lands. He argued that the rapid expansion of Anangu-run service

organisations placed pressure on the PC not only organisationally, in terms of the PC’s

early efforts to house multiple Anangu agencies co-located as part of a Pitjantjatjara

resource centre precinct, but also politically, as agencies moved towards independence

and away from their reliance on the tri-state PC that had spawned them:

During the 1990s, the number of resource agencies stayed much the same, however many

experienced large expansions. Adjoining properties were purchased to house Anangu Winkiku

Stores, Ngaanyatjarra, Pitjantjatjara, Yankunytjatjara Women’s Council and Anangu

Pitjantjatjara. The expansions in Aboriginal Airlines resulted in it finally moving to nearby

premises in Wilkinson Street. Anangu Pitjantjatjara moved onto the Lands when the Resource

Centre at Umuwa was completed in 1991…. In the latter part of the 1990’s, the Ngaanyatjarra

PitjantjatjaraYankunytjatjara Women’s Council experienced the most expansion. As a Council

they successfully obtained funds for many high priority programs for the benefit of people on

the Lands. Hence more advisory personnel were required, which increased the need for office

space (Last 2001, p. 10).

At this time, major Anangu organisations continued to attract Commonwealth or joint

Commonwealth/state funding to deal with social issues in communities. For example, the

NPY Women’s Council received $280,000 of Commonwealth funds as one of five remote

area organisations chosen to roll out a national pilot program that aimed ‘to assist women

and children living in rural and remote areas to escape domestic violence’ (Parliament of

Australia, 16 March 1994, p. 1760).

Around the same time, Nganampa Health attracted a major share of new multipurpose

Commonwealth/state funding to roll out new aged care facilities and provide support to

homelands. Armitage, then SA Minister of Health (and Aboriginal Affairs) explained to

107

the SA Parliament’s Estimates Committee that the South Australian Government would

‘fund Nganampa about $1 million annually and ATSIC contributes some $3.4 million’:

The Commonwealth Department of Human Services and Health will contribute $1 million in

one-off capital and $.44 million recurrent [of] new aged care money…[this] will be the first

multipurpose service in Australia with an Aboriginal community-controlled health organisation,

and it will certainly be the first aged care service on the Pitjantjatjara lands…. If ATSIC becomes

a signatory…Nganampa Health, will have a single three-year funding and service agreement

with all its major funding bodies. The agreement will detail services to be provided and total

funds to be supplied by the funders (SA Parliament Estimates Committee 15 September 1994,

p. 106).

The expansion and growth of specialist Anangu agencies reflect the increased attention

to social issues in Central Australia in the late 1990s. While ATSIC was generally a loyal

annual grant funder, a move towards the outsourcing of human services was slowly

gathering momentum in the late 1990s.111 After the demise of ATSIC under Howard’s

coalition government, quasi-markets in the health and welfare sectors were established,

and funding was diverted towards large, strategically placed non-government regional

organisations (Ohlin 1998; Jamrozik 2001; Quiggin 2005; Considine, Lewis &

O’Sullivan 2011).

Organisations such as Nganampa Health, the NPY Women’s Council, PY Media, AP

Services, local community councils (and AP and the PC) were increasingly pushed to do

more with less, and in some instances they had to compete with other Anangu regional

organisations. Like others in the sector across Australia, Anangu organisations became

preoccupied with the delivery of projects and the pursuit of grant funding. The survival

of Anangu organisations increasingly depended on their ability to win government grants,

and later ‘service contracts’, to deliver what were usually predetermined and specific

outcomes. Organisations that were previously collaborators in the common cause of self-

determination gradually became competitors in funding processes based on economic

rather than emancipatory values.

Signalling this policy shift at the local level, the piranpa who were previously employed

by the Commonwealth Government in Anangu communities in support roles such as

‘Community Adviser’ and ‘Community Development Officer’ gained new titles and roles

111 The National Competition Council was established under the Keating Labor government in 1995 through

an agreement of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG). Momentum for microeconomic form

through competition policy was driven by the 1993 National Competition Policy Review, known as the

Hilmer Report. One key principle of competition policy is the belief that competitive markets best serve

the interests of consumers and the wider community. See Smith (2001) and Jamrozik (2001) for more

details on the effect of competition policy and the marketisation of welfare in Australia.

108

such as ‘Community Manager’ and ‘Management Adviser’ during this period.112 The

emphasis for Commonwealth Government, was now on funding positions in communities

which were tasked with managing government interests in the region, focusing more on

top down direction than local level ground up sommunity development. Instead of local

piranpa playing roles as collaborating supporters, trusted outsiders and agents of social

change (Moran 2010), many were reinvented, or rather repositioned, as ‘managers’ of

agencies or ‘supervisors’ who were accountable for grants, as the era of self-

determination was transitioning into one of competitive survival. This shift posed new

complexities for Anangu and piranpa staff alike.

4.2.3 AP seeks to limit the piranpa and PC’s influence and develop its own role

Proctor (1987), Bonner (1988) and Dunstan (1989) commented on the tendency of non-

Anangu (piranpa) staff to influence Anangu administration and politics (see Chapter 3).

With the physical move of the AP office to the Lands, AP leaders wanted to build the

capacity of Anangu in order to carry out jobs and functions that were previously

undertaken by piranpa outsiders, as well as demonstrate greater organisational

independence from the PC.

However, the prominence of piranpa staff continued after Anangu organisations moved

to the Lands. AP’s Executive raised concerns about this with the PLPC:

The Executive raised issues concerning Community Administration by non-Aboriginal

advisors. [The] Committee was told that fifteen years ago the Aboriginal people were told that

white advisors/administrators undertook to work themselves out of a job, however they are still

there…. It was stressed that education programs of both, Education Department and Department

of Education, Technical and Further Education, should be more specifically based on self-

management concepts (PLPC 1991, p. 3).

The PLPC responded that the employment of advisers was in ‘the hands of AP and the

communities’ and was not imposed by governments or other outside groups (PLPC 1991,

p.3). The Executive parried by asking the government to invest in training and support to

enable Anangu to assume the governance, management and administrative roles for self-

management that the PLRA envisaged and that they were entitled to (PLPC 1991).

As Chapter 3 shows, Bonner (1988) had highlighted a lack of delineation between the

duties and responsibilities of the PC and AP. Further, Dunstan (1989) had identified that

PC received Commonwealth funding and had a budget some three times larger than AP

which was primarily reliant on State Government funding. Such inequities in resources

112 Personal communication with Stephan Rainow, Public/Environmental Officer UPK, Nganampa Health

Council, 20 March 2006, Alice Springs.

109

meant AP had less capacity to service Anangu needs and less power and influence than

the more established PC. Dunstan had also identified the potential for difficulties around

State interests vs tri-State regional interests to arise from AP’s continued dependence on

the anthropological and legal advice provided by the PC. AP sought to establish a more

independent and stronger role for itself, however, while the NPY Women’s Council and

Nganapma Health understandably gained increasing levels of Commonwealth funding

due to their tri-State reach on petrol sniffing and related social issues, AP lacked the

support required to train and develop Anangu staff or build its governance capacity and

skills. The Commonwealth had a strong and increasing influence in the Lands through a

whole of region footprint matched with a considerable funding allocation to Anangu tri-

State organisations. The PLRA and its AP Executive Board remained primarily the

responsibility of the SA Government which had yet to match its progressive legislative

with appropriate resourcing.

While the pursuit of organisational clarity can be critiqued for being simplistic, normative

and functionalist, analyses by both Bonner (1988) and Dunstan (1989) had aptly predicted

the emerging political economy and battle of power between these two Anangu peak

organisations, as inequities in resourcing and recognition increasingly promoted the PC’s

role and stymied the growth of AP.

4.3 Changing Commonwealth/State Balance and Other Policy

Developments

The coming of ATSIC was not the only significant Commonwealth policy shift in the

1990s. Another was the MABO High Court113 decision in 1992 and subsequent Native

Title legislation. In addition, the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation was established

by the Hawke government as a statutory body in 1991114 and spawned a populist

movement that delivered its ‘Declaration towards Reconciliation’ at the end of the decade.

The ‘Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody’ was reported in 1991, and

the HREOC’s ‘Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and

Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families: ‘Bringing Them Home’, was

published in 1997.

113 The MABO High Court decision took place in 1992, the passage of the Native Title Act occurred in 1993

(and commenced in January 1994) and the High Court’s adjudication of the WIK claim followed in

December 1996. 114 On 2 September, under the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991.

110

The pace and breadth of Commonwealth Indigenous policy change was vast, rapid, far-

reaching and often controversial. Policy that had enjoyed bipartisan support during the

1980s115 was now increasingly polarised along party lines. The Commonwealth’s large

array of policy activity during the 1990s also signalled the gradual demise of State

Government leadership on AP matters116. The SA Government acquiesced to an

increasingly assertive Commonwealth, dominating the policy field through ATSIC,

native title laws and major national inquiries. This is perhaps best illustrated by the SA

Parliament’s abandonment of its Pitjantjatjara Lands Parliamentary Committee

(discussed below) and the lack of Parliamentary discussion or debate on the Lands

evedicent in Hansard during this period.

Bannon’s Labor government had also fallen into crisis with the collapse of SA’s State

Bank in 1991. Having had a reputation for ‘good housekeeping frugality’ in the 1980s,

Bannon was engulfed in a storm of controversy when the State Bank of SA over-reached

its commitments and financially collapsed (Parkin 1992, p. 15). The Bank was

underwritten (debts guaranteed) by the South Australian Government, hence Bannon as

Premier was popularly portrayed as placing SA into many billions of dollars of debt.

An Auditor General’s Inquiry and Royal Commission into the relationship between the

Bank and the South Australian Government apportioned primary responsibility to the

Bank’s Board and its Managing Director, Tim Marcus Clark.117 However, Bannon was

unable to recover his standing after the Bank’s collapse and resigned as Premier in

September 1992. Labor’s Lynn Arnold was briefly the replacement Premier from 1992 to

1993 and held the first Cabinet meeting on the AP Lands during his term (House of

Assembly, 8 September 1994, p. 481). Arnold was then replaced by the Liberal’s Dean

Brown at the December 1993 elections.118

4.3.1 Pitjantjatjara Lands Parliamentary Committee is abandoned

Despite rhetoric suggesting otherwise, interest in the AP Lands waned. The PLPC, which

was created for five years in 1987,119 was extended for another five years in March 1992

115 See Chapter 2 for an example of the more bi-partisan nature of policies for the Lands in the 80s. 116 See Chapter 3 (in particular the Proctor review) for a discussion on the changing nature of

Commonwealth/State relations regarding Aboriginal Affairs. 117 See McCarthy (2002) for a detailed analysis of the State Bank’s collapse and its effect on South

Australian politics. 118 The 1993 elections resulted in a significant defeat for Labor, which was left with only 10 lower house

seats out of 47.

111

by both Houses of the South Australian Parliament under Section 42c (11) of the PLRA;

however, in reality, it lapsed at this time and never met again.

The PLPC provided annual reports to parliament for 1988/89, 1989/90, 1990/91 and

1991/92. A fifth report (for 1992/93) was in preparation, but it was not tabled by the time

parliament was prorogued for the 1993 state elections. Despite being given a five-year

extension to continue monitoring progress on the Lands, the PLPC ceased meeting after

Dean Brown’s Liberal government took office. No further reports to Parliament were

tabled, and Section 42 of the PLRA quietly expired on 18 June 1997, thereby formally

extinguishing the Committee.

The abandonment of the PLPC by the incoming Liberal government illustrated a general

retreat of the South Australian Government from earlier, more active, engagement in the

Lands. The PLPC’s later reports were also generally brief and bland. The last PLPC

Report was one and a half pages in length and summarised the Anangu 10-year

celebrations of the PLRA in just six lines. It then reported that Minister Rann’s:

tidy towns competition [had been] embraced with enthusiasm by the major communities and

homelands! (PLPC 1992, p. 2).

Earlier PLPC reports had been more substantial and made stronger recommendations.

The 1991 annual report to parliament conveyed by the then Aboriginal Affairs Minister

Rann urged:

that State Aboriginal Affairs develop a co-ordinating strategy for service and program

provisions for the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands (PLPC 1991, p. 4).

Despite successive reviews over the previous decade arguing the same need for better

coordination of government efforts, such recommendations were not acted upon. The

South Australian Government’s role in Aboriginal Affairs was increasingly caught up in,

if not driven by, the Commonwealth’s policy leadership. The South Australian

Government looked to ATSIC and the Commonwealth for funding for community

support initiatives or found itself responding to national agendas driven by

Commonwealth policy or legislative initiatives.

The PLPC had urged the South Australian Government to pursue Commonwealth funding

for homelands, the further development of AP’s administration centre at Umuwa,

essential services and road maintenance, and health and welfare support for petrol sniffing

and alcohol issues, which Anangu leaders and Anangu organisations steadfastly sought

on behalf of their communities (PLP 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992). As the funder, the

112

Commonwealth was now setting the over-arching agenda on issues, and the South

Australian Government had little political or policy traction.

This is not to say that some Aboriginal Affairs matters did not preoccupy the State

Government in the 1990s. One of the most protracted and difficult controversies in the

State’s history involved the building of a bridge on traditional Ngarrindjeri land at

Hindmarsh Island (Kumarangk) as part of a state government-sponsored private

development. This began to unfold around the time of the State Bank collapse and the

subsequent election of the Brown Liberal government and was not resolved until more

than a decade later.120

While primarily a dispute under the Commonwealth’s Aboriginal and Torres Strait

Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth), the South Australian Government was also

caught in the Kumarangk dispute through development approval processes (Clarke 1996;

van Krieken 2011). A Federal Court case and subsequent Royal Commission enmeshed

not only the SA, but also Keating and Howard governments, for many years. The policy

and judicial complexities of this case undoubtedly contributed to diverting State

Government attention away from what was happening on the AP Lands.

4.3.2 Anangu voices get action on asbestos

One small cameo illustrates a breakdown in what had previously been more bipartisan

approaches to the Lands and resulted from Anangu concerns about asbestos in a building

provided to the Mimili community in the mid 1990s. After lobbying the government for

better school buildings and facilities, the Mimili community was given a transportable

classroom in 1996. Mimili’s Community Council, supported by Nganampa Health,

complained about the asbestos in the building to AP Services, a regional body established

in 1993 with responsibility for Lands maintenance and infrastructure. AP Services

‘ordered that the building be removed and the site be cleaned by 18 October 1996’

(Legislative Council 5 November 1996, p. 299).

Labor’s Ron Roberts claimed that this decision was ignored by the Brown (and

subsequent John Olsen) Liberal governments.121 Roberts argued that ‘instead of taking

notice of this legal order from AP Services…the Minister decided the classroom would

stay at Mimili…regardless of the wishes of Mimili Community’:

120 See Clarke (1996). 121 Olsen replaced Brown as SA Liberal leader and Premier on 28 November 1996.

113

I wonder what would have happened had these asbestos buildings been placed in one of the

schools in the leafy suburbs of Burnside or Kensington Gardens (Legislative Council 5

November 1996).

Education Minister Lucas retaliated by accusing Labor of stirring up issues in the Lands

for political reasons. Lucas accused a local community development officer of deceitfully

obtaining Anangu signatures on a Mimili Council letter of complaint about the ‘asbestos’

building:

The community development officer at Mimili wrote a letter and got two Anangu to sign it but

apparently did not explain what the letter was about. They did not know what they had signed

(Legislative Council 5 November 1996, p. 300).

Lucas tabled a letter from the PYEC,122 signed by its Director Kunmanara Minutjukur,

arguing that the PYEC wanted the building to stay:

We wish the Minister to know: PYEC is the group responsible for education issues on the

Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands. The Mimili Community know this, are represented on PYEC and

take information back to the Mimili Community Council. All letters and concerns raised by a

community should be sent to PYEC to discuss and solve first…chose to go straight to the press

and radio instead of doing this. Mimili Community members have confirmed at a special

meeting that they want this building to stay and are happy for the cement/asbestos sheeting to

be removed on site…. The claim in the letter…for removal of the building is not true…. Anangu

members of PYEC have checked with signatories to Mimili Community Council Incorporated

letters. They have said that they were not sure what they were signing (cited in Legislative

Council 5 November 1996, p. 300).

The letter123 went on to state that the ‘Chairperson of AP wants the building to stay and

be fixed on site’ and listed contact details for ‘Donald Fraser, Chairperson of AP’ to

support this claim. Positioning PYEC and AP as desperate to secure an additional

building, and caught up with negotiations with the Minister, Roberts argued that Minister

Lucas was insulting Anangu by suggesting that an asbestos-contaminated classroom

would be acceptable.

Roberts tabled a copy of another letter signed by the Mimili Community Council, which

he argued had also been sent to the Minister, but this time to complain about him:

Dear Minister, We are writing with some concern about comments you made in the Legislative

Council…making reference to a letter from the Director of PYES [sic]. In this letter, it is

apparently stated …that our Community Development Officer had written letters that were not

known to, or expressing views other than those held by Mimili Council. We consider this an

insult to the intelligence and capabilities of our Councillors and incorrect to suggest that the

council at Mimili would allow its senior administrative officer to operate outside of their

directions…we, the Council, are the only spokespeople for matters concerning the Mimili

community…the real issue [is] the right of this community to object to the unreasonable

placement of an old asbestos building in our community. As we previously stated, the health

122 The PYEC was established in the late 1980s to provide Anangu input into education at the primary,

secondary and tertiary levels on the APY Lands. It has representatives from each community and works

closely with the Government and other education providers. Further, it is an Anangu-controlled regional

organisation and also works closely with other regional Anangu organisations and the AP(Y) Executive. 123 See also Hansard Legislative Council, 22 October 1996, p. 203, and Hansard Legislative Council, 5

November 1996, pp. 299–301, for the letters.

114

risks associated with asbestos are well documented and any further health risks to this

community are unwanted…once again [we] state our firm position to have this building

removed (Legislative Council 5 November, 1996, p.300).

The dispute about Mimili’s temporary school building continued for some time; it split

along Party lines in the Parliament and initially caused stress between the PYEC and

Mimili Council, as well as with the piranpa community worker and other Anangu.

The PYEC was in a difficult position because it was in an ongoing relationship with the

South Australian Department of Education over Anangu education matters. In contrast,

AP Services, Nganampa Health and the Mimili Council, or at least their piranpa

employee, appeared to have open communication channels with the opposition.

The substance and process of this debate illustrated the diversity of Anangu politics. It

revealed an increasing tendency for politicians to politicise AP issues to suit particular

causes and tactics. Anangu were also adept at using the political sphere to draw attention

to issues that might otherwise remain invisible—‘out of sight, out of mind’.

The asbestos in the building was subsequently stripped on site, and Mimili received a

temporary building to ease the overcrowding occurring in their school. The multiplicity

of local Anangu advocacy worked, and the people received their asbestos-free building.

4.4 Mayatja Manta Nyangaku Kutju: Local Government for Anangu

Communities?

Local government is a recurring theme in discussions about Anangu governance

throughout the 25-year period from 1981 to 2006. In its reply to the 1990 Dunstan Report,

AP asserted that the PLRA enabled it to function in a manner equivalent (indeed, superior)

to a local government authority. AP did not want any other body recognised as a local

government within the Lands or to be imposed on them from outside. They argued that

this would lessen the self-determining powers already afforded to them under the PLRA

(AP 1990, p. 9).

AP’s views about the potential for the pursuit of local government status to conflict with

their existing rights under the PLRA were repeated in 1994 in the Commonwealth’s ‘Our

Future, Our Selves’ report:

Anangu Pitjantjatjara rejected the proposals for legislation put forward in Mr Dunstan’s report

arguing that the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act already enabled their body to perform local

government functions (House of Representatives Standing Committee 1994, p. 36).

115

AP argued that they needed to gain access to roads and other financing provided to local

government bodies124 without compromising their other rights to control development

under the PLRA. AP was also concerned that the local government model might imply

an expectation that they raise rate revenue from within the Lands, which they felt was

both inappropriate and unrealistic (AP 1990, p. 10).

In response to a 1991 ‘Let’s Work Together’ Conference Report, which recommended

greater liaison between ATSIC, state governments and local governments with respect to

Aboriginal people, the South Australian Local Government Association (LGA) formed a

reference group to explore Aboriginal local government relations in SA and

commissioned Morton Consulting to undertake consultative research.

The Morton study, funded by ATSIC, presented a report entitled ‘Local Councils Belong

to Aboriginal People Too’ in 1994. Morton highlighted that SA received Local

Government Grants on a population basis that included Aboriginal people, but that

Aboriginal South Australians continued to receive an inequitable share of local

government funding and services (1994, p. 8).

Morton also acknowledged that the AP Lands presented a unique circ*mstance because

they already had the power to develop bylaws (after the 1987 amendments to the PLRA)

and functioned in relation to development issues in ways similar to a local government

authority. A separate project was therefore established to provide advice on the local

governing potential and mechanisms for AP and other legislated Aboriginal Lands, such

as Maralinga (1994, p. 3).

ATSIC provided funding to the PC to conduct Mayatja Manta Nyangaku Kutju: Local

Government for Aboriginal Communities (Parliament of Australia House of

Representatives, 7 September 1993, p. 572). A Steering Committee chaired by Lester was

established, along with representatives of the Commonwealth and state governments

(Office of Local Government and Division of State Aboriginal Affairs), the SALGA and

ATSIC. Lester occupied his chair position not as a representative of AP, but as a member

of the Walatina Aboriginal Corporation. 125, 126

124 The AP Lands were not only unable to access local government funding, but they were also specifically

excluded from coverage in the legislation for the Outback Areas Trust, which covered unincorporated areas

of the state. 125 The Walatina Aboriginal Corporation was the governance arm of Lester’s homeland, and he was

effectively the appointed adviser. 126 It is interesting to note here the inclusion of Yankunytjatjara TO (and PC leader) Lester as the key adviser

(and not AP).

116

When Mayatja Manta Nyangaku Kutju reported in 1994, it repeated what AP had

articulated in its response to the 1990 Dunstan Report. It ‘recommended against the

creation of a new local government body for the Pitjantjatjara lands’ (PC 1994, p. 9). As

a result of both the Morton and Mayatja Manta Nyangaku Kutju Reports, the SA LGA

admitted AP to its membership in 1994 and supported its recognition as the local

governing body for the purposes of funding under the Commonwealth Local Government

(Financial Assistance) Act.127

Keen to facilitate AP access to Commonwealth funds, the South Australian Government

proposed a regulation (No. 111) in late 1994 to recognise AP as a local council for the

purposes of the South Australian Local Government Grants Act 1992, thereby making it

eligible for funding if recommended by the SA Local Government Grants Commission.

In preparation for this development, the government provided funding to support the 1993

separate incorporation of a new independent regional Anangu body—AP Services—to

assume responsibility for ‘road works, basic essential services, some basic housing

repairs, aerodrome construction, waste management and the maintenance of bores’ (SC

2004, p. 54). AP was assuming more local government operations and new functions, as

well as some that were previously within the PC’s remit.

AP Services was located on the Lands and was closely linked to Nganampa Health, which

retained leadership of environmental management and public health matters, including

housing, dust alleviation and dog control (through the UPK, 1987 Wellbeing Strategy).

AP Services was also linked to the PC, which continued to provide some maintenance

and general works on the Lands, primarily for homelands. While housed along with AP

at Umuwa, AP Services was an independent and separate new regional Anangu

organisation, thereby adding to the already crowded and complex local governance

environment.

Over time, most road works, essential services and support for homelands also passed to

AP Services. However, those funds were only for the SA portion of the region, and the

focus shifted away from the PC to AP Services to deliver this work. The PC continued to

provide legal and anthropological support to AP and its Executive, but this was

increasingly conducted on a contract or fee-for-service basis.

127 In addition to AP, regulation No. 111 of 1994 recognised the Gerard Community Council Inc., Maralinga

Tjarutja, Nepabunna Community Council Inc. and Yalata Community Council Inc. as being eligible for

annual grants from the South Australian Local Government Grants Commission.

117

4.5 Petrol Sniffing Persists

Despite AP enacting bylaws that enabled strict control of the sale of petrol, as well as

banning petrol sniffing on the Lands, it remained a constant source of tragedy and worry

for Anangu throughout the 1990s. The profile of chronic sniffers changed during this

decade from young, uninitiated men to older, fully initiated men (Divakaran-Brown &

Minutjukur 1993; Shaw, Armstrong & San Roque 1994).

A comprehensive report into petrol sniffing on the Lands, entitled ‘Children of

Dispossession’, which was published in 1993 by the state’s Aboriginal Affairs

Department and co-authored by respected Anangu elder Minutjukur, called for urgent

community support. The authors observed that many Anangu they interviewed:

were disillusioned by the extent of discussion on this topic and yet the sparse support for Anangu

initiatives to take control of the situation. Some said this would be the last time they are sharing

their ideas for a solution (Divakaran-Brown & Minutjukur 1993, p. 3).

Following this report, and in the closing days of the Arnold (Labor) government,

commitment to a more sustained and better-coordinated state government response was

outlined in Parliament:

Petrol sniffing on Aboriginal lands is a serious problem. Cabinet as a whole was made aware of

that during its recent visit to the Pitjantjatjara lands. In July, Cabinet endorsed a coordinated

strategy for the problem of petrol sniffing on Anangu Pitjantjatjara lands, including endorsing

the AP Law and Trouble Committee as the local reference group for petrol sniffing rehabilitation

program implementation; and with the Law and Trouble Committee to report to the Social

Development Committee of Cabinet, the Department of Family and Community Services, the

Health Commission, the Drug and Alcohol Services Council, and the Department of State

Aboriginal Affairs, to implement the recommendation of the AP report ‘Children of

Disposition’ [sic], in conjunction with the Law and Trouble Committee (South Australia, House

of Assembly, 17 September 1993, p. 190).

In 1992–1993, the South Australian Department of Family and Community Services

allocated $137,000 for local projects to provide alternatives for young petrol sniffers

(House of Assembly, 17 September 1993, p. 201). These small-scale initiatives had little

time to demonstrate success before the Liberals took office in December 1993 and

decided to direct their focus towards working with ATSIC and other Commonwealth

agencies in the cross-border region.

A Commonwealth-backed ‘Petrol Link-up’ initiative was introduced into Central

Australia on a trial basis between July 1994 and March 1995. This initiative encouraged

Anangu communities in the cross-border region (NT, WA and SA) to adopt Avgas128 to

reduce the availability of petrol. During 1994, more than 20 Anangu communities

128 Avgas was an aviation fuel that was not volatile enough to be sniffed for intoxication. It could be used

safely in motor vehicles and other engines as an alternative to petrol in communities battling petrol sniffing.

118

switched to Avgas as part of this regional strategy (Shaw, Armstrong & San Roque 1994).

The project was widely considered to have been successful in reducing access to petrol

and discouraging sniffing. According to the then SA (Liberal) Minister for Aboriginal

Affairs, Armitage, in 1995:

all the figures show that the number of petrol sniffers is basically static or decreasing…the

number of young Aboriginal people, particularly in the tribal lands, who are now starting petrol-

sniffing is absolutely minuscule. There could be a number of reasons for it.… It may also be

that…petrol sniffing has lost a bit of its appeal…the role model now is, ‘Don’t do this or you

will die’ (House of Assembly, 21 March 1995, p. 2031).

A 1996 evaluation of the switch to Avgas (Roper & Shaw 1996) suggested that petrol

sniffing declined after its introduction in 1994. However, within two years, Nganampa

Health was again warning about rising levels of petrol sniffing and a likely further

increase in morbidity and mortality over time (Nganampa Health Council 1996/97; Roper

1998).

However, as Avgas was considered an effective deterrent, local community and youth

development services—many of which had been funded by small state government grants

for diversionary programs to assist petrol sniffers—were reduced in the late 1990s.

Meanwhile, Brown’s Liberal government was pulling back from direct engagement with

the Lands, aiming instead to secure agreements with the Commonwealth that would lock

the Commonwealth into an ongoing funding relationship with key tri-state regional

bodies such as Nganampa Health Council and the NPY Women’s Council.

In 1999, the NPY Women’s Council received a further $800,000 from the

Commonwealth for a four-year ‘Petrol Sniffing Support Project’,129 as noted in the SA

Parliament (Legislative Council, 9 March 1999, p. 838). Commencing in May 1999, this

project aimed to take a ‘regional approach’ to petrol sniffing in 26 communities130

serviced by NPY (D’Abbs & MacLean 2008, p. 66; Shaw 2002).

The Commonwealth provided these and similar funds to the major Anangu-controlled

organisations in the region—namely Nganampa Health and the NPY Women’s Council—

as its means for delivering health and welfare services to the Lands. This was both

strategic and economic; by supporting these tri-state regional bodies, the Commonwealth

could cater for both the Lands and other areas in the Central Australian cross-border

region of SA, NT and WA. This also worked for the South Australian Government,

129 This ~$800,000 was an allocation through the National Illicit Drug Strategy. 130 Only two AP Lands communities were included in this regional project which also covered communities

in the NT and WA.

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because while Nganampa Health and the NPY Women’s Council, like the PC, were not

focused on SA alone, they were nonetheless Anangu-controlled and connected in the

Lands. In addition, they attracted Commonwealth funding, which was always an

attractive option to a small state like SA.131

All indicators were consistent in suggesting that the regional Anangu service providers

could deliver the support the Lands needed. In 1999, for example, ATSIC commissioned

an independent organisational review of the Nganampa Health Council, which reported

that it was:

providing a high quality service which has been sustained over a long period of time and had

made a demonstrable difference to the health of Anangu in central Australia and on the APY

lands (SC 2004, p. 37).

The NPY Women’s Council received many awards—including the National Violence

Prevention Award 1994 and 1995, Best Practice Award for the Child Nutrition Project

1997, and Outstanding Contribution to Australian Culture in 1999—from the

Commonwealth Government in recognition of its contribution to Anangu advancement.

The capacity, voracity and credibility of the NPY Women’s Council is further highlighted

by its success in working with HREOC to gain a Special Measures Certificate to help it

enforce a prohibition on the sale of alcohol in 1997.132 This was a major victory for NPY,

PC and for all Anangu, and it served to reaffirm the importance of the PLRA as a vehicle

for Anangu ‘special’ rights.

The Commission’s Alcohol Report (1995) laid significant groundwork for the recognition

of such Special Measures Certificates when it cited Gerhardy v Brown in relation to the

validity of ‘special rights’ and reaffirmed the right of Aboriginal communities to demand

restrictions on the distribution of alcohol for the benefit of all community members

(HREOC 1995, 1996). Given its significance, a brief discussion of the 1995 Report is

presented below, followed by a summary of the deteriorating conditions on the Lands.

4.5.1 Alcohol supply and control issues: the HREOC Report

In 1990, then Race Discrimination Commissioner, Irene Moss, received multiple

expressions of serious concern from a number of Aboriginal communities and

organisations about the extent of alcohol abuse by Aboriginal people and its effect on

131 Robbins (1993, p. 73) cites SA as having complained at earlier government forums that, in Aboriginal

Affairs, the state took on extra responsibilities ‘only to have the Commonwealth renege on its financial

responsibilities’. 132 For more information, see the NPY Women’s Council, <http://www.npywc.org.au/about-

npywc/achievements/>.

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communities in the NT (HREOC 1995). Such representations emphasised the devastating

effects of alcohol abuse on Aboriginal communities, including violence, murder and

social breakdown, and they described such addictions as ‘a major threat to the survival of

Aboriginal culture and to the achievement of self-determination by Aboriginal and Torres

Strait Islander peoples’ (HREOC 1995, p. 4).

As a result, in late 1990, the Commissioner established an inquiry into race

discrimination, human rights issues and the distribution of alcohol in the NT—focusing

particularly on Central Australia—and called for submissions on these issues. In 1995,

the inquiry was completed by the new Race Discrimination Commissioner, Zita Antonios,

and its comprehensive findings were published as ‘The Alcohol Report’.

The ‘Alchol Report’ (HREOC, 1995) specifically detailed the struggle Anangu had

endured with Curtin Springs Roadhouse133 continuing to supply alcohol to people going

to or from the Lands, despite bylaws prohibiting alcohol on the Lands and specific local

agreements struck between PC and the Roadhouse. The case-study in the Report (1995,

p. 43-48) described how given the High Court’s view in Gerhardy v Brown that special

rights were valid under the PLRA it was reasonable to infer that alcohol restrictions on

the Lands did not contravene the Commonwealth’s Race Discrimination Act, as these

restrictions could be viewed as a ‘Special Measure’ and hence ‘lawful discrimination’ in

accordance with the needs and wishes ot the community (HREOC, 1995, pp.65-68).

An outcome of HREOC’s engagement with this issue and NPY Women’s Council’s

submissions on the Curtin Springs case, is that a formal certificate was developed to show

a particular situation was either considered non-discriminatory in terms of the RDA or a

form of ‘lawful discrimination’ as a special measure within provision of s.8(1) of the

RDA.

4.5.2 Deteriorating health and well-being on the Lands

Anangu success through NPY in restricting the supply of alcohol to people on the Lands

was a major achievement that led, in part, to NPY receiving significant Commonwealth

funding in 1999 for the Petrol Sniffing Support Project, which targeted 26 communities

(as cited above). However, petrol sniffing nevertheless persisted across the Lands,

undermining health and well-being and disrupting social order.

133 For in depth details of this particular case-study and work done by Anangu especially through the NPY

Women’s Council, see Kavanagh (1999), <http://worldlii.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ILB/1999/24.html>.

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One result of the South Australian Government’s acquiescence to the Commonwealth’s

ascendancy in the funding of Central Australian social policy initiatives (for petrol

sniffing and community well-being) was that it lost contact with the deteriorating

conditions, poverty and violence troubling the Lands in the late 1990s.

Not only was Nganampa Health reporting a steady rise in petrol sniffing again in the late

1990s, as cited above, but a 1998 cost-of-living study concluded that a lack of work meant

that an average Anangu family’s income ‘would not buy sufficient food and basic

supermarket items requisite for the family to achieve adequate nutrition and hygiene’

(Tragenza 1998, p. 12).

Despite these examples of the stark deterioration in social conditions on the Lands, the

regionalisation of services and general state government retreat from AP matters lessened

local community engagement. From 1999, for example, Anangu Community Constables

were only supported by ‘Development Officers’ rather than sworn police officers, who

were now stationed off the Lands at Marla.

Being off the Lands meant that the SA police (SAPOL) had limited capacity to respond

to community requests for assistance with violence, petrol sniffing and associated

problems. It could take many hours before the police responded to major incidents. Later,

senior police would document their concern that (SC 2004, p. 41):

we [SAPOL] have not really met our objectives in the past four years—probably since 1998.

Prior to that we had a heavy concentration, particularly because of the rise in petrol sniffing.

We took our eye off the ball for a while and problems emerged again… [my emphasis]

4.6 The PC/AP Relationship: Tensions Erupt over Mining

The relationship between the PC and AP was under strain throughout the 1990s. AP’s

physical shift to the Lands and its separation from the PC had escalated the deteriorating

relations between the two bodies. Rather than ameliorate issues, the shift heralded not

only a physical and operational separation, but also a destabilisation of established

patterns of communication and decision-making.

By the end of the decade, tensions erupted. The precipitating issue was mining. Since the

proclamation of the PLRA, the PC had provided anthropological and legal support and

advice to AP for its deliberations on mining Exploartory License Applications (ELAs),

which were managed ‘one at a time’ and ‘in order of receipt’.

Established in 1986 and agreed to again by the Minister during discussions about the 1987

amendments, the ‘one at a time’ policy was initiated by AP to ensure that TOs had enough

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time to understand and discuss each mining proposal—sometimes in small groups. While

the PLRA conceived of the Lands as a single corporate entity and stressed the importance

of ‘the preservation and protection of Pitjantjatjara ways of life, culture and tradition’

[Section 20(15)], complex kinship and family links bound particular Anangu to specific

places in the Lands with deep cultural and custodial responsibilities through the

Tjukurpa.134 As a corporate entity of tenants in common under the PLRA, the Lands were,

in reality, a complex matrix tessellated by interdependent and intersecting currents of

power, responsibility and duty.

The ‘one at a time’ policy enabled TOs to consider the implications and likely impact of

each individual mining exploration application on the part of the Lands for which they

and their family group/s had customary responsibility for, in a consultative manner. It

gave AP a means for steadily managing the often intense pressures from mining interests,

and it prevented overstretching of the limited professional resources (legal and

anthropological expertise for example) available to assist TOs in their decision-making.

While the PLRA placed an onus on mining companies to carry the costs associated with

this anthropological and legal work,135 it also stipulated that ‘the period between the initial

lodging of the application and that notification of AP’s decision to the applicant shall not

exceed 120 days’136 (Ascione 2002, p. 160). Further, it laid out an important role for the

AP Executive in ensuring thorough consultation with TOs. Section 20 (3) stated that once

an application in writing had been made to the AP Executive and all relevant information

was assembled:

Anangu Pitjantjatjara shall, before carrying out or authorizing or permitting the carrying out of any

proposal relating to the administration, development or use of any portion of the lands, have regard

to the interest of, and consult with, traditional owners having a particular interest in that portion of

the lands, otherwise affected by the proposal, and shall not carry out the proposal, or authorize or

permit it to be carried out, unless satisfied that those traditional owners;

a. understand the nature and purpose of the proposal;

b. have had the opportunity to express their views to Anangu Pitjantjatjara; and

c. consent to the proposal.

Although the ‘one at time’ policy worked well in the 1980s, by the late 1990s, the South

Australian Government and mining companies were urging AP to speed up the processing

134 Tjukurpa is the Pitjantjatjara term for Anangu epistemology/cosmology or ‘law’. APY peoples believe

that the past, present and future form a continuous link through ancestral history to the present time in their

Lands, which is both physically and ‘spiritually’ felt. Thus, the Tjukurpa is not a past ‘dreamtime’, but an

active continuum: ‘Tjukurpa iriti ngaringi munu kuwari wanka nyinyangi. Tjukurpa has existed from a long

time ago and is alive today’ (senior law woman cited in James 2015). See James (2005), Young (2006),

Tregenza (2010) and James (2015) for more contextual information. 135 Section 20(7)(a). 136 Section 20(14) (e).

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of mining applications and encouraging Anangu to embrace mining as an economic

benefit. The business media signalled nationally that ‘the mining industry and the state

government are keen to have the Pitjantjatjara land opened up’ (Davis 1999).

Pressure stemmed from a global boom in the mining sector, from geophysical exploration

analyses, which revealed the Lands to be one of the most ore-rich regions in Australia,

and from frustration with the pace at which applications were managed by the PC/AP

joint handling of ELAs. Fewer than 10 applications had been approved in the early years

of the PLRA, and 56 applications were waiting in a queue, as a surge in mining took hold

elsewhere (Alice Springs News 1999; Ascione 2002; SC 2004).

4.6.1 Applications from the Pitjantjatjara Mining Company and Musgrave Block

Holdings

In 1997, the Pitjantjatjara Mining Company (PMC),137 which included some Anangu

working with mining entrepreneur Danny Hill,138 lodged an application to explore around

18% of the AP Lands. The company urged AP to deal with its application quickly, fast-

tracking it out of order and justified its request on the basis that it had Anangu Directors

who stood to gain from the mining.

The involvement of AP Executive members in an application they stood to benefit from

(as Directors of PMC) created a mire of potentional conflicts of interest. Some saw this

request to ‘fast track’ a proposal as a ‘Trojan horse’ that would undermine TOs’ general

control over mining applications. In the ensuing conflict, some Anangu suggested that

others had succumbed to pressure from mining interests to change their ‘due process’,

while others suggested that it was a deliberate attempt to obviate the PLRA (SC 2004, p.

78; Davis 1999).

The application was rejected by the Executive and at a full General Meeting of TOs,

during which there was an outpouring of concern. Some TOs expressed alarm about what

they perceived as ‘humbug’ by those Anangu advocating the quick ‘out of turn’

processing of a mining application in which they or their family had a pecuniary interest.

The incident polarised Anangu into two camps—those for and those against the rushed

137 In June 1999, the Alice Springs News reported on the history of the establishment of the Pitjantjatjara

Mining Company (PMC)—allegedly by Aboriginal businessman Charlie Perkins, local Anangu and ‘some

Sydney financial people’. 138 Mining entrepreneur Hill set up the MBH and proposed to work on a joint venture with the Pitjantjatjara

Mining Company if permit processing could be expedited quickly. The contention was that this would

advantage some Anangu over others and potentially be a conflict of interest for some members of AP, who

might be perceived to have pecuniary interests in the outcome of certain ELAs.

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mining application—and irretrievably ‘destabilised the AP Executive and administration

staff’ (SC 2004, p. 78).

The rift between AP and the PC escalated again in June 1999, when Musgrave Block

Holdings (MBH) announced a ‘done deal’ with the AP Executive without any of the usual

vetting of ELAs by the PC’s legal and anthropology team or comprehensive consultation

with TOs as the PLRA required (Alice Springs News 1999; Ascione 2002, p. 158). Five

members of the Executive had apparently signed a ‘Pitjantjatjara Land Future Access

Facilitation Deed’ in April 1999, which would not only allow an MBH joint venture with

the Pitjantjatjara Mining Company to proceed, but would also facilitate other ELAs in the

future through a ‘partnership’ deal with Taliwel Pty Ltd.139

The five AP Executive member signatories to this agreement were Chairman Trevor

Adamson from Nyapiri, Deputy Chairman Kunmanara Ken, Lee Brady and Michael

Mitakiki from Amata, and Alby Burton from Pipalyatjara (Alice Springs News 1999, p.

5). Bebe Ramzan from Anilalya Homelands—one of five AP Executive members who

had not signed the agreement—challenged AP and MBH’s actions with the support of

four other Executive members: Roger Kayipi from Fregon, Rupert Peters from Irintata

Homelands, Gordon Inkatji from Anilalya and Adrian Intjalki from Ernabella.

As spokesperson for the dissenting group, Ramzen claimed that they were not against

mining per se, but were opposed to the way that the rights they fought for under the PLRA

were being ignored:

We are not saying no, We are saying do it the right way (Alice Springs News 1999).

Ramzan argued that each mining exploration application should be considered on its

merits, after proper anthropological assessment and consultation with TOs:

for which AP have always used the services of the legal and anthropology sections of the

Pitjantjatjara Council. By neglecting this process, AP as a body corporate, would be denying

the rights of traditional owners, and therefore not acting in their best interests (Alice Springs

News 1999).

However, describing the Lands as ‘the last unexplored frontier in Australia’, MBH’s

Andrew Drummond argued that his company would:

139 Taliwel Pty Ltd was a small mining exploration company that had close links with the PMC through

Perkins’ investments, for example. It was allegedly proposed that Taliwel would become a subsidiary of

the joint venture between PMC and MBH under the leadership of mining entrepreneur Hill (BRW 1999;

AS News 1999). Hill and some Anangu AP Directors’ names appeared across each of the enterprises.

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put resources into AP and onto The Lands to educate people about mining, and would also use

strategies such as clustering applications over adjacent areas, and not waiting for one application

to reach final resolution before considering another (Alice Springs News 1999).

This larger proposal, which entailed engaging Taliwell Pty Ltd to manage AP’s ELA

processes, found support with the Commonwealth through ATSIC, and also with the

South Australian Government through the Department of State Aboriginal Affairs

(DOSAA) and PIRSA.

Liberal Aboriginal Affairs Minister Kotz reported to Parliament’s Estimate Committee

that her department advised her that the proposed deed would provide:

a long term agreement where in return for processing mining applications on the AP lands,

Taliwell receives a part interest in the proceeds received from such mining operations (House

of Assembly Esitimates Committee, 30 June 1999, p. 194).

Opposition Aboriginal Affairs Spokesperson Labor’s Terry Roberts accused the Olsen

(Liberal) government of supporting a mining industry push into the Lands, arguing that

in fact there was no ‘done deal’:

Chris Milne put out two major press releases in the Business Section of the Advertiser, one on

12 June and the other on 16 June 1999, with the headlines ‘Mines Chamber aims to meet

traditional land owners: Pitlands growth’ and ‘Joint venture to bring jobs to Pitjantjatjara

lands: A dream deal’. There were photographs of the geographical location and some of the

traditional owners and a light aircraft indicating that all was going well and that the negotiations

that had been promised were starting to bear fruit. Once the journalist or others started to ask

questions of the other negotiating parties, the Aboriginal people themselves, it became evident

that there was not an agreement. There might have been an agreement among the applicants for

access deeds, but there was certainly no agreement among the majority of the Aboriginal elders

(Legislative Council 8 July 1999, p. 1630).

Roberts argued that this ‘unfortunate exercise’ had resulted in ‘the worst case scenario,

where there [were] now divisions within the Aboriginal communities’ and legal action

had been threatened (Legislative Council 8 July 199, p. 1631).

With the support of legal officers and anthropologists from the PC, the Ramzan group of

AP Executive members ensured that TOs were fully appraised of all the issues and were

given an opportunity to express their views at a Special General Meeting to be held the

next month (in accordance with the PLRA). The TOs who attended in large numbers,

resoundingly objected to the MBH deed, which was effectively stalled.

Drummond blamed the PC and its legal and anthropological staff for resisting change,

and he urged AP to sever ties with the PC and use other services. He argued that AP

would be better off contracting solicitors on a case by case basis, instead of relying on the

PC to help AP process ELAs.

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The split on the AP Executive in relation to mining approval processes, which flowed

from the PMC and MBH applications was entrenched, protracted and bitter. This added

to a broader disputation between some AP Executive members and the PC, primarily

around the role of professional (piranpa) staff providing legal and anthropological support

direct to TOs (Ascione 2002, p. 161).

From this time on, the pro-mining voices on the Executive fought for AP to establish its

own anthropological and legal advice for mining licences on the Lands. Others lamented

the intense pressure being placed on Anangu (especially AP Executive members) to adopt

a more liberal approach to mining.

The resulting conflicts among Anangu led to much confusion amongst TOs and a

weakening of Anangu control in the late 1990s. Externally there seemed also ane

emerging lack of respect for Anangu land rights and a preparadeness for some mining

operators to test the resolve of Anangu to uphold ELA conditions. TO Murray George

later lamented how, at this time:

drilling crews commenced operating without proper notification and had transgressed particular

sacred areas in contravention of negotiated agreements (SC 2004, p. 80).

DOSAA and ATSIC now jointly funded AP’s ‘Land Rights Administration’ costs (e.g.,

permits and mining application processing), and a proportion of this funding was being

regularly transferred to the PC for its legal and anthropological advice. The bitter

polarisation of Anangu now carved a rift through the two Anangu organisations PC and

AP, which was further inflamed by increasing pressure from ATSIC and PIRSA for a

greater mining presence on the Lands. Government agencies effectively had the upper

hand hand as they controlled the funding directed to AP for administration.

As a result of this pressure, in October 1999 the AP Executive agreed to process three

mining applications at a time. Gertrude Stoltz, then senior anthropologist with the PC,

later claimed that this decision only came about because of PIRSA’s insistence (G Stoltz

Submission 5, SC 2004, p. 78).

To construct the AP/PC dispute over ELAs however, as only a struggle between those for

mining and those against would belie the complexity of the issues. The dispute was not

just about whether to allow mining; it involved tensions about who could or should have

input into decisions or opportunities to guide (or control) TO decision-making processes.

There were also concerns about the administration of ELAs and the access of ‘experts’

and lobbyists to important ‘private’ cultural information.

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As older routines established with the PC140 and its long-term staff were destabilised and

broke down, TOs worried about trusting the advice of the many new ‘expert’ piranpa

courting their favour, especially those involved in the resources sector.

Of particular concern was the pace at which decisions could, would or should occur. How

much time and expert advice could Anangu reasonably expect in order to ensure that

decisions regarding development were well informed, and therefore self-determining, in

ways envisaged by the PLRA? It was the operations and administration—not just the

spirit of the PLRA—that were increasingly being tested.

The Commonwealth Howard Government had begun to move rapidly away from the

policy rubric of ‘self-determination’, and increasingly espoused the discourse of

mainstreaming, invoking what Robbins termed an ‘imposed national unity’ (2007, p. 1).

The scene was set for an irrevocable confrontation between the PC and the now deeply

split AP Executive.

4.7 Anangu Pitjantjatjara Operational Review 1998

During these volatile events, the Commonwealth and South Australian State governments

instigated the 1998 ‘Operational Review of Anangu Pitjantjatjara’ - to address tensions

between the PC and AP; to provide strategic directions for the development of services

and infrastructure; and to recommend a model for service delivery and organisational

accountabilities (Larkin & Hayes 1998).

The Review was tasked with identifying a coordinating body for Anangu service delivery.

It was a means for the two governments to strategically influence the outcome of the battle

between the PC and AP. Some felt that it spelled the beginning of the end of the PC for

fostering perceived Anangu resistance to mining.

Chris Larkin, a respected Aboriginal public servant with a history in community

administration linked to the Lands, and Brian Hayes, a well-regarded QC specialising in

local government, development and organisational governance issues, were

commissioned to undertake the review as a joint effort between DOSAA,141 ATSIC and

AP. Notably absent was the PC, a subject of the Review, but not part of it.

140 While the PC and AP and its Executive were all non-Aboriginal organisational constructs, the PC had

emerged organically as part of the ground–up social movement that lobbied for the PLRA, as detailed in

Chapter 2. The PC had tri-state significance reflecting cultural relationships across the region, whereas AP

was a newer governance model formed top–down out of the PLRA. 141 DOSAA was a division within the SA Department of Environment, Heritage and Aboriginal Affairs at

this time (1997–2000).

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This was the most significant review of AP since the Bonner report a decade earlier. The

final version of the ‘Operational Review’ was completed in March 1998. After

consultation with Anangu, the Review was scheduled for implementation during 1999

and 2000, which it recommended occur during the rest of 1998 and into 1999.

The terms of reference for the Review were to:

identify the major roles of AP

assess whether AP meets the requirements of its legislation

determine AP’s degree of accountability to its clients in carrying out its current

functions, and assess whether it meets their needs

determine the resources required to manage AP’s responsibilities under the

legislation.

In addition, the Review was asked to comment on the scope of AP’s responsibilities and

relationships to the Lands, Anangu communities, organisations, and government and non-

government service providers (Larkin & Hayes 1998, p. 1).

It was a far-reaching review that echoed aspects of Bonner’s earlier recommendations for

greater recognition of AP’s central role under the PLRA. However, whereas Bonner had

sought to develop AP’s regional coordinating role in a cooperative manner in order to

shape policy frameworks and directions for the Lands ‘without eroding community

autonomy’ (Bonner 1988, p. 47), the Operational Review recommended that AP be a peak

council at the apex of a federated structure. It sought to empower AP as the preeminent

Lands body and to establish clearer parameters of accountability between community

councils, Anangu regional organisations and AP. It also recommended a substantial

funding boost for AP and its associated delivery arms. Under the model recommended by

the Review, a shift in organisational relationships would see AP at the ‘top’, with a range

of service functions subordinated and reporting to it.

The Operational Review identified limitations on AP’s operations at the time of its

inquiry. AP had no ability to delegate any of its powers under the Act to any other agency

or sub-committee. The Review also noted that Anangu regional organisations such as the

PC, the NPY Women’s Council, Nganampa Health, PY Media and local community

councils were all separately incorporated and operated independently of AP, with each

seeking funding from external sources for their programs.

The Review argued that this deterred cooperation and created incentives for Anangu

agencies to compete for funding. It argued that, as a result, regional Anangu agencies

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were ‘parochial’ and unwilling to cooperate with AP because it lacked the ‘leadership

role which would build confidence with the service agencies that their areas of operation

would be protected’ (Larkin & Hayes 1998, p. 11).

Hence, Larkin and Hayes argued that the ‘creation of separate constituencies and

associated power bases around a system of governance and administration structured on

separately incorporated bodies’ was a systemically flawed model that perpetuated a

situation whereby governments were continually directing funding away from AP and

diluting the self-determination ethos of the PLRA (1998, p. vi).

In perceiving the complexities of dispersed governance as a deficiency rather than a

potential strength, as Bonner had argued (1988, p. ii), the Review rationalised its pursuit

of a bureaucratic ‘chain of command’ model of organisation, replete with a convenient

single local sovereignty (Sanders 2004).

In the model proposed by the Review, AP would operate as a ‘governance umbrella’

under which would sit a range of sub-committees, federated community councils and

Anangu regional service providers. These would be guided by AP as the key decision-

making ‘corporate entity’ under the PLRA. Larkin and Hayes promoted the idea that AP

was effectively ‘above’ the other regional bodies as a representative ‘governing’ body

because it was the collective land-holding body (Larkin & Hayes 1998, p. 61).

The Review identified two ways to reform what it argued to be duplication: ‘poor

accountability’ and the competitive nature of service delivery to the Lands. The first was

to amend the PLRA to strengthen AP’s operational control of service delivery on the

Lands (as the prime driver of an overarching policy framework for the Lands). The second

was for Anangu to be supported by the Commonwealth and state governments (and

existing regional Anangu organisations) to implement a model of service delivery that

positioned AP at the peak of a federated (and representative) umbrella body to which

service delivery organisations had accountability.

Downgrading the PC and giving AP clearer powers and more staff and resources was

necessary to realise the first reform, and subordinating the range of mature and powerful

regional Anangu service agencies under AP was required for the second reform. Elevating

AP was likely to exacerbate tensions with the PC, but attempting to subordinate Anangu

regional organisations such as the NPY Women’s Council and Nganampa Health was

likely to prove even more contentious.

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The Review recommended downgrading the PC’s role and empowering AP as the focus

for service delivery to Anangu. Larkin and Hayes (1998, pp. 16, 81) argued that the PC

should pass all relevant funding and resources to AP, which should be properly resourced

as the key governance body for the Lands. The Review allowed for the possibility that

AP might subsequently contract the PC (or other providers) for services on an agreed fee-

for-service basis, but it considered that government funding should be provided direct to

AP (and not to the PC) for such purposes. As noted at the beginning of this section, the

formulation of these and other Review recommendations regarding AP’s future was

happening at a time when tensions around liberalising mining industry access to the Lands

were escalating into open hostility between the PC, AP and the key Anangu protagonists

involved in either or both of these organisations.

The 1998 Operational Review adopted Colebatch’s (2009, p. 24) ‘authoritative choice:

policy making as deciding’ framework and recommended a linear hierarchical model of

AP governance. Taking a more critical perspective, it might also be argued that the

Operational Review was geared towards serving the political economy interests of the

government and an eager-for-change mining lobby that was perhaps bolstered by those

Anangu who were pragmatically keen for an economic ‘modernisation’ of the Lands.

However, it seems particularly naive to expect that large regional organisations such as

Nganampa Health, the NPY Women’s Council, PY Media and the PC would give up their

funding and ascendancy as organisational entities as part of a process of social

engineering for ‘better service delivery’ to Anangu. These were well-established, large

agencies that employed many piranpa as well as Anangu, and they were adeptly engaged

in service delivery supply-chains and government contracts. Recommendations for the

PC to relinquish its resources and functions to AP, or suggestions that regional Anangu

bodies might subordinate themselves to AP, were accelerants in an already inflammatory

environment.

The Review also recommended the re-establishment of an ATSIC Regional Council for

AP as a matter of priority, which Anangu had campaigned for since ATSIC’s original

regional council structures were replaced.

It recommended the winding-up of PY Media, AP Services and PYEC as separate

agencies, and the transfer of their functions to a new portfolio structure for AP. The plan

was for a number of services to operate under the elected governance of an enhanced AP,

which would oversee regional delivery in a model akin to a local government authority.

131

The Review argued that bringing regional Anangu bodies under AP’s ‘umbrella’ would

rationalise, improve and alleviate the burden of management and enhance governance

(Larkin & Hayes 1998, p. 98).

Under this model, the NPY Women’s Council, for example, would continue to be a

service provider to Anangu communities, but it would include AP on its Management

Committee and establish a service provider relationship with AP. This was more

reminiscent of Bonner (1988), who had also argued for the integration of women’s issues

within the main body politic, as well as a separate organisation—a replica of policy

constructions, rationale and advice. Like Bonner, the Operational Review recommended

that Executive members be trained, that women be supported to attend Executive

meetings, and that AP meetings be broadcast across the Lands.

Unlike Bonner’s (1988) more nuanced focus on the needs of accommodating the cultural

mores and strengths of Anangu community and organisational life, the Operational

Review identified fragmented government service delivery as ‘the problem’ and searched

for the elusive but seductive and appealing notion of a single, rational, unified ‘solution’

to establish order over Anangu services and governance. It advocated the development of

an intergovernmental approach to service delivery to the Lands, as well as the

development of new bureaucratic accountability protocols:

The notion of Service Agreements or Protocols between AP and government service agencies

should be developed to identify service outcomes, mutual obligation, AP’s vision for

development and service outcomes and consultation protocols (Larkin & Hayes 1998, p. 86).

The Review was against making major changes to the PLRA itself, preferring a bilateral

‘heads of agency’ agreement to capture responsibilities in a clear, well-defined manner.

It also recommended a significant increase in funding to AP to provide support for

governance, leadership and management training (Larkin & Hayes 1998, pp. 96–100).

4.7.1 PC/AP relationship: tensions escalate around the Operational Review

The recommendations of the Operational Review challenged longstanding arrangements

whereby the PC had been funded to service AP. The Review’s initial preferred position

was for funding to be provided to AP to enable it to purchase services by competitive

tendering, on a competitive fee-for-service basis (Larkin & Hayes 1998, p. 16). In this

model, the PC would compete with other tenderers to provide support services to AP.

132

Public choice theory (Buchanan & Tollison 1984) was becoming popular at this time,

with ‘competitive contractualism’142 (Moran, Porter & Curth-Bibb 2014, p. 20) replacing

what Sanders (2007, p. 2) described as ‘loyalty models’, whereby Indigenous

organisations obtained ongoing funding and support ‘because of their identification and

links with the community being served’.

However, the sudden introduction of this level of market competitiveness was considered

unworkable given the specialist linguistic and cultural knowledge held by the PC and the

remoteness of the communities to be serviced. The Review therefore recommended

another option—that the PC transfer staff and resources to AP so that it could become the

pre-eminent Anangu service delivery and governance body on the Lands (Larkin & Hayes

1998, p. 81).

Not surprisingly, this resulted in strong and prolonged objections not only from the PC,

but also from other communities in the broader cross-border constituency (in the NT and

WA), who felt that they would lose out if this transfer occurred. The PC resisted this

proposal vehemently and fought to maintain arrangements whereby it was the exclusive

provider of legal and anthropological services to AP.

On one side of the dispute stood Anangu protagonists such as Lester, Lewis (then Chair

of the PC), George and others who had a long history with the PC, and whose legal and

anthropological staff had assisted five AP Executive members with legal advice regarding

their challenge to the signing, by five other members of the Executive, of the

MBH/Taliwel ‘Pitjantjatjara Land Future Access Facilitation Deed’ some months earlier,

as discussed above.

On the other side stood AP Chairman Owen Burton, Trevor Adamson, Lee Brady and

others—including PC ‘sympathisers’ on the AP Executive, such as Ramzan and

Inkatji143—with ATSIC, DOSAA and PIRSA staff, who were perceived by some as the

key drivers of the push to centralise and fast-track the processing of mining ELAs in the

South Australian Government’s political economy, which was increasingly pro-mining.

However, TOs who still worked closely with the PC and their tri-state Anangu

counterparts in WA and the NT were less keen on such changes and were not easily

142 See Maddison (2009) for an analysis of the contracting-out era, which was not only aimed at increasing

efficiency, but also at silencing dissent. 143 The Executive members who had raised concerns previously, when in 1999 a group of five Executive

members had tried to sign a deal with MBH without, they argued, broad AP or TO agreement (in

contravention of the PLRA).

133

manipulated. Following the PC’s AGM in May 2000, a large group of Anangu who

gathered for a meeting at which ATSIC and DOSAA staff were present voiced their

unified, strong objection to the Review’s recommendations about the PC:

The Pitjantjatjara Council is the ‘mother’ organisation representing all members of

Pitjantjatjara, Yankunytjatjara and Ngaanyatjarra over the ‘children’ organisations—including

AP. This is the view of Anangu members that they are: …freely exercising their legal, economic,

social, cultural and political rights!144 (Ascione 2002, p. 161).

In response to this resistance from the PC and its supporters, ATSIC redirected funding

for ‘Land Rights Administration’ through DOSAA (rather than direct to the PC), so that

DOSAA could determine the distribution of the funding by competitive tendering. The

PC could still apply for funds, but it would be competing on a fee-for-service basis with

other contenders.

Thus, the Commonwealth passed the issue over to the South Australian Government to

resolve. Not surprisingly, the PC viewed this as a further threat:

Consequently, it became necessary for the very existence and survival of the Pitjantjatjara

Council [that] a Provider Agreement was presented at the AP Executive Meetings on 6

December 2000 and 6 February 2001 between AP and Pitjantjatjara Council to continue to

provide a range of professional services to AP (which it has done for the past 20 years).

Ultimately following a resolution passed unanimously,145 each party signed and sealed the said

Agreement (Ascione 2002, p. 162).

From polarisation around mining, which was splitting the PC and AC into warring camps,

to threats of competition over service delivery, TOs worked through endless meetings

towards a position that they felt would work for both agencies. Anangu leaders from both

organisations signed a ‘Service Provider Agreement’ to be binding for three years, which

established the PC as the legal and anthropology service provider to AP (Ascione 2002,

p. 162).

After the bitterness and division between Anangu leaders around government-sponsored

proposals for new, externally imposed administrative regimes and governance models,

Anangu had finally found a unified voice again—or had they?

4.8 Reflecting Back on the Second Decade

The 1990s were book-ended by the advent of ATSIC in 1990 and the Harbour Bridge

walk for tolerance in 2000. This ‘reconciliation decade’ is often characterised as a time

of great optimism, but also of lost opportunity (Duncan 1993; Dodson & Pritchard 1998;

144 The wording in italics (original emphasis) was a set of words taken from the cover of the ‘ATSIC—

Service Charter’ 1998 and was intended as a ‘dig’ by the TOs present, reminding ATSIC of its stated

commitment to self-determination. 145 On 6 February 2001

134

Dodson, Mowbray & Snowden 2003; Altman & Hunter 2003; Berhendt 2003; Robbins

2004, 2007). The same could be said with respect to the 1990s and the PLRA.

When the 1990s began, Labor was in office at both the State and National levels under

Premier Bannon and PM Hawke respectively. By the end of the decade, there were

Liberal coalition governments both at the State level, under Premier Olsen, and nationally

under PM Howard. At the National level, a policy reversal was gathering momentum, and

it was a policy shift away from self-determination, away from the populist push for Treaty

and away from ATSIC.

In its place, rhetoric about a ‘unified’ and normalised citizenship for all Australians was

shaping public discourse (Arabena 2005; Robbins 2007; Sullivan 2011). Howard argued

against ‘special’ treatment for Aboriginal Australians and in favour of what he saw as

mainstream inclusion of Indigenous Australians, which his critics argued was a return to

assimilation. In 1997, Patrick Dodson, the ‘father’ of reconciliation, proclaimed his

frustration with Howard’s approach to Native Title legislation, protesting that the

Coalition ‘was “pulling apart the delicate threads of Reconciliation” by rejecting

“opportunities to act with magnanimity”’ (Canberra Times cited in Sanders 2002, p. 4).

For many Anangu on the Lands, the 1990s took them full circle. As at the end of the

1980s with the Bonner Review, so it was for Anangu at the end of the 1990s with the

Larkin and Hayes Review. However, whereas Bonner had sought ways to enhance

Anangu self-governance through culturally sensitive and collective control, the 1998

Operational Review sought to promote AP over the PC in order to establish a singular

local sovereignty with hierarchical control and stricter accountability to the government.

AP’s move onto the Lands created two loci of Anangu governance and political power,

where previously there had primarily been only one (the PC). Mining split Anangu into

warring factions. The strained relations between the PC and AP over mining

demonstrated many of the issues that Bonner had foreshadowed a decade earlier. The

Operational Review exacerbated tensions by suggesting AP take over the PC’s role,

funding and resources.

However, it was the intractable issue of petrol—of collective concern to Anangu since

before they started meeting together in the late 1970s—that was to prove the final trigger

for the discursive construction of narratives of blame and dysfunction in the decade ahead.

135

Petrol sniffing persisted as a cyclical and wicked problem.146 With the Commonwealth

providing significant new resources to NPY in 1998 for a four-year regional ‘Petrol

Sniffing Support Project’, the South Australian Government withdrew from its previous,

more locally focused, community development funding role.

As ATSIC lost momentum locally and favour nationally, and in an increasingly

politicised policy environment, relationships between the PC and AP—two organisations

born from the same womb of land rights activism and, often conflated, were now set

against one another in competition for funding and support—nearly reached breaking

point.

146 ‘Wicked problem’ is a term originating in the planning literature; for example, see Rittel and Webber

(1973). It refers to multifaceted and complex problems that are aggressive and persistent, not easily (if ever)

resolved, for which solutions change over time, problems in which stakeholders have radically different

world views and frames for understanding (Conklin 2003), and ‘whose solution requires large groups of

individuals to change their mindsets and behaviours’ (Hunter 2007, p. 37).

136

Chapter 5: 2001–2002: Tensions between Anangu

Pitjantjatjara and the Pitjantjatjara Council: First

Coronial Inquest

‘The extent of the problem diminished somewhat in the mid 1990s, and it is apparent that there

was a reduction in effort towards tackling the problem. It has been apparent since at least 1998 that

the problem was returning, and that the prognosis was bad, but little has been achieved to restore

the effort to pre-1995 levels, let alone take it further’.147

5.1 Introduction

This chapter argues that the sustained pressure on Anangu to fast-track applications for

mining exploration continued to exacerbate divisions between Anangu leaders at the start

of the new millennium. The dispute between the PC and AP, which had initially polarised

around mining, spread into debates about contracting and service provision. As the schism

between AP and the PC deepened, the AP Executive also split along what were generally

considered pro- and anti-mining lines. Tensions were aggravated further by the concerted

efforts of ATSIC and the SA DOSAA148 to implement the Operational Review they had

jointly instigated and funded.

This chapter argues that bilateral government support for AP to take over the PC’s role

and resources entrenched political divisions in Anangu governance.149 Through ATSIC,

the Commonwealth committed resources to AP to appoint an Administrator to develop a

new centralised structure. The PC felt threatened by government pressure to transfer its

resources to AP and strongly objected to this proposal. Efforts by the Rann Labor

(minority) State government, elected in March 2002, to assuage the antipathy between

the PC and AP were a case of ‘too little, too late’.

This chapter argues that, despite the Commonwealth and state governments’ efforts to

direct Anangu organisations, the main threat to Anangu well-being remained the

prevalence and persistence of petrol sniffing. While the Commonwealth supported

regional responses through the NPY Women’s Council and Nganampa Health, the South

147 South Australia Coroner’s Court (2002). 148 In February 2000, the Division of State Aboriginal Affairs was transferred to the SA Department of

Transport, Urban Planning and the Arts. In October 2000, it was renamed the Department of State

Aboriginal Affairs. 149 As detailed in Chapter 4, the Operational Review recommended that the PC transfer its resources to AP.

It also recommended that all direct grant funding to the PC for services intended for AP constituents be

discontinued, and that its assets be distributed to its shareholders and AP.

137

Australian Government drew back from localised service delivery, preferring to rely on

Commonwealth leadership and funding to address petrol sniffing.

As petrol sniffing escalated and there was a series of local deaths, Anangu implored the

state government to act, and elders appealed to the SA Coroner’s office. This chapter

explores the ensuing 2002 Coronial Inquest into deaths by petrol sniffing on the Lands,

its critique of governments for ‘taking far too long to act’ (SA Coroner 2002, p. 36), and

its comprehensive list of recommendations for urgent action.

It also analyses how the South Australian Government reacted to the Coroner’s strongly

worded public critique by strategically deflecting attention away from its inadequate

responses to petrol sniffing on the Lands and onto Anangu governance instead. As the PC

lost funding and support, the government steered media and public scrutiny towards AP

and its Executive, where pressure from the prolonged trauma of petrol sniffing in

communities and the fall-out between key protagonists over mining mingled with older

kinship rivalries to escalate intra-Lands frictions.

5.2 Signing a Service Agreement: Appointing an Administrator for AP

ATSIC and DOSAA’s plans for restructuring AP following Larkin and Hayes’ (1998)

Operational Review (discussed above in Chapter 4) were temporarily thwarted by

Anangu leaders signing a ‘Service Agreement’ of their own between AP and the PC in

February 2001. This codified an arrangement to keep matters between PC and AP much

the same as the one that had existed since the PLRA began. This new consensus among

Anangu threatened Government plans for AP to sever its ties with the PC’s legal and

anthropology section, which had been supporting TOs over two decades under the PLRA.

However, this consensus was itself set back when in April 2001, those AP Executive

members who shared DOSAA and ATSIC’s aims of severing AP’s ties with PC and fast-

tracking ELAs called for a new vote amongst TOs to reject the signed ‘Service

Agreement’:

Anangu Pitjantjatjara Executive Council considers the Pitjantjatjara Council’s service provider

agreement unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

1. No fair and open competition

2. The agreement cannot be for three years

3. All agreements should be suitable for Anangu to understand

4. All services to be provided should be clearly defined including performance indicators and

reporting requirements

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5. Funding agency guidelines should be followed

6. AP should be allowed to choose other service providers for Anangu if they wish.

The executive wishes to have a meeting with ATSIC, DOSAA, independent lawyer and

Pitjantjatjara Council lawyer to discuss development of guidelines and service agreement to be

used by AP Executive and communities.

Moved: Anton Baker Seconded: Keith Stevens Carried: Unanimously

Executive Meeting of 27 April 2001(AP Executive Minutes, 27 April 2001).

While the conflict centred on the efficacy of the ‘Service Agreement’ signed by AP and

the PC in February 2001, attention soon also shifted to the Terms of Reference for an

Administrator, which AP had agreed to appoint to assist it with the implementation of the

1998 Operational Review. Contention emerged about who the Administrator would be

accountable to—AP, the ATSIC or DOSAA, or both—and whether the Administrator

would be involved in development issues. These matters unified Anangu from all

‘factions’, as their rights under the PLRA were considered sacrosanct – or were they?

5.2.1 ‘Practical reconciliation’ in practice

Pro-mining forces on the AP Executive were keen to see the Administrator installed as a

way to help fast-track ELAs and explore new joint venture partnerships with the mining

industry. Others were equally keen to ensure that the ‘Terms of Reference’ for the

Administrator would ensure that whoever was appointed would focus first and foremost

on the human service, health, well-being and infrastructure issues troubling the Lands.

Negotiations about ‘Terms of Reference’ for the AP Administrator continued for some

months in the middle of 2001 against a backdrop in which both levels of government (and

some Anangu150) sought to liberalise mining access. For example, the Commonwealth

had announced it would provide $186,000 to AP for preparation of a ‘regionally

integrated strategic plan’ for the ‘social and economic development on the AP Lands’,

which specifically referred to active pursuit of ‘economic opportunities through mining’.

This consultancy report was due to be provided to AP in 2002 (Tambling & Macdonald

2000; PDP 2002).151

150 While most TOs continued to express concern and general opposition to mining, some were keen to

encourage it. The point made by those challenging the MBH/Taliwell deed was not that they were ‘against

mining’, but rather they wanted processes for consultation specified in the Act to be upheld. See Ramzan

(Alice Springs News 23 June 1999): ‘we are not saying no, we are saying do it the right way’. 151 See Joint Media Release Senator the Hon. Grant Tambling; Senator for the Northern Territory,

Parliamentary Secretary to Minister for Regional Services; for Health and Aged Care Territories and Local

Government; Senator the Hon. Ian MacDonald, Minister for Regional Services, Territories and Local

139

The mining industry was impatient with the steps required by the PLRA before an ELA

could be considered, and keen to pursue what were thought to be vast rich ore and

minerals deposits in the Lands waiting to be developed. On 20 June 2001, Dennis Mutton,

CEO of PIRSA, faced questions from Independent (ex-Liberal) MP Lewis:

The concern that has been expressed in the mining industry…is, ‘What is the point of our

discovering the minerals if the people’—that is, the Aboriginal people in the Pitjantjatjara lands

or the Maralinga lands…—‘will not let us have access to them?’ I would have thought that,

before the government sunk millions into that, it was sensible for the government to have

concluded the background arrangements that would enable access and further exploration and

development of whatever is discovered; otherwise, it seems to me to be an exercise in futility.

If they will never let the ground be developed, there is no point in exploring it. We might as

well ignore it until they decide (if ever) that they would like to see the mineral deposits so

discovered, or any mineral deposits for that matter, developed for commercial purposes. Why

sink taxpayers’ money into a black hole—and no pun is intended? (South Australia House of

Assembly Expenditure Committee 20 June 2001, p. 77).

Mutton responded to the Estimates Committee’s questioning by explaining that PIRSA

was working to ‘encourage’ AP to expedite matters. He said ‘about 10%’ of the Eastern

end of the Lands had ELA’s pending from a surge in mining interest in the region:

there is very strong support from those companies that have applications in place [and] over

recent times, the involvement of the agency [PIRSA] has been to work with the Aboriginal

community [AP] to provide support and data to accelerate the process of consideration of those

exploration applications (South Australia House of Assembly Expenditure Committee 20 June

2001, p.78).

Shadow (Labor) Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Terry Roberts, was alarmed at the

mounting pressure placed on the AP Executive. He felt that there had been insufficient

efforts to stem tensions between the PC and AP. Roberts supported an ongoing role for

the PC as a way of ensuring that there could be a consistent source of ‘independent’ legal

and anthropological advice to TOs. He grew close to activists such as Lester, Ramzan and

Lewis, and he spent time sitting quietly listening to older TOs like Kunmanara Thompson

and Nyaningu.

In an effort to highlight the pressure on TOs, Kunmanara Thompson, then Director of AP

and the man who had signed the original land rights agreement in 1981, wrote a heartfelt

letter to the Advertiser:

Dear Editor,

We are very concerned about the actions of the Federal and State Governments to take away

our land rights and walk over us. We met Deputy Premier Rob Kerin and representatives of the

Department of State Aboriginal Affairs and ATSIC this week and hope that they will resolve

this serious action taken by their senior government officers. The Federal and State

Governments stopped funds to Anangu Pitjantjatjara and Pitjantjatjara Council earlier this

month after traditional owners refused to accept a government-imposed administrator with

Government Tuesday 6 June 2000 entitled ‘$186,000 Federal Funding to Help Social and Economic

Development in Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands’.

140

powers to dismantle the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act (1981). The terms of reference governing

the administrator are illegal and undermine traditional owners’ rights to control development on

their land. It takes us back to the 1940s. Senior government officers decided to install the

administrator and we only became aware of the consequences of the terms of reference

governing the administrator last month. Anangu Pitjantjatjara and the Pitjantjatjara Council are

both financially in the ‘black’ and have no argument with the Governments’ claim they want to

install a financial administrator. What we cannot accept is the proposed terms of reference,

which go far beyond the merely financial into the profoundly political area of traditional owners’

rights. Both the SA Liberal and Labor governments presented the Pitjantjatjara Council with

land rights 25 years ago. We hope to jointly celebrate 20 years of land rights with Anangu

Pitjantjatjara in November.

Kunmanara THOMPSON

Director

Anangu Pitjantjatjara

Umuwa

(Advertiser 2001, Letters to the Editor, p. 27).

This public appeal by Kumunara Thompson was effective. After further negotiations,

DOSAA and ATSIC ‘conceded and acknowledged the continuing contractual

arrangements between AP and the PC’, and agreed that the Administrator would focus on

organisational, not resource development, issues (Ascione 2002, p. 162).

This was a significant win for the PC, as Clause 6.8 of the ‘Terms of Reference’ agreed

to by the AP Executive on 5 September 2001 stated that the ‘Management Consultant’

(as the Administrator was now called) ‘shall not interfere with any contractual relations

subsisting between AP and third parties, namely the Pitjantjatjara Council’ (AP Executive

Minutes, 5 September 2001).

The Administrator/Management Consultant took up the position in September 2001. The

piranpa appointee was Chris Marshall, an imposing and experienced consultant known to

ATSIC staff and throughout the NT. Marshall embraced the role with vigour,

exacerbating some existing conflicts and igniting new tensions as he set about

restructuring AP. Marshall was well attuned to ATSIC and DOSAA, which jointly funded

his consultancy, and he was pro-development and keen to prise AP away from its

dependence on the PC. He quickly established centralised finance and development under

AP’s control. The campaign to consult with communities across the Lands on the new

centralised ‘umbrella’ structure for AP was called ‘Rolling Thunder’. An example of the

existing and proposed relationships between Anangu organisations used in the campaign

is presented in Figure 5.1.

141

Figure 5.1: ‘Rolling Thunder’, Proposed APY Relationships. Copyright Burdon, R,

Burdon Torzillo Pty Ltd, 2002.

142

Proposing AP as the pre-eminent governance body on the Lands was not popular with

those it would subordinate. Playing out through the PC and AP tensions was a clash of

values, competition over resources and power, and a more profound, deeper struggle over

the future of Anangu ‘self-determination’ on the Lands.

As Altman and Martin (2009) suggested, following the 1996 election of Howard’s Liberal

Coalition, a national narrative emerged that criticised past policies of ‘self-determination’

promoted by Labor leaders such as Whitlam, Keating and Dunstan for their alleged failure

to achieve ‘development’ in Aboriginal communities. However, the capacity for

Indigenous communities to resist state-sanctioned mining or ensure an equitable share of

profits remained highly dependent on the capacity of regional Indigenous controlled

agencies to advocate for Indigenous people’s collective entitlements as legal rights

(Altman & Martin 2009).

Some Anangu—particularly those keen on development—saw the implementation of the

‘Operational Review’model as a means for consolidating Anangu control through AP as

envisaged under the PLRA, whereas others saw the centralised, bureaucratic nature of the

model and severance of ties with the PC as having the opposite effect. Separating AP

from the PC, as well as moves to denude the PC’s funding, had political and

organisational dimensions as well as longterm ramifications.

Schisms about governance arrangements for the Lands were increasingly located along

three key continuums: Anangu ‘self-determination’ versus centrally directed

governmental social engineering; a pro-mining/pro-development ‘open the Lands to

economic development’ push versus a more cautious ‘protect the environment and

cultural traditions’ group; and the PC versus AP inter-organisational competition for

status and resources. Key protagonists—both Anangu and piranpa—were located

throughout these tendencies, at times moving between them.

5.3 Twenty Years’ Celebration of the PLRA—as Petrol Sniffing

Reappears

5.3.1 Coronial inquest announced

A month before AP Director Kunmanara Thompson’s letter, which protested government

attempts to ‘undermine traditional owners’ rights to control development on their land’

(The Advertiser 28 July 2001, p. 27), appeared in the media, Anangu people’s ongoing

struggle with petrol sniffing had taken a tragic turn. Thompson’s own son had died of

143

petrol sniffing, prompting the SA Coroner to announce that he would conduct an Inquest

into three deaths from petrol sniffing on the Lands.

The media headline read:

Petrol Sniffing Deaths Inquiry

South Australia’s coroner Wayne Chivell is to establish an investigation into a hidden killer of

Aborigines in the state’s Far North. The death of Anangu-Pitjantjatjara land council director

Punch Thompson’s 27-year-old son last month has paved the way for Mr Chivell to undertake

the investigation into petrol sniffing-related deaths.

Mr Thompson’s son was found dead in a house at Ernabella, 440km southwest of Alice Springs,

with a petrol-can by his side. Mr Thompson asked the coroner to investigate his son’s death,

and those of two others who died in the past year (The Advertiser 28 August 2001, p. 23).

The Coronial Inquiry focused on the deaths of Kunmanara Ken of Amata who died on 3 August

1999, Kunmanara Hunt of Black Hill Homeland who died on 27 January 2001 and Kunmanara

Thompson of Ernabella who had died on 26 June 2001 (Chivell 2002, p. i). The Coroner grouped

the deaths and tackled the inquiry as one in order that the three deaths under investigation were

considered within the broader context of petrol sniffing which he argued was ‘…endemic on the

Anamgu Pitjantjatjara Lands’.

It has caused and continues to cause devastating harm to the community, including

approximately 35 deaths in the last 20 years in a population of between 2,000 and 2,500. Serious

disability, crime, cultural breakdown and general grief and misery are also consequences

(Coroner 2002, p. ii).

For some time, Anangu community leaders had protested that sniffing had begun to

increase again in the late 1990s to levels not seen since the early 1980s. In language

echoing his calls for support at the time of the passing of the PLRA, Thompson called on

the government to act:

Children and sniffers have become bosses over their parents. They are running the agenda by

their behaviour. They are out of control and people have to react to the behaviour of sniffers

rather than keeping to the law and keeping to the culture. Sniffers break their mother’s arms.

There is violence against families. Sniffers threaten their parents that they will commit further

acts of self-harm. They swear at their parents. They breach traditional secrets by speaking out

of turn. They throw rocks at their parents…. When I talk about these things I am talking about

sniffers generally, I am not talking about the deceased. We as older people are worried about

the children and about the younger generation of parents having to bring up petrol sniffers….

We have no sniffers now. We have lost our only son (Coroner 2002, p. 20 [Exhibit C24c, p5]).

Commencing in September 2001, the Inquest took a year to deliberate, collecting

evidence from health experts, government agencies, Anangu organisations and

individuals, families and community leaders in situ on the Lands at Umuwa for over a

week each time in May, June and September 2002. The submissions to, and findings of,

the Inquest are returned to shortly. However, this chapter first tracks other events that

were unfolding on the Lands at this time.

144

5.3.2 Celebrating the second decade of the PLRA

In November 2001, an inma152 was organised by Anangu to celebrate the twentieth

anniversary of the passing of the PLRA. The celebrations at Amata were attended by

thousands of people and held great meaning for Anangu communities and families across

the Lands.

The NT Centralian Advocate noted how ‘they came from communities all over the

Pitjantjatjara Lands, PC staff, past and present, plus special guests many who had

travelled interstate in order to be present’:

Pitjantjatjara Council chairman and Anangu Pitjantjatjara member Gary Lewis opened the

proceedings soon after midday, introducing guest speakers. These included the Anangu

Pitjantjatjara director Kawaki Thompson, Anangu Pitjantjatjara chairman Owen Burton,

Shadow Minister for Aboriginal Affairs Terry Roberts, Federal Member for Lingiari Warren

Snowdon, SA Member for Grey Barry Wakelin, ATSIC commissioner Brian Butler as well as

many of those who had been involved in the struggle for land rights in the late 1970s (Centralian

Advocate 7 December 2001, p. 41).

The image of Anangu leaders such as Lewis, Burton, Adamson and Thompson, often

pitted against one another in Anangu organisational politics, together performing

customary affirmations of their connection to country and each other is an emblematic

image of the complex interconnections of people, politics and place on the Lands.

This diversity within unity, or balance between collectivism and autonomy that

characterises the Anangu organisational landscape is often overlooked in Western

analyses. Eurocentric managerial notions can too easily privilege structure over process

to enact a ‘new form of structuralism’ (Sanders 2004, p. 12). Obsession with ‘the’ perfect

governance model leads to simplistic approaches to Aboriginal governance (Wolfe 1989;

Rowse 1992; Sanders 2004), which belies the complexity, messiness and ambivalence of

Anangu social relations, where situational leadership adapts to circ*mstance and where

multiplicities of difference coexist as unity.

Despite all of the challenges confronting the Lands, the PLRA’s twentieth anniversary

celebrations proceeded as a display of Anangu pride, dignity and joy in self-

determination:

152 ‘Inma’ is a Pitjantjatjara term meaning ‘celebration’, involving singing and dancing for example.

145

Historic day in struggle to win land rights

The Advertiser 27 November 2001

Sean Fewster

THE Pitjantjatjara Council’s struggle for land rights was long and hard—but yesterday,

thousands of people gathered to celebrate their eventual triumph.153 Formed [in] 1976 the

council represented the views of Ngaanyatjarra, Pitjantjatjara and Yankunytjatjara people—a

community stretching more than 350,000sq km across Australia’s arid centre. Its aim was to

return the land to its traditional owners and set about changing public perceptions through

rallies, meetings and marches. The council returned to Amaralytja Creek yesterday to

commemorate its 25th anniversary and the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 which led to the

handover of 102,630 sq km of land to the Pitjantjatjara people by former premier David

Tonkin—a landmark in Aboriginal history.

Led by council chairman Gary Lewis, the group performed traditional celebration dances—or

inmi—including the Witchetty Grub Dreaming inmi and the Perentie inmi. They also listened

to speeches by the director of the Anangu Pitjantjatjara, Kawaki Thompson, and Anangu singer

Trevor Adamson. Former council director Yami Lester was not able to attend the ceremony but

said it would be as jubilant as the 1981 celebrations. He said his fondest memory of the fight

yesterday came from a rally in the early 1980s: ‘One of the old blokes stood up and said, “The

Government has taken our kangaroos and put them on their penny, and they’ve taken our emus

and put them on the two-bob coin”’, Mr Lester said. ‘Then he said, “so now, we want our land

rights in return”. I laughed because it was such a good thing to say’.

5.4 Rift between AP and the PC Widens as Rann Takes Office

5.4.1 AP turns away from the PC

After the goodwill of the twentieth anniversary of the PLRA celebrations, it only took

three months before a bitter dispute erupted again between the PC on one side and AP,

ATSIC and DOSAA on the other. Within weeks of his appointment, Chris Marshall, the

Administrator/Management Consultant, and now called Acting CEO, sought to secure

independent legal and anthropological services for AP and to sever any previous

arrangement with the PC. The PC felt that they had a Service Agreement that was being

dishonoured.

The PC alleged that DOSAA was withholding ATSIC funding. However, the AP Chair

was reported in the press as arguing otherwise:

The council, which has provided legal, anthropological and administrative services to the

Anangu Pitjantjatjara for 20 years, says it relies on the funding to continue operating. AP

Council chairman Owen Burton, in a statement issued at the weekend, denied funding had been

blocked by DOSAA. He said it was AP, which ‘…has proposed changes to the legal and

anthropological services currently provided by the Pitjantjatjara Council’ (The Advertiser 28

January 2002, p. 2).

153 A letter from Bill Edwards, a past administrator with a long history on the Lands, appeared the following

week (Letters to the Editor, The Advertiser, 03/1201) discussing aspects of Fewster’s reporting. Edwards

told of how the PC was formed at a meeting at the Amata Community on 13–14 July 1976. Edwards helped

with interpreting at the meetings, which were significant steps towards gaining Pitjantjatjara land rights in

1981.

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Lewis, who was Chair of the PC, responded by suggesting that problems underpinning

the conflicts between the PC and AP were not issues of Anangu making, but rather that

the South Australian Government was behind continual attempts to ‘usurp control from

the traditional owners’ (The Advertiser 28 January 2002, p. 2).

Lewis and other members of the PC felt frustrated by attempts to wrest decision-making

away from the PC and into new consultancy arrangements that he argued would be more

amenable to government control. He argued that:

the State Government wanted greater control over the Pitjantjatjara lands to ensure mining

projects were fast-tracked (The Advertiser 28 January 2002, p. 2).

Lewis had previously accused the Liberal government of trying to weaken Anangu

organisations that had been built up over many years to support Anangu self-

determination. Under the banner headline ‘Land Rights Body under Siege’, The

Australian reported:

The Pitjantjatjara Council—a pioneering force in early land rights victories—is fighting to

survive…according to Chairman Lewis. He claims there is a campaign to destroy the council

by diverting its powers to the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Executive, the legal land-holding body. [PC]

is a service provider…Lewis accused David Rathman, executive officer of the Department of

Aboriginal Affairs… of trying to weaken the PC so it was ‘easy to manipulate and control’.

‘This concerted attack on the integrity of the indigenous people’s right to self-determination

must constitute the lowest point in the recent history of Aboriginal Australia’, Mr Lewis said

(The Australian 5 June 2001, p. 6).

Anangu TOs called a Special General Meeting about the dispute between the PC and AC

in January 2002 which called for the resignation of Aboriginal Affairs Minister, Kotz,

and DOSAA CEO David Rathman. The conflict around the ‘Service Agreement’ between

the PC and AC became litigious, with all sides engaging legal counsel.

5.4.2 A minority Labor government

In February 2002, the SA elections resulted in a hung parliament, with the return of 23

ALP, 20 Liberal, one National and three Independent members in the 47-seat House of

Assembly (Martin 2009, p. 160). Labor’s leader, Rann, negotiated the support of the key

Independents and signed a ‘Compact’ with maverick Independent MP Peter Lewis. Lewis

became Speaker and Rann was able to form government. Lewis was a contentious former

Liberal MP who was infamous for confessing in Parliament that he had once shot a man.

Lewis held a long-standing desire for radical Constitutional change in SA, as well as

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several mining interests of his own. He was also well known for his pro-mining, pro-

development views in relation to the Lands.154

In March, Rann became SA’s forty-fourth Premier, leading a precariously balanced

minority Labor Government in the House of Assembly. In the Legislative Council, the

State’s Upper House, there was also a non-Labor majority, with seven Labor members,

nine Liberals, three Australian Democrats, one Family First and two Independents.

Rann’s fragile minority coalition strategically embraced non-Labor ministers to form

Government and relied on the support of unpredictable and volatile Speaker Lewis, to

maintain it.155 As a result of the fragile alliances holding his minority Government

together, Rann was generally acquiescent to Lewis’s interests, which on the AP Lands

coincided with the Commonwealth’s (and others) pro-mining agenda.

Labor’s Terry Roberts was sworn in as Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and

Reconciliation156 on 6 March. Roberts had seen petrol sniffing first-hand and considered

it a policy priority to address it. In September 2001, when the Coronial Inquest was first

announced, he had called for an ‘emergency summit’ to deal with the ‘epidemic’ he said

he had witnessed on the Lands:

‘I saw kids between 10 and 16 with cans strapped around their mouths and noses walking around

in a semi-dazed state’ he said. ‘It’s tragic. It depressed me considerably but it also affirmed my

commitment to work towards a solution (The Advertiser 3 September 2001, p. 2).

Roberts viewed the dispute between the PC and AP as counter-productive and destructive.

He formed a view in Opposition that the Howard Government’s move away from self-

determination and towards policies of economic self-sufficiency and ‘mutual obligation’

(Braithwaite, Gatens & Mitchell 2002) dovetailed with ATSIC, DOSAA and PIRSA’s

pursuit of liberalising mining industry access to the Lands.157

He observed that the two key Anangu organisations had been pitted against one another,

and that while this served Anangu interests poorly, it had empowered Governments that

154 Hon Peter Lewis owned eight mining leases and held interests in Goldus Operations and Mintech

Resources. It has been reported that Lewis had sold his iron ore project at Razorback Ridge, 80 km east of

Yunta, to Western Australia's Royal Resources for $30 million (The Advertiser 5 October 2009). His pro-

mining stance is also illustrated by the tenor of Lewis’s questioning of the CEO of PIRSA, which was cited

earlier in this chapter. 155 The Rann government worked to appease the Independents by representing itself as ‘tough on crime’

and economically ‘dry’ and distancing itself from both the social democratic progressiveness of the Dunstan

era and the State Bank collapse under Bannon. 156 The Hon. Roberts also became Minister for Correctional Services at this time. 157 According to Ascione (2002), mining interest intensified after the Aero-magnetic Survey revealed the

possibility of rare, precious and profitable minerals in the Musgrave Ranges and PIRSA senior staff outlined

the comprehensive results of the Aero-magnetic Survey, focusing on AP Lands at an International

Conference held in Adelaide in August 2000.

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were united in pursuit of the pro-mining policy agenda. There was little doubt in Roberts’

mind that larger and more economically focused political agendas were advantaged in the

dispute between PC and AP as the two peak Anangu organisations.158 Concern about the

macro political economy of the State had usurped the quest for Indigenous ‘self-

determination’ that was characteristic of the Dunstan Labor era.

One of Roberts’ early interventions as Minister was to engage professional mediator Rick

Farley, former head of the National Farmers Federation to attempt to reconcile key

Anangu protagonists. Discussions with all parties to the PC and AP dispute were hosted

by the Minister in May 2002. Portrayed as a dispute resolution process, careful media

analysis of what each protagonist said reveals much about the construction of this issue:

State Aboriginal Affairs Minister Terry Roberts convened a meeting of the executive of Anangu

Pitjantjatjara at Parliament House to discuss the dispute, which stems from a decision by AP to

remove funding for legal and anthropological services from the Pitjantjatjara Council. The

Pitjantjatjara Council, based in Alice Springs, is the organisation contracted by AP for the past

20 years to implement essential services….

Members of the [Pitjantjatjara] council have argued since last year that their organisation, a

force in Aboriginal land rights in the 1970s, is being undermined by forces in the Aboriginal

and Torres Strait Islander Commission manipulating the parent body by controlling funding

(The Australian 15 May 2002, p. 19).

AP’s Administrator was resolute that it should be properly recognised as the peak body:

Acting general manager of AP Chris Marshall said the dispute with the Pitjantjatjara Council

would be settled quickly if all parties acknowledged the role of AP as the peak body for [the]

Pitjantjatjara lands (The Australian 15 May 2002, p. 19).

Roberts appeared to be focused on establishing a basis for effective Government service

provision:

‘Provision of services will have to be commonwealth, state and territory governments’

responsibilities, in agreement with the governance of AP and the representatives on the ground’,

he said.

‘We need the input, we need the feedback, we need the ideas…because in the past we’ve failed

badly’ (The Australian 15 May 2002, p. 19).

Roberts’ next step was to request the transfer of the Head of DOSAA, stating that ‘he did

not feel they could work together’ (The Advertiser 4 June 2002, p. 4). David Rathman,

then SA’s most senior Aboriginal employee, had become embroiled in the PC and AP

conflicts of the previous three years. Roberts argued that he was too closely aligned with

ATSIC and thereby AP with regards to the dispute.

158 Personal communications with Minister Roberts about the breakdown in the relationship between the

PC and AP.

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While Roberts considered Rathman too supportive of AP and its Acting CEO Chris

Marshall, he had himself become close to a number of TOs involved with PC, including

Lester and outspoken PC Chairman Lewis. Roberts interpreted attempts by DOSAA,

ATSIC and Acting AP CEO Marshall to sever the ties between AP and the PC as a

strategy of ‘divide and conquer’. In the new Minister’s mind, this was anathema to

empowering self-determination for Anangu on the Lands.159

Roberts wanted DOSAA to play a facilitative role in assisting Anangu to make

independent decisions, rather than feeling they were being coerced through the carrot-

and-stick manipulation of funding. However, dumping DOSAA’s Head drew a sharp

response from ATSIC SA Zone Commissioner Brian Butler, who quickly clarified in the

media that Marshall was funded by the government but appointed by AP, not DOSAA.

Butler restated ATSIC’s support for ‘any efforts to bring about…reform to governance

and service delivery on the Lands’ and strongly defended Rathman, commending him for

having ‘served Aboriginal Affairs admirably’ in SA (The Advertiser 6 June 2002, p. 18).

The way Rathman was dispatched did not win friends for Roberts in some quarters. In a

surprise move Roberts succeeded next in attracting ex-senior Commonwealth public

servant and Narungga man Peter Buckskin back to SA to take up the position as the new

Head of DOSAA. In a previous role, Buckskin had been an advisor to Commonwealth

(Liberal) Minister Kemp. Buckskin was well accepted across the SA political spectrum.

5.4.3 PDP Strategic Economics Initiatives Plan (Phase II)

In July 2002, a report from the consultancy engaged from the economic development

grant (awarded by Ministers Tambling and Macdonald in June 2000, as detailed above)

was provided to AP. The Report, which was prepared by consultants PDP Australia Pty

Ltd, assessed potential areas for economic development on the Lands in the areas of

‘cattle, camels, tourism, the arts, mining and banking’ (PDP 2002, p. 6).

Although the brief for this consultancy was to assess ‘Anangu aspirations and priorities

for furthering AP’s economic goals’, the Report’s key recommendations highlighted what

it termed ‘the critical need for better governance’. It recognised that governance:

is a multi-faceted issue: it relates to matters such as accountability, transparency, the level of

consultation, and the way decisions are made and implemented [and] has important implications

for the efficient and effective allocation and use of human and financial resources (PDP 2002,

p. 6).

159 Personal communication with Minister Roberts at this time.

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Governance here was addressed not in terms of representativeness or decision-making

(Mantziaris & Martin 2000; Hunt, Smith, Garling & Sanders 2008), but rather as

coordination for budget and organisational efficiency in terms of normative

administration (Sullivan 2006; Jose 2007; Limerick 2008).

In many ways, PDP’s model of governance—or rather administrative control—mirrored

the 1998 Operational Review. It argued for a single ‘Policy Coordination and

Management Office’ to provide a form of central command to support the economic

development it recommended.

In a Western style of normative bureaucratic rationality, the PDP Report postulated a

matrix that calibrated ‘the problem to be solved’ (Bacchi 2009, 2012) with a specific

organisational solution (badged as addressing ‘governance’ concerns), as Table 5.1’s

excerpt from the matrix in the PDP Report (p. 8) illustrates.

Table 5.1: Source PDP Report Matrix (2002, p.6)

Problem to be solved Actions to be taken Beneficial outcomes will be

Agencies operating in the AP

Lands operate autonomously as

‘silos’ in terms of policy

development, project design,

liaison with funding agencies

from a wide range of

governments without screening

and priority setting from a

single entity that coordinates

and unifies priorities and

budgets in support of wider

development objectives for the

AP Lands as a whole.

Establish a Policy Coordination

and Management Office to

underpin the operations of the

CEO and integrate strategic

plans for sectors under a single

development approach.

A better allocation of resources

to coordinated achieving of

strategic priorities across the AP

Lands would be achieved as a

first step to establish a single

unified governance structure.

*my bolding emphasis

The Report contained advice on how to minimise the dispersed consultative processes

through which AP maintained cultural dialogue across communities, family groups and

TOs, and to speed up access for development possibilities, particularly those related to

mining. Interestingly, the Report suggested that engaging anthropologists in the

assessment of proposals was ‘unnecessarily paternalistic’. It recommended direct

negotiations between the mining industry and TOs:

With respect to the Exploration Licence Approval system we have found that in the past it

involved using anthropologists to filter mining proposals to the Traditional Owners. This

appears us to be unnecessarily paternalistic; to have inhibited Traditional Owners from making

informed decisions, and to have resulted in delays, which could impose costs on AP

communities (PDP 2002, p. 12).

Continuing on the trajectory of the Operational Review (Larkin & Hayes 1998), the

Report sought an improved ‘administrative efficiency for AP’, along private sector,

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corporate or departmental lines. The concept of a single bureaucratic organisational

efficiency focal point is used interchangeably with governance, as if it could be an

unproblematic proxy for it. It advocated strongly for ‘a single unified governance

structure’ (PDP 2002, p. 8).

A pervasive discourse was building in Commonwealth and state government policies at

the time about the need for ‘improved governance’ in Aboriginal community and

organisational domains. However, ideas of ‘improved governance’ were often conflated

with administrative rationality, centralised planning and authoritative hierarchies, which

were expressed as chains of command.

As Rowse (1992, p. 89) identified a decade earlier, the notion that ‘community power is,

or should be made to be, a unified, centralised sovereignty’ [is] ‘one of the most common

and seductive assumptions in the discussion of Aboriginal self-government’.

While clear lines of organisational accountability may be one part of some strategies to

improve governance in some contexts, the notion of governance also encompasses

complex and messy questions of cultural congruity and relevance of fit for purpose,

political pluralism and dispersed relationships. Sanders (2002, p. 8) suggests that

Indigenous organisations,

can also make legitimate claims to representing the interests of Indigenous people if

government is thought of more as a process than a structure.

However, little content in the economically focused PDP Report was geared towards the

complexities of the inter-sectorial, inter-cultural or intra-cultural space (Limerick 2005;

Hunt et al. 2008; Moran 2010), let alone empowering the primacy of self-determination

with regards to the lived experience and expressed priorities of Anangu peoples.

The Report was a pro-development study framed in terms of fast-tracking capital

investment to improve economic development on the Lands. This was of course also the

nature of its brief from the Commonwealth funders. In a supplementary assessment of

the study, which was requested by the AP Executive, Altman (2002, p.3) made the wry

observation that it was, ‘unclear how this developmentalism [could] be reconciled’ with

the clearly stated wishes of Anangu:

The consultant notes that mining is not a popular aspiration for Anangu, but presses ahead as if

this is not a major issue, indeed seeks options to enhance exploration activity on AP Lands and

to streamline provision of [mining] leases.

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5.5 Dodson Report

After Rick Farley’s attempts to facilitate mediation, Minister Roberts next engaged

Professor Mick Dodson in early June 2002 to, in the Minister’s words, ‘attempt to bring

the Executive Board of the Anangu Pitjantjatjara and the Pitjantjatjara Council’s

executive together to resolve their differences’ (South Australia Legislative Council 29

August 2002, p. 969). Dodson had been Australia’s first Aboriginal and Torres Strait

Islander Social Justice Commissioner, from 1992 to 1998.160 He had previously served as

Counsel assisting the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and was

widely respected as an Indigenous leader.

In visiting the Lands, Dodson was accompanied by Phillip Toyne,161 a well-respected

lawyer who had worked for the PC and been deeply involved with Anangu in their land

rights campaign. Toyne had deep knowledge of both AP and the PC when he met with

each of the Executives, initially separately in Umuwa on 25 June and in Alice Springs on

26–27 June. Dodson then held mediation sessions with all parties in both Umuwa and

Alice Springs on a number of days during July.162

Dodson reported to Minister Roberts in August 2002, and the report was tabled in

Parliament on 29 August. The observations and recommendations that Dodson provided

were succinct, penetrating and plain-speaking. He reported his ‘great professional

disappointment’ in being unable to resolve the dispute, and he had concluded that in his

mediation efforts, ‘the process had broken down irretrievably’ (Dodson 2002, p. 1).

Dodson briefly summarised the history of the dispute, pointing out that while the PLRA

specifies a role for AP and the Executive Board of AP, there is no mention of any role for

the PC under the PLRA. However, while the PC had no designated role under the PLRA,

‘nevertheless AP for most of the life of the PLRA engaged the PC to provide legal,

anthropological and other services to AP’ (Dodson 2002, p. 1).

He identified that the dispute emerged when, ‘sometime late in 2001 the AP ceased to

engage PCI for the delivery of legal and anthropological services’ and that while AP had

160 The position of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner was created by

the Commonwealth Parliament in December 1992 in response to the findings of the Royal Commission

into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. Dodson also served as Counsel assisting the Royal Commission into

Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and held many other associated highly respected roles in pursuit of self-

determination for Indigenous peoples in Australia and internationally. 161 Toyne had also co-authored ‘Growing Up the Country: The Pitjantjatjara Struggle for their Land’ with

Vachon in 1984. 162 Mediation sessions were held in Umuwa from 11–26 July and Alice Springs on 29 and 30 July.

153

the power to make this decision, it had sparked intense conflict ‘with claim and counter

claim, accusation and counter accusation’ (Dodson 2002, p. 2).

Dodson referred to a deliberate politicisation of the dispute by politicians with direct links

to the Executive, and of their preparedness to use confidential mediation discussions to

further their own ends. In a strongly worded rebuke directed at Opposition (Liberal)

Aboriginal Affairs spokesperson Kotz,163 Dodson (2002, p.2) spoke of his distress when

he learned that Kotz had asserted in Parliament that he agreed with her and had taken the

side of, and was aligned to AP:

It now pains me no end to now see something I said privately to the AP Executive Board being

used inaccurately and for party partisan political purposes in the Parliament. For me there is no

clearer illustration of the way in which the parties have conducted themselves throughout the

dispute, almost no tactic including breach of trust is discarded.

As Dodson (2002, p. 2) described, it was a litany in the Parliament and on the Lands too,

of what he termed ‘claim and counter claim accusation and counter accusation’. Dodson

(2002, p.3) detailed his concern that some of the enmity between ‘players’ had

longstanding historical origins and that a small number of people ‘did not genuinely desire

a mediated outcome’. He argued that poor advice was being provided to Anangu in both

the PC and AP about the mediation process and broader aspects of the PLRA.

Dodson (2002, p.3) considered that the duty of an elected Executive Board was to protect

the interests of TOs ‘in relation to the use, management and access by others to the

Lands’. Accordingly, AP had ‘political advocacy, negotiation and administrative

functions in protecting those rights and interests on behalf of the Traditional Owners’,

which Dodson argued included hiring staff and ensuring the provision of independent

expert advice to TOs (ibid).

Dodson was clear in his view that AP had no role in the provision of services. Rejecting

the ‘peak’ umbrella service delivery model promoted by the ATSIC and DOSAA

sponsored 1998 Operational Review (and later PDP Report), Dodson (2002, p. 3)

explained:

I do not believe that it was ever intended, nor do I think the AP is the appropriate legal vehicle,

as presently constituted under the provisions of the PLR act, to deliver a host of municipal or

human services to the communities on the Lands generally and the TO’s particularly.

163 On 1 August, Opposition spokesperson Kotz continued urging AP to split from the PC and claimed that

Dodson was ‘aligned’ to AP and supportive of her view. Kotz accused the PC of being ‘irrational and not

necessarily eager to assist in the [mediation] process’ (Hansard, EA 1 August 2002, p. 102). Minister

Roberts (Hansard, EA 1 August 2002, p. 102) defended the impartiality of Dodson’s mediation process and

inferred that the Opposition was fuelling, if not manipulating, the dispute.

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He argued (2002, p.3) that the fundamental role of AP did not appear to be understood,

or appreciated, by the AP Executive Board, staff of AP or Government officials:

With the exception of PC there has been a tendency to inflate or expand the position of AP

beyond what is provided for in the Act.

This is a muddle headed view of the PLRA and the AP!

It is not appropriate to ascribe to AP roles that are not provided for under the statute.

Dodson argued against AP’s involvement in the delivery of municipal and other human

services because it ‘has the potential to place them in conflict from time to time with the

interests of the TOs’ (Dodson 2002, p.3).

On governance, Dodson suggested that, at that time, the AP Executive164 was

‘unrepresentative, undemocratic, unaccountable, seriously confused about its role and

future role’. He also raised concerns about the ‘possible misuse of Board funds’, which

he suggested ‘should be explored’ (Dodson 2002, p.4).

Dodson advocated a review of the PLRA due to its 21-year history. He advocated a closer

examination of local government models for the Lands: ‘what this might look like is a

matter for discussion, consultation and negotiation between Anangu, their representatives

and government’. Specifically, Dodson (2002) recommended:

AP Executive Board members to be elected for a minimum 3-year term

Election to be by secret ballot and/or conducted by relevant state electoral authority

Number of Board members to be expanded to represent all major Lands communities

Board Chairperson to be elected by members of the Board through independent secret ballot

Fixed number of seats to be set aside for female Anangu Executive members

Qualifications for candidature to be detailed

Dispute resolution through mediation and arbitration provisions

Recognition of Yankunjatjara [sic] in the PLR Act

Limitations on use of proxy representatives at AP Executive meetings.

Dodson pointed out that while AP’s Constitution enabled most of the above to be enacted,

some matters required legislative amendment, which he favoured as a means of

enshrining good practice. Dodson expressed a sense of profound concern and

disappointment at the collapse of the mediation discussions.

Acknowledging the organisation’s historical depth, Dodson wrote of the PC as having

been a champion of political advocacy and agitation on behalf of the people of the AP

Lands. He pointed out that it was the PC that had secured the PLRA. He also noted that

the PC had been instrumental in achieving the hand-over of Uluru to the TOs:

164 Under the Chairmanship at this time of Burton.

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On any measure PCI [sic] has a very successful history in achieving Land Rights for Anangu.

It is a record that any Indigenous organisation can be justifiably proud of (Dodson 2002, p. 5).

Dodson’s (2002) Report cut to the heart of the structural problems bedevilling the PLRA.

While Dodson’s efforts at mediation had no effect on what he portrayed as frustratingly

self-serving and wilfully obstructive ‘Party partisan’ politics, his Report established a

baseline for next steps to be taken by the South Australian Government.

However, Dodson’s Report (2002) was also not without its critics. For example, then AP

Chairman Burton was reported as saying that Dodson’s Report was ‘unbalanced’:

[It’s] not really a true story—it’s not real to Anangu people. This story about money misuse is

untrue. We have in Alice Springs an accountant and bookkeeper and in Umuwa a financial

manager. We have auditors too (The Australian 30 August 2002, p. 4).

5.5.1 Parliamentary Select Committee on the PLRA established

Following the tabling of Dodson’s Report in August 2002, a Parliamentary Select

Committee on the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act165 was established with bipartisan

support (South Australia Legislative Council 29 August 2002, p. 957).

The SC was asked to report on:

a) the operation of the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981;

b) opportunities for, and impediments to, enhancement of the cultural life and the economic

and social development of the traditional owners of the lands;

c) the past activities of the Pitjantjatjara Council and Anangu Pitjantjatjara Executive in

relation to the lands;

d) future governance required to manage the lands and ensure efficient and effective

delivery of human services and infrastructure; and

e) any other matters.

This was the first full review of the PLRA since its inception. The SC held public hearings

in Adelaide, Alice Springs, Yulara and on the Lands at Umuwa and in six community

locations. Ninety-six witnesses gave evidence to the Inquiry, which finished its hearings

in 2003 and finalised its Report to the SA Parliament in June 2004. Chapter 6 will discuss

this report in more detail.

5.6 First Coronial Inquest Reports

Running alongside the entrenched struggles and political controversy surrounding the PC

and AP was Coroner Chivell’s Inquest into the deaths of three men by petrol sniffing on

the Lands. The Inquest convened at Umuwa on 28–31 May, 3–6 June and 6 September

2002. State elections were held, Rann’s minority government was formed, and disputation

165 The SC was Chaired by Minister Roberts and comprised the Hon. John Gazzola (Labor), the Hon. Sandra

Kanck (Australian Democrats), the Hon. Robert Lawson (Liberal), the Hon. Caroline Schaefer (Liberal)

and the Hon. Nick Xenophon (Independent, No Pokies). Due to illness, Nick Xenophon was unable to

participate in the activities of the Committee.

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over the Executive seeking to sever its agreement with the PC peaked, while at hearing

after hearing, Anangu from communities all over the Lands quietly poured out their sense

of loss, trauma and suffering to the Inquest into the deaths of people who had been loved

parts of their immediate families and extended kinship networks. The Inquest heard of

Anangu living in a ‘constant state of grief’ (Coroner 2002, [T400–402], p. 33). It heard

testimony of the effect on communities:

If the petrol sniffers are running riot, few people get to sleep; the whole place is in uproar.

Sometimes there is damage; there’s community meetings; there’s white fellas growling at you;

there’s police running around. The whole thing is very stressful, and it goes on night and day

and it’s extremely disruptive to everyone’s life (Coroner 2002, [T30], p. 19).

Testimony at the Inquest emphasised this Anangu perception that petrol sniffing was

‘imported in, so the answer must be imported in because we have no answer here for this

problem’ (Coroner 2002, T31, p. 21). In his submission, elder Kunmanara Thompson,

father of one of the deceased, made this poignantly clear:

There has been petrol sniffing since the 1950s. Who is responsible? The petrol doesn’t belong

to us. It is not part of Anangu law. It was introduced to the Lands by white people. It is important

that Anangu revive their culture and hold on to their culture.

The problem with petrol comes from outside, it’s like the Maralinga bomb tests, the solution

should come from the outside too (Coroner 2002, [Exhibit C24c, p4], p. 19).

Anangu elder Kumunara Ward, an Aunt of Kunmanara Thompson and member of the

NPY Women’s Council, told the Inquest that:

Petrol is not from our culture; it’s got nothing to do with Aboriginal people’s culture or law. It

comes from white people, from white people’s culture, from white people’s law.

Kids sniff petrol because families just don’t have enough money. They don’t have enough of

anything. That’s why they sniff (Coroner 2002, [T327], p. 18).

Dr Torzillo of Nganampa Health suggested in his testimony that ‘alienation and

sometimes hopelessness’ was a factor in young and mature aged men’s use of petrol as

an inhalant. Torzillo is also cited as stating that:

there seems to be a widespread view within government…that this is a problem which the

community should solve, this is their responsibility…

This is a community with less resources and ability to control a tough problem than any

mainstream community…and secondly, that’s not a demand that’s put on any other community

in the country.

No-one, no politician and no bureaucracy expects that…a suburb like Cabramatta…have to

solve the heroin problem and it’s up to them to do it.

No-one makes that demand of them…because it’s a stupid thing to do, it’s clearly not possible

(Coroner 2002, [T1 55–6], pp. 20–21).

157

Jane Lloyd of the NPY Women’s Council gave evidence of the connection between

domestic violence and petrol sniffing. She suggested that one in four women on the Lands

at that time aged between 15 and 44 years was, or had been, a client of their services, and

that around 80% of violence experienced by clients was committed ‘by males who are

under the influence of marijuana, alcohol or petrol’ (Coroner 2002, [C41a p.1–2], p. 17).

The NPY Women’s Council submission called for system changes in the form of

‘legislation, police procedures, court procedures and women’s shelters in Alice Springs’,

and argued for a ‘permanent police presence, a more expedient court system, and a local

women’s shelter’ for the Lands.

Repeating a longstanding request of Anangu, the NPY Women’s Council also argued the

urgent need for ‘a treatment and rehabilitation centre located close to their home

communities’ (Coroner 2002, [C41a p.3–4], p. 18).

As earlier discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, in 1986 the South Australian Government

had promised to build a treatment and rehabilitation facility on the Lands ‘within twelve

months’;166 however, 16 years later, this important facility had not been built. This

example was raised by a number of Inquest witnesses as indicative of Government

inaction (Coroner 2002, [T400–402], p. 33; p. 39; p.40; p. 47; p. 75).

Evidence also highlighted a lack of post-primary education on the Lands. Apart from the

University of South Australia’s Anangu tertiary training program, AnTEP,167 vocational

training, trades and apprenticeships remained largely unavailable.

Anangu evidence to the Inquest complained that there was little employment on the Lands

outside of the CDEP program. As one elder, Mr Young, described, ‘…there is not enough

work for the young people to be proud of’ (Coroner 2002, T312, p. 18).

In a powerful statement to the Inquest, the NPY Women’s Council Coordinator, Maggie

Kavanagh, expressed strong feelings about the way the repeated requests by Anangu for

support were met with a culture of inaction by governments or repeated requests for more

information:

166

In December 1986 Health Minister Cornwall, announced that the South Australian Government would

build a rehabilitation facility for petrol sniffers on the Lands ‘within twelve months’ (Burnett 1986, p.1). 167 As described in Chapter 1 the University of South Australia’s AnTEP program commenced with its first

intake of 10 students in 1984. Most students of AnTEP studied Anangu teacher training and over the years

scores of graduates obtained Diplomas or Bachelor degrees in Anangu education and gained employment

across the Lands in Schools and associated positions. It was concisdered by PYEC and Anangu to be a

successful example of AP initiative and an important education for employment program.

158

Anangu are sick and tired of yet again having to tell the government what they want, because

they know the next time a government person comes here, it won’t be the last one, the same

person that they talked to the last time, it will be a different person. And so they have no

relationship, they have no corporate memory about what has gone on, they have no knowledge

of the history of the communities, what the issues are, who people are, they know nothing about

their lives, they know nothing about the tragedy and the grief in people’s lives… weekly people

are going to funerals here, it has enormous impact on people’s lives because they’re always

grieving, let alone their health being so poor, people are in a constant state of grief.

We don’t need more reports, we don’t need more enquiries, we don’t need more meetings with

government to say, ‘What do you want?’. Anangu have written it down time and time again.

The recommendations from the AVGAS conference was very, very thorough, it involved 40

communities across a wide area. You couldn’t get more clear about what is needed and what

people want…

…in the meantime we know that kids are dying, we know that services aren’t getting out here,

we know that the incidence of acquired brain injury on communities mean there are many, many

more children who are ending up in wheelchairs….

Anangu have said they want youth workers in every community, they want housing for youth

workers. They want a detox/rehabilitation facility. They want more money for diversionary and

sport and rec activities. They have said this consistently for years (Coroner 2002, T400–402, p.

33).

There was no criticism of Anangu governance during the Inquest. Only one comment

referred to Anangu governance, and it was aimed at governments rather than Anangu.

Consultant John Tregenza, a long-term worker on the Lands with affiliations to

Nganampa Health, suggested that governments were mistaken in their tendency to

concentrate on the AP Executive as if it were somehow ‘the Parliament of the Anangu

Pitjantjatjara lands’ (Chivell 2002, T232, p. 31).

Echoing Dodson’s (2002) report, Tregenza suggested that the governments’ fixation with

wanting a peak representative body showed ‘a lack of knowledge of the history of the

organisations on the lands’. Tregenza argued that the Executive was not the paramount

organisation, but one of a number of Anangu organisations, some of which ‘such as the

Pitjantjatjara Council, existed before the passing of the Pitjantjatjara land Rights

legislation’ (Chivell 2002, T232, pp. 29–30).

5.6.1 Findings

The Coronial Inquest Report stated early in its findings that petrol sniffing was not a new

issue, but rather one that had been entrenched for more than 20 years. Chivell found that

the number of petrol sniffers on the AP Lands ‘fluctuated from as high as 178 in 1993 to

a low of 85 in 1995 and then a gradual increase back to 166 in 2000’:

The extent of the problem diminished somewhat in the mid 1990’s, and it is apparent that there

was a reduction in effort towards tackling the problem. It has been apparent since at least 1998

that the problem was returning, and that the prognosis was bad, but little has been achieved to

restore the effort to pre-1995 levels, let alone take it further (2002, p. ii).

159

Reasons given at the Inquest for the decrease in petrol sniffing between 1993 and 1995

related primarily to the introduction of Avgas, as well as the policy and material support

for the ‘outstations movement’ with the resurgence of cultural activities such as hunting,

ceremony and land maintenance as a result of support for homelands (Chivell 2002,

T135–336, p. 11; T22, p. 10).

Chivell also noted that there had been a marked decline in the South Australian

Government’s support in funding and service provision for Anangu communities in the

mid 1990s, and that the maintenance of homelands had been neglected.

Chivell (2002, p.75) referred to the ‘remoteness of bureaucracy’, demands for outcome

reports and cumbersome grant processes. He cited evidence of what he found to be

‘appalling’ and inadequate service provision. He emphasised the ongoing requests from

Anangu for government help:

the wider Australian community has a responsibility to assist Anangu to address the problem of

petrol sniffing, which has no precedent in traditional culture. Governments should not approach

the task on the basis that solutions must come from Anangu communities alone (Coroner 2002,

p. 75).

In their analysis of petrol sniffing in Central Australia, d’Abbs and Brady (2000, p. 23)

noted that ‘the situation today remains in many respects little different to what it was

thirty years ago’. They argued that the way governments addressed petrol sniffing as a

short-term crisis impeded its resolution.

Citing the cyclic and sensationalist nature of media attention, d’Abbs and Brady (2000,

p. 23) identified ‘that petrol sniffing remains on the public agenda in…a transient

manner’, and that petrol sniffing as a public issue ‘owes almost everything to media

outbursts’, whereas long-term systemic support is needed. Chivell echoed these

sentiments, noting the fluctuations in cycles of ‘crisis’ funding, and arguing for ongoing

sustained support:

It would also be preferable…if programmes are funded on a triennial basis, as recommended by

the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Coroner 2002, p. iii).

The Inquest Report also emphasised a lack of effective government support:

I believe that both the federal and state governments have failed the people up here in that they

have been aware of this problem up here for…more than 30 years…and still there is very little

that occurs, and I don’t think it’s for want of resources (Chivell 2002, p. 24).

Chivell found that too much emphasis was placed on consultation and discussing ‘the

issue’, while action on the ground remained limited and poorly planned:

160

the redescription of the problem and the research has been going on long enough…everyone

knows what there is to know about petrol sniffing is really significant…there should have been

action some time ago (Chivell 2002, p. 12).

Coroner Chivell (2002, p.20) highlighted that systemic political, policy and socio-

economic issues had disadvantaged Anangu communities. He argued that government

inaction over the 1986 promise to provide a rehabilitation facility on the Lands, as well

as a lack of adequate police presence, had not only contributed to the increased prevalence

of petrol sniffing, but also to family violence and the disruption to community life that

ensued:

Clearly, socio-economic factors play a part in the general aetiology of petrol sniffing. Poverty,

hunger, illness, low education levels, almost total unemployment, boredom and general feelings

of hopelessness form the environment in which self-destructive behaviour takes place.

That such conditions should exist among a group of people defined by race in the 21st century

in a developed nation like Australia is a disgrace and should shame us all.

A constant theme before the Inquest was the need for greater government assistance with

the problems of petrol sniffing, education, welfare, health, employment, and housing

needs—‘only coordinated and outside funded—that means in this instance government

funded—programs are going to have any impact’ (Chivell 2002, p. 24).

The 2002 Inquest Report raised no concerns with the existing PLRA (1981). Not one

witness, nor any submissions to the Inquest, saw the PLRA as being relevant to petrol

sniffing or affecting AP service delivery issues in any way. However, the Coroner

specified that separate new legislation around substance controls to enhance policing

powers was needed. The Coroner noted that Anangu were generally scathing about the

lack of Government support.

In relation to the SA Department for Families and Youth Services Chivell said:

several of the witnesses were critical of the level of services provided by FAYS to Anangu. Mr

Charles, Counsel for the families of the deceased, described the level of services to Anangu

youth as ‘appalling’ (Chivell 2002, p. 75).

that agencies are unable to offer long-term appointments with no guarantee of continuance

because Commonwealth and State governments insist on providing short-term funding for

projects, is also unhelpful (Chivell 2002, p. 56).

Anangu cannot be expected to find all of the human and other resources to tackle these problems.

They need…assistance and input of non-Anangu professional people to tackle these problems

direct, and give them the power and skills to take up the task in due course (Chivell 2002, p.

58).

Coroner Chivell (2002, p.37) bluntly criticised the South Australian Government and

urged greater support for ‘developing and fostering community cohesion’. He emphasised

the perception that there were serious human rights issues for the Lands.

161

It seems to me that in the Lands there is actually a human rights issue here. Everywhere else in

Australia communities are able to feel a certain level of security in the knowledge that they have

access to reasonably rapid police services, and the fact that at a minimum it takes two hours for

the police from Marla to get to most communities

…to me this is really an issue of basic human rights and not being able to be accessed by the

community members in the Lands, and I believe they have a right to a range of government

services in terms of say health, education

…somewhere along the line there seems to have been a decision made that they don’t have the

right to the protection of the community itself from people who may be at risk of either harming

themselves or harming other people in the community (Chivell 2002, p. 70).

Chivell (pp. i–v) made 17 specific recommendations on immediate interventions

regarding policing, engagement of community constables, Anangu training for assuming

job roles, the long-promised rehabilitation facility, and a range of diversionary and

preventative strategies. Finally, he urged (2002, p.36) the South Australian Government

to act immediately if further deaths were to be avoided, stating that ‘…there is no need

for further information gathering’:

What is missing is prompt, forthright, properly planned, properly funded action.

5.7 Conclusion

The Coronial Inquest was a wake-up call to Commonwealth and South Australian

Governments that came one month after Dodson’s (2002) confronting report was

received. New Minister Roberts had appointed a new CEO for DOSAA, which was now

re-configured in conjunction with the Premier’s Department to strengthen its policy focus.

A bilateral inter-agency group called the ‘Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands Inter-

Governmental Inter-Agency Collaboration Committee’ (APLIICC) assumed

responsibility for overseeing the implementation of 17 specific recommendations made

by the Coroner in the findings of his Coronial Inquest into Anangu deaths by petrol

sniffing on the AP Lands.

As the first year of Rann’s minority government ended, many challenges lay ahead in

improving service provision to the Lands. The new parliamentary SC was charged with

reviewing the PLRA. Major issues remained unresolved between key Anangu

protagonists and organisations on the Lands.

On 28 September 2002, a Commonwealth-led review of the NPY Women’s Council was

announced ‘to ensure that an effective community driven and properly resourced

women’s council provides measurable and culturally appropriate services to its

community’ (Lawson, South Australian Legislative Council 15 October 2002, p. 1022).

162

Although funded by the Commonwealth, the review was expected to report to the newly

formed APLIICC, under the South Australian Government.

As outlined in Chapter 4, in 1999, the NPY Women’s Council had received $800,000

dollars in Commonwealth funding (for three years) to deliver a regional response to petrol

sniffing in Central Australia, including for communities on the Lands. At the conclusion

of the funding period, the regional approach adopted by the Commonwealth was not

considered to have been the most effective means for dealing with the escalating issues

associated with petrol sniffing.

The Shaw (2002) review of NPY’s petrol sniffing project delivered at Kaltjiti (Fregon)

from 1999 to 2001 made thoughtful observations about the importance of ‘sustained local

level community’ connectedness for externally funded projects to be effective. It argued

that ‘delivering blocks of activities to communities with endemic chronic sniffing is

unlikely to result’ in desired outcomes, and that what was needed was ‘a confluence of

policing, law and justice, education, youth work, health and recreational strategies’

accompanied by consistent and prolonged input from well-resourced external agencies

(Shaw 2002, p. 35). The latter echoed the findings also of the Coronial Inquest.

The Commonwealth’s approach in the late 1990s discussed in chapter 4, of dispersing

one-off project grant funding via regionally controlled Anangu organisations was not

netting the practical change anticipated. Heightened scrutiny of Anangu organisations

(such as NPY and Nganampa Health) was one result. Not only were the PC and AP under

pressure, but other Anangu regional bodies were now faced with new accountability

measures and heightened scrutiny.

Despite the best efforts of mediators and pro-PC supporters, with the support of new

Administrator/Acting CEO Marshall, AP severed its service agreement with the PC.

Without funding or support, the PC wound up its legal and anthropological operations.

In an audacious and swift retaliatory coup on 7 November 2002 at the AP AGM, the

immediate past Chair of the PC, Gary Lewis, was elected incoming Chair of AP with the

strong support of a broad range of TOs from across the Lands (Minutes of meeting,

7/11/2002),. Minister Roberts issued a press release congratulating the new Executive,

which included new women members, and stated also in Parliament that election of the

new Executive represented:

a significant opportunity to reverse almost a decade of neglect which has led to a breakdown of

basic human services, including health, housing and education (South Australia Legislative

Council 12 November 2002, p. 1228).

163

By 14 November 2002, incoming Chair of AP Lewis moved quickly to sever Acting CEO

Marshall’s contract168. After some disputation and settlement discussions, Marshall

quietly and quickly left the Lands. An eventful chapter in AP’s journey had reached a

dramatic conclusion. However, tensions and conflicts between key agencies and the many

actors involved in the PLRA story still had a long way to go before reaching an even more

calamitous peak.

168 Internal correspondence between the parties shown to the author privately backed by private discussions

with the key participants.

164

Chapter 6: 2003–2005: Consultations, Crisis, Consultants

and a Second Coroner’s Inquest

‘The sheer number of inter-departmental and inter-governmental forums for dealing with issues such as

petrol sniffing on the AP Lands reads like a nightmare from a Kafka novel’

Jonas (2004)169

6.1 Introduction

In the months following the September 2002 release of the Coronial Inquest into Petrol

Sniffing, the conflict between the PC and AP resolved in AP’s favour. A new AP

Executive was elected in November 2002, with ex-PC Chair Lewis becoming AP Chair.

Greater prominence was given by the South Australian Rann (minority Labor)

Government to the bilateral ‘Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands Inter-Governmental Inter-

Agency Collaboration Committee’ (APLIICC). It was hoped that the APLIICC would

bring together government responses to petrol sniffing and address the ‘fragmentation of

effort and confusion and alienation of service providers’ identified by Coroner Chivell

(2002, pp. 75–77).

Two major partnership agreements were promoted in the first half of 2003. The first, on

24 January, was a strategic ‘Statement of Intent’ between the State Government and AP,

which outlined the Government’s commitment to improving service delivery to the

Lands. The second, on 22 May, was a joint Commonwealth/state/AP ‘Working Together’

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which confirmed the Lands as one of eight

COAG sites selected to trial ‘whole of government action’170 (COAG 2002).

Despite these new arrangements, tensions between Anangu and the Government re-

emerged at the end of 2003, particularly around the role of the ‘Allocations Committee’

established under the COAG trial to involve Anangu stakeholders in funding decisions

(HREOC 2003).

169 See Jonas (2004). 170 In April 2002, the COAG announced that governments would work in partnership to improve service

delivery to remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities (COAG 2002). In eight trial sites,

one of which was the APY Lands, Commonwealth and state/territory governments agreed to work on a

‘whole of government’—interdepartmental and intergovernmental—basis together with Aboriginal and

Torres Strait Islander communities.

165

Among other governance reforms sought by AP was an extension of its Executive’s term

of office from one to three years, as recommended by Dodson (2002, p. 2). However,

attempts to realise this change initially failed.

The cumbersome nature of the interdepartmental, intergovernmental APLIICC slowed

on-ground service delivery and by early 2004, the State government’s response to the

2002 Coroner’s Report was stalling. The Coroner indicated his intention to hold another

petrol sniffing inquest and Rann went into damage control. In a strongly worded

statement, the South Australian Government announced an end to self-determination on

the Lands.

This chapter maps the period leading up to this crisis in Anangu–state government

relations in March 2004. It chronicles how the Premier centralised control of AP issues

in an effort to limit the political fall-out feared from media scrutiny over petrol sniffing.

A critical analytical lens is used to reveal how alleged ‘failures’ of AP governance were

discursively constructed, then widely promulgated as the excuse, if not focus of blame,

for delays in government service delivery to Anangu communities battling chronic petrol

sniffing. The chapter also discusses the roles of a succession of well-paid external

administrators, consultants and advisers engaged by the government to propose solutions

to what was framed as an ‘Anangu problem’.

I: Consultations: Plans and Committees in 2003

6.2 Statement of Intent

With a new AP Executive elected with Lewis in the Chair, Minister Roberts aimed to

broker a fresh start in Anangu–government relationships. On 24 January 2003, he hosted

an event to celebrate the signing of a formal ‘Statement of Intent’ (Williams 2003;

Roberts, LC Hansard, 3 April 2003, p. 2086) committing the SA Rann (Labor)

government to cooperate with AP and its new Executive on issues of shared concern.

Present were four Ministers from the Aboriginal Affairs, Human Services, Environment

and Resources portfolios, several senior Commonwealth and state departmental officials,

and a delegation of 25 Anangu from the Lands.171

Announcing the ‘Statement of Intent’ as indicative of the Rann government’s aim to work

well with the new AP Executive, Roberts suggested that the dispute between AP and the

171 The delegation included representatives from eight Anangu communities on the Lands and Board

members of key Anangu regional organisations, including the NPY Women’s Council, Nganampa Health

and PY media.

166

PC had been prolonged by ‘white-gatekeepers’172 (The Weekend Australian 25 January

2003, p. 3). He stated that his ‘first priority is to address human services issues and out of

that will come land management, the dividing issue for the last 20 years’ (2003, p. 3).

AP’s new Chairman Lewis responded by emphasising the determination of Anangu

leaders to ‘work together’ with governments to overcome petrol sniffing in their

communities:

We’ve been working in different directions and we’ve lacked government support. Now our

people are united. But the problems still exist—we’ve got more young people sniffing petrol.

We’ve got to set up a program for the young people (The Weekend Australian 25 January 2003,

p. 3).

AP had held a planning workshop173 the day before the ‘Statement of Intent’ event, which

identified ‘land and culture; petrol sniffing; education and training; women’s issues; and

community safety and youth issues’ as the priorities that Anangu wanted to urgently

address (Williams 2003, p. 8).

In addition to this Adelaide workshop, a second AP planning session held in Alice Springs

over two days in February 2003 was attended by more than 165 delegates from Anangu

regional organisations, communities and other service providers. A third planning

workshop was held with TOs at AP’s General Meeting in Umuwa in March 2003. The

resulting ‘APY Land Council Strategic Plan 2003’ was presented to the South Australian

Government by AP’s Executive in April (Williams 2003, p. 7).

The ‘Statement of Intent’ that facilitated AP’s focus on local strategic planning was also

the first stage towards the more formal ‘Working Together’ MoU between Anangu and

the Commonwealth and state governments, as outlined below. Roberts was keen to use

the rubric of the COAG ‘whole of government’174 approach, announced in April 2002, to

promote the repair of Anangu/state relations wherever possible.

172 Roberts believed that interference by piranpa (and pro-mining interests especially) in AP decisions was

creating too much pressure on Anangu. He argued that some of the entrenched hostilities between Anangu

protagonists had even been deliberately promoted for party politics or the advancement of outside interests.

Roberts’ difficult interactions with Marshall, the Management Consultant funded by ATSIC, added to his

preparedness to be overtly partial toward Anangu TOs who questioning of the pressure for change. This led

in turn to suggestions Roberts was politically aligned with Lewis. 173 AP requested that the South Australian Government fund it to engage Aboriginal management consultant

Rod Williams of ‘Gongan consultancy’ to develop a detailed Strategic Plan. For more info on ‘Gongan’

and Rod Williams see: http://www.gongan.com.au 174 For a discussion of ‘whole of government’ trials on the Lands, see d’Abbs and MacLean (2003) and

Tedmanson et al. (2011).

167

6.2.1 Mining still in focus as arts gain support

Roberts was aware of concern in the mining lobby and the Liberal opposition at Lewis’s

election to the Chair of AP, given Lewis’s opposition to fast-tracking mining exploration

when with the PC. Roberts was also the leader of Labor’s left faction in SA at this time

and175 was perceived to be pro-land rights, pro-self-determination and wary of the mining

lobby. In contrast, Premier Rann set about working with the mining lobby to promote the

benefits of an open-door approach to mining on the Lands.

Under the headline ‘Royalties lure for blacks on mines’, a feature article reported that:

The mining industry is wooing Aboriginal communities in the Anangu Pitjantjatjara lands of

central Australia with promises of ‘potentially huge’ royalties to restart exploration, which they

say has been strangled by bickering between communities. Miners believe the ‘under-explored’

territory contains gold, silver, platinum, nickel, lead and zinc. The wooing includes showing

Pitjantjatjara leaders Northern Territory mines generating jobs and prosperity (The Weekend

Australian 25 January 2003, p. 3).

Lewis responded that the new Executive would ‘be more accommodating to exploration’

(The Weekend Australian 25 January 2003, p. 3). AP was also keen to develop its arts

industry to ensure work and a future for young people in communities. Rann announced

a special ‘one-off’ $150,000 grant to help the ‘estimated 300 artists’ on the Lands into the

national art market:

‘Artworks like painting, works on paper and craft are currently the major regular source of

income earned from outside the region’, Mr Rann said. ‘My Government is keen to increase

communities’ capacity for self-help, particularly as we seek ways of responding constructively

to serious issues of the kind exposed by the coronial inquiry into petrol sniffing deaths’ (The

Advertiser 12 March 2003, p. 111).

Petrol sniffing was the first priority of the new AP Executive, as detailed in the ‘Statement

of Intent’ and at every workshop, meeting and government forum. However, it was not

viewed in isolation, but as part of broader challenges for Anangu communities to generate

employment and hope.

6.3 ‘Working Together’: The COAG Trials

Minister Roberts brought the AP Executive into closer dialogue with the APLIICC. The

Coroner had criticised the APLIICC176 for being ‘stuck in the information gathering

175 Terry Roberts had worked as a ship’s engineer and was an active union delegate for the Australian Metal

Workers Union, a left-wing union that was prominent in Labor politics in the 1980s and 1990s. A left

faction convenor before being elected to SA’s Legislative Council in 1985, Roberts became Shadow

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Correctional Services in 1993. He was appointed Minister for

Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation, Minister for Regional Affairs and Minister for Correctional Services

by Rann in March 2002. The role of Minister Assisting the Minister for Environment and Conservation was

added in December 2002. 176 Along with the Commonwealth’s Central Australian Cross Border Reference Group on Volatile

Substance Abuse.

168

phase’ and taking ‘far too long to act’ (Chivell 2002, pp. iii, 35–36). Roberts wanted

APLIICC to coordinate governmental efforts on priorities nominated by AP that, along

with Nganampa Health and the NPY Women’s Council, continued to push for greater

practical support for people affected by petrol sniffing. At the request of AP’s Executive

with Lewis as Chair, Nganampa Health became a formal member of the APLIICC.

The APLIICC had Tier One and Tier Two177 committees, the SA Petrol Sniffing Task

Force (now absorbed into Tier One’s functions) and the Central Australian Cross Border

Reference Group on Volatile Substance Abuse. Another coordinating body, the ‘Tri-

Jurisdictional Justice Group’, was established early in 2003 to examine legislative and

policy means for greater cooperation between courts and police across the tri-state border

region (HREOC 2003). Meetings with Commonwealth and State officials continued as a

major feature of Anangu leaders’ lives.

In addition to the existing coordinating mechanisms, a new layer of ‘inter-governmental

inter-agency collaboration and coordination’ was also taking shape. The Lands had been

named one of eight COAG trial sites178 in April 2002, and during 2003–2004, the Lands

received ‘whole of government’ attention (SC Report 2004).

6.3.1 From Statement of Intent to MoU

In May 2003, at yet another meeting between Commonwealth and state representatives,

Anangu regional service providers, local community representatives and the AP

Executive published a joint ministerial press release179 to announce the signing of a

‘Working Together’ MoU between AP and Commonwealth and state governments on the

COAG trial. Roberts reported to the SA Parliament as follows:

We [met] with the federal government in the AP lands last week. We met with the AP Executive,

and the members of the COAG trial, the Hon. Kay Patterson and the Hon. Philip Ruddock and

their support staff. We have had numerous meetings here in Adelaide in relation to building up

a working relationship with the new AP Executive. We signed a partnership arrangement with

them in January. There were further meetings held in Alice Springs that included some 150

representatives who attended to endorse and discuss the resolutions that were made at the

Adelaide seminar, and consequently we listed full recommendation to the federal government

that the AP lands become part of the COAG trials. …Tier 1 will be going to the lands, either in

the first or second week of June and it will meet with the AP Executive to form those

177 The APLIICC’s Tier One comprised a core group of CEOs from a range of state government

departments, the Commonwealth Department for Health and Ageing, ATSIC, AP Chairman and Nganampa

Health Council. Tier Two comprised working groups of senior officers from state and Commonwealth

agencies who were responsible for the implementation of the Tier One directives. 178 In April 2002, COAG agreed to trial a ‘whole of government’ cooperative approach with Indigenous

communities to ‘provide more flexible programs and services based on priorities agreed with communities’.

A further discussion of COAG’s ‘whole of government’ initiatives is presented in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 179 Signed by the Hon. Philip Ruddock (Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs),

the Hon. Kay Patterson (Minister for Health and Ageing), the Hon. Terry Roberts (SA Minister for

Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation) and Gary Lewis (AP Chair).

169

relationships. With the COAG collaboration we now have federal ministers Ruddock and

Patterson and our own cross agencies working together to maximise returns that, hopefully, we

will get (SA Legislative Council 26 May 2003, p. 2370).

The Minister’s reference to ‘returns’ undoubtedly included his hopes for added

Commonwealth dollars, as well as improvements in Anangu well-being. Ruddock et al.

(2003, p. 2) also emphasised ‘shared responsibility’:

The key to this initiative is that neither governments nor Indigenous communities can do it all

on their own. We must work together…in partnership and share responsibility for improving

outcomes and building the capacity of people in communities to manage their own affairs.

This COAG announcement was cause for hope, but some people foresaw pitfalls.

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner Bill Jonas

prophetically warned of danger, stating that ‘the APLIICC/COAG trial process as the

major interface between government and AP Lands communities’ might become such a

slow, cumbersome bureaucratic operation that it could ‘foreclose the potential to make

progress on an issue such as petrol-sniffing on the AP Lands’ (HREOC 2003, p. 17).

Despite the public optimism of State and Commonwealth officials (and Anangu) at the

22 May 2003 COAG launch event, a shadow spread over the gathering with the terrible

news that petrol sniffer Kunmanara Ward,180 aged 19 years, had hanged himself that day

on the ‘monkey bars’ in the playground at Indulkana.

6.4 ‘People Cannot Be Allowed to Die!’

In July 2003, Magistrate Hiskey delivered a sharp rebuke to the South Australian

Government over the inadequate supervision of, and lack of support for, the petrol sniffers

that he witnessed on the Lands. Anangu man Casper Yakiti was charged with petrol

sniffing offences in a case heard by Hiskey during his June court circuit to Pukatja

(Ernabella). Yakiti pleaded guilty and Hiskey ordered that he be counselled and placed

on a supervised bond. However, Correctional Services wrote to Hiskey, claiming that

they lacked the departmental resources and personnel to carry out his order.

The Coroner’s 2002 Report had made specific recommendations about Lands-based

justice and sentencing options.181 Hiskey was outraged and went public with his

frustration at the government’s inaction on petrol sniffing:

180 The death of Kunmanara Ward was referred to the Coroner and subsequently became part of the

additional inquests conducted by Chivell in 2004–2005, as discussed later in this chapter. 181 Chivell identified secondary interventions related to: a range of sentencing options available to the courts

sitting in the AP Lands (recommendation 8.5); amending the Public Intoxication Act (recommendation 8.6);

establishing night patrols (recommendation 8.7); planning for secure care facilities on the AP Lands

(recommendation 8.10); implementing the recommendations of the SAPOL review into the Community

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People are dying for want of intervention and assistance. Parliament [needs] to act immediately

to ensure implementation of the findings of the Coronial Inquest into the deaths of three petrol

sniffers on the Pitjantjatjara Lands (ABC News 23 July 2003).

Hiskey called for more supervisors ‘so that bonds, undertakings and community service

obligations can be enforced’ (The Advertiser 24 July 2003, p. 25). Yakiti was a 27-year-

old man with a two-year-old child, and he wanted to stop sniffing petrol. Hiskey argued

that the lack of supervisors impeded Yakiti’s opportunity to be placed on a supervised

bond, which amounted to systemic unfairness. In newsprint, on TV and through radio, Hiskey

(2003, p. 25) expressed anger, pointing out that in his time on the Lands, ‘59 offenders came

before the court charged with 138 petrol sniffing offences’.

He warned of serious consequences if the Government continued to delay. ‘People cannot be

allowed to die when intervention and assistance may save them. The communities on the

Pitjantjatjara Lands need assistance’ (ABC News 23 July 2003).

Constable Scheme and establishing a permanent police presence (recommendation 8.12); and ensuring that

Marla staffing was at full strength (recommendation 8.13).

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Figure 6.1: Koori Mail (30 July 2003, p. 5)

Minister Roberts announced $12 million of funding182 for Lands-related initiatives during

this same week (Media release, 23 July 2003). However, Commonwealth and State

officials remained locked into the APLIICC and its Tier 1 and 2 committees as they

negotiated priorities for COAG trials.

The ‘silo behaviour of different departments, which whole-of-government approaches

were meant to overcome’ was proving difficult to change (Hunt 2008, p. 30). As

Fitzgerald observed in his critique of the over-investment in coordination, ‘often

182 This included: $8.163 million over four years for Department of Health Services health and well-being

initiatives that directly affect petrol sniffing, and for regional office and respite initiatives; $1 million over

four years for policing and justice initiatives on the Lands; $797,000 over four years for the Department of

Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation for the introduction of legally licensed electrical operators; and $2

million over four years for the Department of Administration and Information Services to provide staff

housing on the Lands (Roberts 2003).

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coordination by governments becomes a euphemism for inaction’ (Fitzgerald 2001, p.

10). Creating more and more committees to coordinate the activities of others can

ironically generate a need for more committees to coordinate the coordinating

committees. As Lea suggests, the paradox of coordination is that it actually ‘creates more

fragmentation, which only more coordination can solve’ (Lea 2008, p. xvii).

6.4.1 ‘What is the name of that committee again please?’

As media attention on Hiskey’s rebuke subsided, government officials hosted yet another

priority-setting ‘Shared Responsibility’ workshop with Anangu in Alice Springs in

September 2003 so the ‘government and community representatives could set priorities

for the COAG trial’ (HREOC 2003, p. 16).

Hundreds of Anangu participated, and most had attended some, if not all, of the previous

consultations. The AP Executive, Nganampa Health, PYEC, the NPY Women’s Council,

PY Media, TOs and various representatives of local community councils were again well

represented. The focus of this meeting was the COAG trial. The South Australian

Government was keen to lock in Commonwealth funding through the lead agency, the

Department of Health and Ageing (DoHA). Anangu priorities remained the same; their

most urgent concern was to receive help for petrol sniffing.

As the meeting dragged into its second day, Anangu elder Kunmanara Thompson strode

purposefully to the microphone. This was no ordinary Anangu elder; this was the man

who had signed the deed for the PLRA, whose son had died from petrol sniffing, and who

had called for the Coronial Inquest183—a man who was well known across the Lands and

respected by Anangu and piranpa alike. In sheer frustration, he took to the microphone184

and, focusing on the government officials, he said:

How many times do we have to say this to you? What is the problem—is it that you do not

believe us? Our young people are dying, our communities are stressed and upset—we need

assistance and we need it now! We have told you the same things, the same priorities over and

over again—we told you during the ‘Rolling Thunder’ consultations in late 2002…we told you

when we met the new Minister in January this year…we told you in the Strategic Plan we

worked hard on with Rod Williams…we told you when we met with the Ministers in May this

year—and here we are now in September telling you all over again! Our priorities have not

changed, and they are still urgent. Every time we tell you, you set up another committee with

another big name—rather than do something, you set up another committee to talk about it.

Every time we hear these new committees, COAG, Petrol Task Force, Tier this and that—too

many tears if you ask me—every time these committees get long names—but the words mean

183 With the support of the NPY Women’s Council. 184 I was present as an observer during this meeting and had been asked (by Anangu TOs) to keep a written

record of speeches and contributions, which were also, in part, recorded. Thus, I witnessed this

‘intervention’ first-hand. It ended with much mirth and applause and was a well-timed strategic input that

served to release tension for all those assembled.

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‘let’s do nothing’. Can you tell me, what is it that one you’re all from now? Which mob is it this

time? What is the name of that Committee again please?

At this plea, a senior public servant stepped up to the microphone and, emphasising each

syllable, he slowly and carefully said: ‘It’s APLIICC, which stands for the ‘Anangu…

Pitjantjatjara… Lands… Inter-Governmental… Inter-Agency… Collaboration…

Committee’. Thompson took the microphone back and, in a loud voice and with a

melancholic yet wry grin, he smartly said: I rest my case’!

6.5 COAG Trials: Mai Wiru and PY Ku

The September 2003 ‘Working Together’ meeting settled on two programs for adoption

under COAG: Mai Wiru and PY Ku. Mai Wiru was to be conducted and managed by

Nganampa Health and PY Ku by PY Media. These trials were overseen by a COAG

working group formed under the APLIICC and led by the Commonwealth DoHA. Earlier

in 2003, the Commonwealth provided funds to AP for a project officer (selected and

engaged by DoHA) to prepare a business case for PY Ku,185 an initiative to provide

Internet connectivity, which PY Media had strongly advocated. Mai Wiru186 was a

primary health project aimed at improving the quality and cost of food in local stores that

Nganampa Health had already established with local community councils. Neither

initiative directly tackled petrol sniffing.

In a critical analysis of the COAG trials and the accompanying Shared Responsibility

Agreements (SRAs) four years later, Lawrence and Gibson (2007, p. 650) suggest that

this approach signalled a shift in policy away ‘from debates about rights and inheritances,

to the “responsibilities” that communities must accept in order to be provided with

infrastructure and services from government’. They argue that discourses about shared

responsibility were often linked to requests from Aboriginal communities for

interventions or help with specific problems. Such requests became opportunities for

governments to ensure that Aboriginal communities conformed to certain ‘specified

disciplinary practices such as improved personal hygiene [or] maintaining clean

households’ (Lawrence & Gibson 2007, p. 650).

Mai Wiru and PY Ku illustrated this critical analysis, with the former encouraging healthy

eating and the latter providing options for people to better manage their banking and

payment of fines, fees and charges online. COAG priority-setting meetings appeared to

185 For detail on PY Ku, see Tedmanson, Fisher and Muirhead (2011) and Urbis Keys Young (2006). 186 For more detail on the Mai Wiru initiative, see above and ‘Mai Wiru: healthy food, healthy families’,

<http://www.maiwiru.org.au/history_top.html>

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emphasise consultation and choice; however, an agenda to enforce compliance was also

taking shape. As White and Hunt (2000, p. 105) point out: ‘choices forced on subjects

can be highly coercive’.

With COAG funding these initiatives through Anangu regional agencies, there was a co-

option of Anangu service providers into the supply chains of discretionary resourcing,

which characterised the ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach of SRAs (McCausland & Levy

2006). Substantial new funding was provided to Nganampa Health and PY Media for

being part of the COAG trials; however, having obtained this new funding, they and their

Anangu Boards of Management were now caught between their traditional Anangu

constituencies and the requirements of multi-agency COAG committees—their new

‘partners’.

Beneath the collaborative appeal of the ‘Working Together’ COAG trial rhetoric, with its

promise of new funding, lay the risk of Anangu agencies being conscripted into

government agendas and bureaucratic modes of implementation as part of a hidden cost

for their willing participation (Cooke & Kothari 2001).

Self-determination was making way for ‘shared responsibility’ (Hunt, op cit. p. 30). As

d’Abbs and Brady (2003) pointed out, under the policy rubric of ‘shared responsibility’,

communities were increasingly enlisted to the disciplinary work of the government:

Under this strategy, Aboriginal communities are expected to articulate desires and aspirations

which are then taken as authentic manifestations of ‘self-determination’—as long as they accord

more or less with what the state wants them to choose (d’Abbs & Brady 2003, p. 7).

‘Shared responsibility’ enabled the Commonwealth to increase its control while

outsourcing risk. Control remained with APLIICC and the COAG lead agency (DoHA),

while Anangu agencies PY Media and Nganampa Health bore responsibility for the

implementation. An older Anangu protagonist who had observed many policy shifts noted

that ‘It’s all coming from the government down’ (Tedmanson et al. 2011). As Braithwaite,

Gatens and Mitchell (2002) suggest, beneath the simplistic rhetoric of mutual obligation

and its shared responsibility lay ‘the concrete assumptions of a new paternalism’ (p. 226).

While PY Ku and Mai Wiru were welcomed by Anangu, these trial projects also

introduced new complexities, and neither project tackled petrol sniffing. With prophetic

foreboding, the ATSI Social Justice Commissioner’s 2003 Report further mused:

whether such initiatives as the COAG whole-of-government trials [will] ultimately prove to be

more of a hindrance, obscuring and obstructing an effective response to issues such as

Indigenous petrol sniffing (Jonas 2003, p. 154).

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6.5.1 The ‘Allocations Committee’

The September 2003 COAG ‘Working Together’ meeting established a 15-member

‘Allocations Committee’—comprising nominees of Community Councils, Homelands,

AP Services, Nganampa Health, PY Media and the NPY Women's Council—to be

convened by AP’s Chair, Gary Lewis. The Committee was established to help the

government disburse funds across the Lands and:

Aim[ed] to ensure that all stakeholders [would] have a clear understanding of the funding

situation for the AP Lands, as well as a say in the distribution of monies on the Lands’ (HREOC

2003, p. 16).

An information flyer was distributed to communities by the AP Executive to invite them

to be part of the Committee’s first meeting in Alice Springs in early November. The flyer

stated that:

This is a new way for Anangu—to work together—everyone sharing the responsibilities towards

helping fix the problems on the Lands…. We have over $1 500 000 to allocate to different

programs i.e. petrol sniffing, family violence, youth development, mothers & babies

programs…. We have to work out a fair way to allocate this funding and make sure it is helping

to fix the problems in our Anangu communities and not wasted [sic] (Allocation Committee

invitation to communities cited in Lawson, LC 13 November 2003, p. 572).

The AP ‘Allocations Committee’ was intended to be a means to obtain consensus

regarding local priorities, and hence more ‘buy-in’ at the community level. However, in

effect, it was a confusing addition to the plethora of committees already in play. Perhaps

more importantly, it was an approach not particularly welcomed by Anangu regional

service providers, who considered it a challenge to their roles as the ‘go to’ agencies in

the delivery of health and welfare services.

Creating options for dispersed local funding through a multi-interest ‘Allocations

Committee’ could undermine the role of Anangu regional agencies as the key actors on

health and social welfare issues—a role that was actively fostered by the Commonwealth

in the 1990s and recognised in the COAG trials. It unsettled these agencies, which each

had their own Anangu board, network of constituencies and budget issues.

Nganampa Health and the NPY Women’s Council had more than 20 years’ experience

by this time, and they were key sources of advice to governments on petrol sniffing and

other issues—a role they wanted to keep. Project funding that flowed to these agencies

might come under challenge if community councils developed their own local priorities

not mediated by regional agency administrations (HREOC 2004; McCausland 2005).

There was also tension between an increasingly professionalised service delivery and the

community ‘bottom–up’ approaches. In a corollary to Lea’s (2008) observations about

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the paradox of coordination (cited above), a paradox of ‘participation’ is that, while

intended to promote consensus, it inevitably invites conflict. The trend for governments

to stimulate ‘quasi-markets’ in welfare service delivery (Le Grande 2000; Carson & Kerr

2013) also flamed local tensions in Aboriginal and mainstream communities.

For Anangu, managing funding allocations was potentially quite destabilising, as one’s

place in community life was shaped by complex webs of relationships, duties and

customary roles. While consultation over resources mattered, continuity and stability

were more important to community well-being than competitive aspiration or material

accumulation.

The South Australian Government’s focus on empowering the AP Executive and

fostering local participation generated new tensions as well as competition for funding.

The focus on a top–down-initiated push for participation has been critiqued in the broader

development literature as masking unequal relations of power between the state and

communities, and/or ignoring power imbalances within communities (see Escobar 1984;

Mosse 2001; Mohan & Stokke 2000; Cooke & Kothari 2001; Williams 2004). Hunt

(2008, p. 27) pointed more specifically to the Australian context in her analysis of how,

during this period, Indigenous organisations found themselves increasingly ‘between a

rock and a hard place’:

the assumptions and principles of self-determination underlying the policy environment in

which many of them were created have changed…and [they find themselves] caught at an

uncomfortable intersection between communities operating with one set of assumptions, and

governments another.

Promoting the AP Executive as the focal point for the ‘Allocations Committee’ ran

counter to Dodson’s advice, which counselled against the tendency to ‘inflate or expand

the position of AP beyond what is provided for in the Act’ (Dodson 2002, p. 2). As Jonas

(2003) argued, making the AP Executive responsible for advice on the distribution of

petrol sniffing funds ‘set them up to fail’. It furthered the misconception of the Executive

as ‘the peak body in all matters on the AP Lands and over-stretches the community

acceptance and expertise of that agency’ (Dodson 2004, p. 2).

Placing Lewis, as the AP Executive’s Chair, at the core of a new broad-based ‘Allocations

Committee’ was another contentious decision. Jealousies and tensions remained volatile

around Lewis after his election as AP Chair at the end of the previous year. While

politically adept, Lewis had displaced a small group of old ‘factional’ rivals,187 many of

187 Bern’s (1989) analysis of politics in Ngukurr communities in the NT points to the powerful role of

family competition in community life, and likens the competitiveness and division between leading core

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whom were still antagonistic about the role he had played in the struggle to maintain

support for the PC.

6.6 Rolling (Over) the Executive

The September 2003 ‘Working Together’ COAG priority-setting workshop agreed to

extend the term of the AP Executive from one to three years,188 in line with the Dodson

Report of 2002.189 The proposal had been put to communities during the August–

September 2002 ‘Rolling Thunder’ consultations and was strongly supported by the

majority of Anangu communities.190 The proposal was re-endorsed during the strategic

planning workshops conducted in January and February 2003 (Williams 2003, p. 4), and

at the COAG workshops in May and September.

Under the terms of the PLRA, changes to the Executive’s constitution had to be agreed

upon at the AP General Meeting. In July 2003, a General Meeting of TOs held at Umuwa

agreed to the proposal to extend the term of the current AP Executive from one to three

years.

In consultation with the APLIICC and the Minister’s office, AP therefore put the

necessary steps in place to extend the term of its Executive. On 15 October 2003, AP’s

lawyers applied to the Office of Consumer and Business Affairs to amend rule 10(d) of

the AP Executive Board’s Constitution to read that ‘a member of the executive board

shall hold office from the date of his or her election until the annual general meeting of

AP three years thereafter’.191

The amendment was approved by the Office of Consumer and Business Affairs, and AP

was notified that the amendment to its Constitution had been registered and took effect

immediately (South Australian Legislative Council Hansard 16 February 2004, p. 939).

This meant that the Executive expected to continue for a further two years, until

November 2005. However, this extension was not to be.

families as structuring local politics in ways similar to the ‘factional divisions of the ALP’ (p. 169), which

characterised inter-family rivalry on the Lands at this time. 188 Along with training and support for AP, as well as other local Anangu organisations in administration

and finance. 189 The SC (established on 29 August 2002) was also expected to recommend an extension of the

Executive’s term. Although due in October 2003, it did not report until June 2004; as anticipated, it

recommended that the term be extended. 190 The majority of communities were in favour, except for Indulkana and Mimili, which preferred a one-

year term (see Williams 2003, p. 26). 191 This wording was used in correspondence between the Executive and the Office of Business and

Consumer Affairs (2003).

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Capitalising on tensions around the Executive convening the ‘Allocation Committee’, and

encouraged by politically savvy Anangu who were hostile to Lewis,192 the South

Australian Liberal Opposition took exception to any roll-over of the Executive’s term.

Shadow Minister Lawson accused Labor Minister Roberts of favouring AP’s Executive

(Lawson, LC 10 November 2003, p. 473; Lawson LC 18 February 2004, p. 990).

In a repeat of partisan alignments and Anangu for and against the PC, sides formed for

and against the extension of the Executive’s term of office. Despite general agreement

across the Lands and in government for extending the Executive’s term, some local

aspirants resented the idea, and the Opposition quickly exploited the situation.

While Anangu continued to request urgent petrol sniffing support, the first meeting of a

new Aboriginal Lands Parliamentary Standing Committee (ALPSC)193 with Minister

Roberts as Chair, took place in Adelaide on 27 November 2003. This was a reactivation

and reinvigoration of a Committee similar to the original Pitjantjatjara Lands

Parliamentary Committee, which had been established by the 1987 amendments to the

PLRA, but which had ceased to meet after the Liberals took office in 1993 and finally

lapsed in 1997.

Roberts pushed to re-establish the parliamentary oversight of AP through the Aboriginal

Lands Parliamentary Standing Committee Act 2003. The Select Committee on the

Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act also continued to take evidence in what had become a

much longer inquiry than planned.194

Given Opposition criticism of the extension of the Executive’s term, and acting on the

Minister’s advice, Lewis sought confirmation of the Executive’s ‘mandate’ by requesting

re-endorsem*nt of the Executive at the AP AGM on 15 December 2003 (LC Hansard 4

December 2003, pp. 8883–8884). The opportunity to meddle was not missed by those

192 In particular, for example, proactive and outspoken Anangu activists such as Burton and Bernard Singer

from Iwantja (Indulkana), who was subsequently elected Chair after Lewis. 193 As discussed in Chapter 4, the Pitjantjatjara Lands Parliamentary Committee was originally established

after the 1987 amendments to the PLRA; however, after operating continuously since that time and

achieving a five-year extension to enable it to continue to operate, the Committee ceased to meet after the

Liberals came to office in 1993, and it expired in 1997. The passing of the Aboriginal Lands Parliamentary

Standing Committee Act 2003, enabled Minister Roberts to re-establish the Committee—now known as the

Aboriginal Lands Parliamentary Standing Committee—which held its first meeting on 27 November 2003

with Roberts in the Chair. 194 On 29 August 2002, the Legislative Council of SA appointed a SC to review the operation of the

Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981. The SC was chaired by the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, Roberts,

and was originally scheduled to report to parliament by October 2002 (Hansard, LC 29 August 2002, p.

957); however, it did not report until 2 June 2004. A summary of the SC findings and recommendations is

provided in this Chapter.

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unhappy with the Executive. Shadow Minister Lawson sent a formal letter to be read out

at the AGM, advising the gathering against re-endorsing the Executive.

While neither Lawson nor Minister Roberts were present at this AGM, their competing

construction of the issues conveyed by letters and advice to those who were present

further fuelled internal Anangu rivalries. Both Minister and Shadow Minister sought to

influence AP, while Anangu rivals also willingly drew politicians to their respective

causes. The AGM resolved to support an extension of the Executive’s term, but ended

without recording a clear statement of ‘endorsem*nt’ for the incumbent Executive.

Ongoing tensions on the Lands and in Adelaide continued to stifle the delivery of urgently

needed petrol sniffing support. The ‘remoteness of bureaucracies and their incessant

demands’ identified by the Coroner (Chivell 2002, p. iii) had increased, rather than

abated, in 2003. In the words of Social Justice Commissioner Jonas (2004, p. 4), the ‘sheer

number of inter-departmental and inter-governmental forums’, established since the

Coroner’s 2002 Inquest, created an administrative quagmire akin to ‘a nightmare from a

Kafka novel!’

Tragically, on 19 December 2003, just four days after the AP AGM, Kunmanara Ken,195

a 35-year-old man who was severely brain damaged as a result of prolonged petrol

sniffing, walked away from his community of Indulkana on the Lands and died from

exposure in the scorching summer heat.

II: ‘Crisis’

6.7 The Ides of March

On 16 February 2004, Coroner Chivell signalled his intention to conduct an inquest into

the deaths of Kunmanara Ward and Kunmanara Ken, commencing 4 May 2004 at Umuwa

on the AP Lands. Effectively warning the Rann government, the Coroner announced that

as part of the inquest he would be examining progress on the implementation of his 2002

recommendations.

This was also the first sitting day of the SA Parliament for 2004. Minister Roberts

promptly sought leave to make a Ministerial statement in the Legislative Council.

Interestingly, whether perhaps advised to or from self-volition, Roberts focused this

statement on the AP Executive, its input to the APLIICC and COAG consultative

195 The death of Kunmanara Ken was referred to the Coroner and, with others, subsequently became part

of the further inquests conducted by Coroner Chivell in 2004–2005 (discussed later in this chapter).

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processes and the proposed extension to its electoral term, rather than reporting on service

delivery or progress on mitigating petrol sniffing on the Lands.

Roberts outlined the discussions with the previous and current AP Executive over

extending its term to three years. He also described the December 2003 AGM and

explained that Chair Lewis had followed his advice in seeking the re-endorsem*nt of the

Executive. The change ‘was extensively discussed with support expressed at the meeting,

although there was…minority opposition’ (Roberts, LC 16 February 2004, p. 938).

Roberts also reported on the APLIICC’s activities and praised the work of Anangu

regional organisations and the AP Executive in particular:

The current executive board has done a great deal of work and continues to be proactive to

ensure priorities for Anangu are being considered by service providers and policy makers alike.

Since signing a statement of intent with the government in February 2003, its contribution to

discussion and decision making with APYLIICC has provided the government with timely

advice on matters such as the agreement of priorities through the statement of intent, the

establishment of the allocation committee and the participation of Nganampa Health on

APYLIICC (Roberts, LC 16 February 2004, p. 939).

Roberts appeared to be making pre-emptive efforts to protect and support AP; however,

by making the Executive’s term a feature of his first Ministerial Statement for 2004,

Roberts wittingly or unwittingly drew the focus onto Anangu governance, which served

to obfuscate questions about government service delivery to the Lands. Robert’s focus on

governance implied that the Executive’s term was somehow related to the Government’s

incapacity to respond to petrol sniffing or implement the Coroner’s recommendations.

By Roberts defining what the problem was ‘represented to be’ (Bacchi 2009, p. 1), a

trajectory was shaped that framed the analyses and responses that would follow. Public

policy is politics through ‘communicative practice’ (Fischer & Gottweis 2012; Yanow

2003; Colebatch 2009). By foregrounding the Executive’s role, election and term of

office, the Government generated a particular representation of an ‘issue’, and then

shaped its response accordingly. The generation and promulgation of this fertile ‘policy

storyline’ (Fischer 2003, p. 86) reverberated in the days and weeks ahead.

On 1 March 2004, Minister Roberts presented a briefing paper to Cabinet. He emphasised

the constructive engagement of the AP Executive in the COAG trials and associated

APLIICC activities (paper tabled during Legislative Council debates, Hansard, 31 May

2004). The briefing paper gave Cabinet details of the Executive’s term of office, including

the repeated commitments given for its term to be extended. It recommended a Bill to

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amend the PLRA to provide for an Executive term of between one and three years.196 The

briefing paper and recommendation was signed as noted by Premier Rann that day.197

Meanwhile, the Cabinet Office was asked ‘by the Chief Executive of the Department of

the Premier and Cabinet to look into how the money for the petrol sniffing problem was

being spent’ (Mazel cited in Chivell 2005, p. 57). Of $12 million provided over four years

in the 2003/2004 State Budget, the Cabinet Office found that ‘a large amount of the

money was yet to be spent’ (Chivell 2005, p. 57).

The CEO of the Premier’s Department urgently briefed the Premier and Deputy Premier,

who was also the Police Minister, on this large under-expenditure of funding allocated

for services to tackle petrol sniffing on the Lands. On 12 March 2004, the Commissioner

of Police informed the Premier and Deputy Premier about three deaths by suicide and

eight attempted suicides that had occurred on the AP Lands during the preceding 12 days

(Chivell 2005, p. 48).

6.7.1 ‘Tied up by red tape!’

On 15 March 2004, The Advertiser ran a front page article headlined: ‘DISGRACE!

Funding to save lives tied up by red tape’:

Urgent funding of $7 million to deal with Aboriginal petrol sniffing—highlighted by State

Coroner Wayne Chivell in September 2002—has never reached health workers. An

investigation by The Advertiser has found bureaucratic delays have blocked the delivery of the

funding to doctors and nurses battling petrol sniffing and drug addiction in the Anangu

Pitjantjatjara Lands (Kemp 2004, p. 1).

The article cited John Singer of the Nganampa Health Council as saying that ‘people have

heard about all this money and gone to all these meetings…and nothing has happened on

the ground’ (p. 1). While citing Human Service Department CEO Jim Birch as accepting

‘some responsibility for the delay’, the article also cited him as suggesting that legal

arrangements between Government agencies and service providers took time:

we can’t just allocate money willy-nilly…we have to have a legal agreement between us and

the people receiving the money (Kemp 2004, p. 1).

In contrast, AP Director Rex Tjami:

196 It was argued that it was necessary for this amendment to take effect from the immediate past AGM so

there could be no doubt of the legality of the Executive’s decisions after November 2003, when it was

elected, up until the amendment’s passing. 197 Personal communication: during the later controversy surrounding the mid March 2004 ‘intervention’

by Premier Rann, the signed Cabinet minute was anonymously circulated to a number of media, church

bodies and community activists. During this time, I was shown a copy of the signed recommendation at a

well-attended Anangu support group meeting.

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blamed the Department of Human Services for the delay…‘It is not the Lands Council’s fault

or the community council—it is the department in Adelaide. The community is not happy

because they should have given the money directly to us to allocate’ (Kemp 2004, p.1).

Not only was the front page article scathing of the Rann Government’s delays in

responding to petrol sniffing, but the Editorial was also negative. It associated the recent

spate of young Anangu deaths with the Government’s failure to implement the funding

identified for tackling petrol sniffing on the Lands:

Failure of the Government to ensure the money was paid and the program implemented is

disgraceful. This is funding critical to…help in youth suicide prevention and substance abuse;

and necessary for the purchase of medical equipment. That it has never reached its intended

target because of a farcical debate over who should control the funds and decide the allocation

is a terrible shame. Pointing the finger of blame at Aboriginal communities is futile. Ultimately,

the lack of follow-through and accountability is an indictment on Government and Public

Service processes and disciplines. Sadly, the breakdown in the process to tackle petrol sniffing

may have been indirectly responsible for the premature deaths of at least two, and perhaps many

more, young Aboriginal people. …There can be no further delays. The money must be paid and

the programs set up to avoid further tragedy. Too many committees and too much debate is

doing nothing to reduce the damage of substance abuse in the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands (The

Advertiser, Editorial, 15 March 2004, p. 16).

This stinging rebuke was potentially damaging to the Rann minority government. It was

also challenging for the Labor heirs of Dunstan who had initiated the PLRA and worked

with Anangu to bring it to fruition.198 Despite this legacy, with knowledge that the

Coroner was initiating a follow-up inquest and therefore desperate to shift the blame, the

Rann government appeared to jettison existing policy frameworks and prior commitments

to AP, COAG and APLIICC processes and opted for a strategy of political survival.

6.7.2 ‘Time’s Up!’

On the afternoon of 15 March 2004, SA Deputy Premier and Police Minister Kevin Foley,

acting for the Premier, issued a press statement indicating that the Government intended

to make a ‘radical intervention’ in the AP Lands (Foley 2004, p. 1).

Stating that, in ‘the opinion of Cabinet this crisis has simply gone beyond the capacity

and control of the AP Council’, Foley announced the immediate dispatch to the Lands of

a high-level task force headed by former South Australian Assistant Police Commissioner

Jim Litster ‘to sort out an escalating crisis that has resulted in tragedy and death’ (Foley

2004, p. 1). Directly contradicting earlier Cabinet agreements and commitments, Foley

(ibid) announced an immediate spill of the AP Executive, and new elections were called

alongside ‘a full review of the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act’.

198 Rann had worked for a time as Dunstan’s Press Secretary. In a media feature during the previous year,

he had claimed credit for writing the ‘speech announcing Pitjantjatjara Land Rights in 1981’ (The

Australian Magazine, ‘Rann the Man’, 8 March 2003, p. 1).

183

On 16 March, just three days short of the twenty-third anniversary of the bipartisan

passing of the PLRA in 1981, The Advertiser’s front page headlines announced that ‘Self-

rule is Finished’:

‘This government has lost confidence in the ability of the executive of the AP Lands to

appropriately govern their lands’, Acting Premier Foley says. ‘We have no choice but to step in

and take control. Self-governance in the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands has failed. What I say as

far as the executive of the AP Lands is concerned is: time’s up. This government has said we

will not tolerate an executive that cannot deliver civil order, community services, social justice

and quality of life to their community. The Government has decided to take drastic and dramatic

action to step in and deliver civil order and appropriate action in a part of our state that is, quite

frankly, a disgrace in terms of governance!’ (Kemp, The Advertiser, 16 March, p. 1).

Foley proclaimed that he was putting the interests of ‘women and children’ ahead of

Anangu ‘factionalism [and] local politics, which simply cannot be tolerated and will not

be tolerated by this government’ (Foley 2004, p.1). In closing, Foley stated that he wanted

‘order restored to an effectively lawless community’ (Foley 2004, p.1). With purposively

if hastily chosen words, he said:

‘I think this is an acknowledgement that 20 years of doing what we thought was right for the

Aboriginal lands has failed and dramatic action, strong action must be taken’ (ibid).

Framing this intervention in the Lands as a policy response to an Executive that had been

derelict in its duties and arguably illegitimate, Foley denigrated the PLRA and more than

two decades of self-governance in the AP Lands (The Advertiser, 16 March 2004, p. 1).

Such a powerful statement was a pre-meditated political bombshell delivered strategically

by a state government that was keen to divert attention away from its own failure to

deliver services to communities on the Lands. A ‘politics of crisis management’ (Boin,

t’Hart, Stern & Sundelius 2006, p. 1) and strategic ‘crisis exploitation’ (t’Hart 2008, p. 1)

drove the announcement of what became a dominant discourse and ‘policy storyline’

(Fischer 2003, p. 86).

The Rann Government’s repudiation of self-determination aligned with the Howard

government’s intentions to abolish ATSIC, which were then taking shape at the national

level of government.199 Turning the spotlight onto alleged deficiencies in Anangu self-

governance was, in this context, an opportunistic and pre-emptive deployment of a

‘political wedge’ (Wilson & Turnball 2002; Singleton, Aitkin, Jinks & Warhurst 2013).

199 Prime Minister Howard announced his intention to abolish ATSIC in April 2004, saying that ‘the

experiment in elected representation for indigenous people has been a failure’ (The Sydney Morning Herald,

15 April 2004). Labor Opposition Leader Mark Latham also agreed to the demise of ATSIC. On 28 May

2004, Howard introduced to abolish ATSIC. After a delay, which also saw the Howard government re-

elected for a fourth term in October 2004, the Bill finally passed both houses of Parliament early in 2005,

and ATSIC was formally abolished at midnight on 24 March 2005.

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It served to deflect public scrutiny away from the South Australian Government’s

response to petrol sniffing, while also blunting Opposition attacks. Rann was keen to

maximise returns from ‘working together’ with the Commonwealth, and this spin on the

policy storyline could serve that purpose well, as it added fuel to Howard’s assertion at

this time ‘that the experiment in elected representation for Indigenous people has been a

failure’ (The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 April 2004, p. 1).

6.8 ‘Rann Takes Control from Blacks’

National newspaper headlines dramatically reported that ‘Rann Takes Control from

Blacks’ and listed the ‘decisive’ actions of a government that ‘had lost confidence in the

APY council and had intervened to take control of the region’ (DiGirolamo 2004, p. 6).

Detailing how the government was moving quickly to ‘install a former Police

Commissioner as the area’s administrator’:

Former South Australian assistant police commissioner Jim Litster will head a government

taskforce to take charge in the APY lands once the legal changes pass through state parliament.

This will effectively halt state funding to the APY council and its executive, handing

responsibility to Mr Litster’s team.

‘This Government has said we will not tolerate an executive unable to administer civil order,

community service, social justice and quality of life for their community’, Mr Foley said. ‘We

are stepping in, putting an administrator in, full resources, and we will do what we can to ensure

young people don’t die, women don’t get bashed’ (DiGirolamo 2004, p. 6).

Such language discursively constructed the Lands as a lawless, violent place, and Anangu

leaders as people ‘unable to administer civil order’ to their own affairs (DiGirolamo 2004,

p. 6). The Executive was portrayed as if it were responsible for matters of ‘community

service, social justice and quality of life’ on the Lands, despite this not being its role, nor

being consistent with any tenet of the PLRA.

Moral panic (Cohen 1972; HREOC 2003; Cuneen 2007) about petrol sniffing and failed

communities (Dillon 2007; Lawrence & Gibson 2007) spread through the media. Such

negative stereotyping found ready acceptance among the latent racial biases simmering

just under the surface of public consciousness. Rhetorical and gratuitous concerns about

young people dying and women getting ‘bashed’ (Foley cited in DiGirolamo 2004)

awakened older imaginings and deep-seated anxieties about Aboriginal people as

‘harbingers of disorder’ (Cuneen 2007, p. 4). The Lands, which were mysterious and far

away, were easily portrayed as ‘failed or ungovernable spaces’ (Lawrence & Gibson

2007, p. 652).

While Justice Elliott Johnston suggested that ‘racial stereotyping and racism in the media

is institutional, not individual’ (Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody

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1991, pp. 185–186), its application in specific contexts can be strategically deployed to

advantage particular groups of individuals in calculated ways (Plater 1993; Mickler

1998a, 1998b; Hartley & McKee 2000).

As Hollinsworth (2005, p. 16) explains, ‘media representations and narratives occur

within institutionalised codes and practices that typically sensationalise Aboriginal issues,

emphasising conflict, violence, irrational and pathological behaviours’. The media

agenda in this instance was encouraged by a powerful and well-resourced state

government media unit under the direct control of the Premier’s office.200

This was a politically motivated and opportunistic form of covert racism that was deftly

deployed by the Rann (Labor) government to shift blame onto the Executive and

reposition itself on the moral high ground. It positioned AP governance as ‘the problem’

and pointed to Anangu as a vulnerable people in need of government intervention, as the

Lands had been let down by its ‘leaders’; indeed, they had been let down by the policy of

‘self-determination’. The effectiveness of this framing was its appeal to latent public

assumptions about non-Western peoples, with their conduct and organisations being

readily seen as somehow less developed or less capable and in need of improvement

(Hindess 2001).

This sudden attack on the AP Executive took place just weeks after it had been praised in

parliament for its contribution, ‘proactive’ work and ‘timely advice’, and hailed as a

respected partner that was conscientiously ‘working together’ with the government to

overcome petrol sniffing (Roberts, LC, 16 February 2004, pp. 938–939). A senior person

on the Executive who had a long history of engagement in efforts to combat petrol

sniffing, as well as the personal experience of grief and loss from its effects, said:

What can be worse than watching your child die from petrol sniffing? Waking up to find you

are being blamed for it on the front pages of the National and State papers and in radio and TV

broadcasts.201

6.8.1 ‘We will not be pushed around’!

Makinti Minutjukur was a senior Anangu woman who was respected across the Lands as

ninti,202 and who was sincere and moderate in her views and measured in her responses.

200 Rann had been a journalist prior to entering politics and had many years of experience as a Press

Secretary to premiers and ministers. Upon assuming the office, he brought all Ministerial Press Advisers

under his control through the Premier’s Department and ensured tight management of all government/media

relations. 201 Personal communication with senior Executive member (also on NPYWC) the day after the Foley

announcement. 202 ‘Ninti’ is the Pitjantjatjara word for clever/astute/smart.

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In 2004, as a member of the AP Executive and the Municipal Officer for Pukatja

(Ernabella), she wrote in protest to the Premier the day after the announcement, stating

that:

Six and half months ago, I attended a meeting in Alice Springs with the South Australian

Department of Human Services, and submitted a plan by the Pukatja community council for a

petrol sniffing prevention program. Our plan was accepted as a good one. We were told that we

would get $120 000 for it. Since then, I have heard nothing further.203

Also on 17 March 2004, a letter dated 9 March arrived in the AP Executive’s mailbox at

Umuwa, signed by the then CEO of the state government’s Human Services agency, Jim

Birch, which stated:

I refer to the allocation of funds for petrol sniffing as recommended by the APY Lands Council

Allocation Committee, which were forwarded to the government in November 2003. I advise

that the recommendations concerning petrol sniffing are still being considered by the

government.

Also on the same day, AP Chair Lewis, in Adelaide with a number of members of the

Executive, issued a press release urging people to protest against the Government’s

actions reported on page 2 of The Advertiser under the headline, ‘Fight Takeover, Urges

lands’ Boss’:

‘We want people to write letters and protest against the Government that has taken our rights

away’, [Lewis] said. ‘Anangu call on all Aboriginal people, trade unions and the community to

defend land rights, human rights and self-determination. We will not be pushed around’ (Lewis

cited in Kemp 2004, p. 2).

Lewis complained that despite being in Adelaide since Friday, the Executive only found

out about the action when it was announced to the media:

This is a sad day. This is the cynical action of a very conservative government. It is not what we

expected of a Labor Government and only serves to reinforce the racist beliefs that indigenous

peoples are not capable of managing their own lives…. Lewis said it had been the State

Government, not the lands council, which had failed to act after a Coronial inquest identified

inaction over petrol sniffing. ‘We asked the Coroner to report in the first place’, he said (Lewis

cited in Kemp 2004, p.2).

In a further letter to the Premier, Minutjukur challenged the sudden change in policy:

We are still waiting for the government to act on the Coroner’s recommendations…. The

government taking control, telling us what to do and changing the Land Rights Act is not the

way to help us with our problems. How can the government change the act without talking to

all Anangu first? It seems that some people in government and other places are looking at

Anangu and blaming them for the problems. We have been waiting for two years since the APY

council executive met with government in Adelaide and made an agreement which Gary Lewis

[and the Minister] signed about delivery of services to the lands. It is the government that has

been slow to act, not the APY council (Minutjukur cited in Lawson, Legislative Council, 22

March 2004, p. 1141).

203 Personal communication. Also, see South Australia. Legislative Council Debates, 24 March 2004, p.

1206.

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As the Government’s threat to take over administration of AP sunk in, the NPY Women’s

Council and Nganampa Health moved to assert their expertise as conduits for service

delivery on the Lands. While the Executive was explicitly targeted for blame, Anangu

regional organisations Nganampa Health and the NPY Women’s Council were

encouraged to act strategically—to work with rather than against—the Government’s

intervention.

In a carefully worded statement, the NPY Women’s Council opposed any undermining

of land rights: ‘Anangu women fought for their land many years ago and would do so

again if necessary’. However, the Council stated that it would support (Administrator)

Litster’s visit if it would bring some urgently needed action on petrol sniffing and

violence in communities. NPY’s Chairwoman Yanyi Bandicha said that:

‘NPY has argued for more police on the AP Lands…for a long time, and maybe now some of

the grog, petrol and marijuana will be stopped. We agree with Mr Foley that it is appalling that

these things keep happening…. Aboriginal communities should not have to solve all their

problems without expert advice and help. We look forward to meeting Mr Litster very soon. We

hope to talk to him about his plans and offer NPY’s experience and knowledge to help get some

order into community life…’ said Mrs Bandhica (NPY Women’s Council, Media release, 16

March 2004).

The next week, Nganampa Health issued a statement expressing concern at the ‘continued

misreporting’ of deaths on the Lands, suggesting that it was a disrespectful and inaccurate

way to deal with the loss of human life and tragedy (SC 2004, p. 101). Free pro bono

journalism and legal support was quickly offered to AP, as academics, church groups,

unionists and others rallied to protest against threats to the still iconic PLRA. Responding

to Lewis’s call for help, the SA United Trades and Labor Council (UTLC) passed a

strongly worded resolution sent as a (public) letter to Premier Rann:

That the UTLC calls on the State Government to uphold the principles of self-determination and

appropriate consultation with the Anangu people regarding their affairs. We note that problems

in the lands are not of land management but of human service delivery and we encourage the

Government to take the appropriate steps to address health, education and police matters in a

culturally sensitive way. We do not support any changes to the Anangu Land Rights Act without

agreement from the Anangu people (UTLC Letter, 18 March 2004).

The AP Executive subsequently wrote a long appeal to Minister Roberts, with whom they

had worked closely over the previous couple of years. It asserted that AP was not a service

provider, and it provided an analysis of the contradictory nature of the government’s

announcement:

we note that you agree with APY Council, communities and service agencies that there are

issues relating to human service delivery especially regarding petrol sniffing which need to be

addressed urgently. We note your acknowledgement that these issues relate to delays in the

Government’s implementation program…. The APY Land Council was never established as a

service provider…we do not believe there is any necessity to amend the Land Rights Act to

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affect (sic) self-government of the APY Lands in order to achieve urgent action on petrol

sniffing and related human service issues…. Indeed it would be quicker and more effective if

the urgent human service interventions the Government has mentioned were introduced side by

side with the support of Anangu and that [any] amendments to the PLRA were negotiated

separately in a respectful manner….

This was the Partnership approach agreed to and specified through the Working Together

statement we signed with the Government at the beginning of 2003…we draw your attention to

the Working Together Statement of Intent and Memorandum of Understanding Government’s

own policy…. The Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act is held in trust by the Parliaments of South

Australia to protect the rights of Anangu. The SA Labor Government policy initiatives

announced last year commit the Government and its Agencies to negotiate in a respectful and

meaningful way with Anangu for the best outcomes for communities before (Executive’s italics)

any action is taken (AP Executive Media Release, 22 March 2004).

On the same day, Minister Roberts defended AP and its Executive in Parliament. He

expressed confidence in AP’s Chair, Gary Lewis: ‘We do have confidence. He is the

elected Chairperson of APY in its current form…I am not blaming the APY

executive…partnership is the key to working with people in the lands (Roberts, LC

Hansard, 22 March 2004, pp. 1141–1142).

Roberts argued that Anangu had been proactive in difficult circ*mstances. He flagged his

wish to extend the Executive’s term to promote stability. He argued that contestation was

a norm in all communities:

For as long as I have been familiar with the lands, it does not matter who is elected within those

communities, there will always be people who are not happy with the outcome. That is the same

in every society. In the interim, while we were developing a form of governance that suited the

requirements of the government, we decided to engage them (Roberts, LC Hansard, 22 March

2004, p. 1146).

The Liberal Opposition took every opportunity to exploit divisions between Anangu and

within Labor, focusing its attack on the AP Executive and its Chair. They claimed that

Perth-based mining company Acclaim Exploration NL (formerly Austral Nickel), which

had secured exploration rights over part of the Lands, had complained to the Premier

about difficulties negotiating with the AP Executive.

The Opposition moved a censure motion against both Premier Rann and Roberts (as

Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation) for: a failure to ‘provide a timely and

adequate response’ to the Coroner’s 2002 recommendations, ‘delays in providing

effective health, welfare, police and other services for people on the lands’, a ‘failure to

insist’ on Executive elections in the previous year, and:

attempts by the Rann government to transfer blame to the executive board of AP for the failure

of the government to address issues on the AP lands (Lawson, LC Hansard, 24 March 2004, p.

1203).

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In a powerful debate that canvassed the PLRA, petrol sniffing and the efficacy of State

Government policy, the Australian Democrats amended the motion to censure the Rann

Government, but not Minister Roberts, who in their view had been hung ‘out to dry’ when

problems hit the headlines:

Cabinet did not like a damning front-page story and, instead of abiding by the agreement it

signed in May 2003, when it promised to ‘do it right’, the Deputy Premier made a series of

harshly worded accusations while he tried to deflect blame onto the APY executive (Reynolds,

LC Hansard, 24 March 2004, p. 1215).

As media reporting amplified the construction of the Lands as a chaotic and unstable

place that was unable to ‘govern’ itself, and as Parliament debated the politics of AP

engagement and the role of the Premier and his Deputy in it, Minister Roberts stood firm

against the censure, admitting forthrightly, if forlornly:

‘It is the Government not AP that has let the Anangu down’ (Roberts, LC Hansard, 24 March

2004, p. 1211).

III: Consultants and Reports

6.9 Litster Visits the Lands—Litster Resigns

After the Government’s hasty announcement, Assistant Police Commissioner Litster was

to visit the Lands to take up a position as ‘Administrator’. Crown Law urged caution, as

installing Litster by Executive decree could contravene both the PLRA and the

Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act and thereby expose the government to

litigation (Niarchos 2004).

Litster was re-termed ‘Coordinator of Government Services’ and sent to Umuwa the next

week to meet the AP Executive. When Litster arrived on 25 March, followed by a press

contingent, he was met by AP Chair Lewis, who presented Litster with a ceremonial ‘VIP’

AP Lands permit and graciously welcomed him to Anangu country.204

At Umuwa, dozens of TOs, older law men and women, the Pumpas and Tjilpis205 of the

Lands, gathered on the red dirt in a large circle near the AP offices to speak with the new

‘Coordinator’. Litster met with senior AP staff and then conferred with the old men for

some hours. He then promptly returned to Adelaide and announced his resignation from

204 Under the PLRA, all visitors to the Lands must apply for an official permit to be allowed to enter and

stay on the Lands; however, there is also provision for State Government workers and/or those conducting

business for the Minister to have the ‘right’ to enter. Lewis and the Executive considered protesting and

trying to prevent Litster from entering the Lands without a permit, but decided that doing so would be

counterproductive and provocative. They quickly prepared the special guest ceremonial permit and

diplomatic greeting, albeit they had not been told officially of Litster’s visit and found out through a call

from the media in Adelaide, who alerted them that a plane carrying Litster was in transit. 205 Tjilpi is a Pitjantjatjara word for an elderly man, and Pumpa is the equivalent for an older woman.

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the role, citing health and personal reasons. Litster explained that the task was too big for

him to take on, now that he knew more about it:

The basic error was that no one knew quite how big the job was and what it entailed. But it’s a

massive job and I think common-sense tells you that now and we’re always wise in hindsight

(Litster 2004).

On the same day, HREOC Social Justice Commissioner Dr Bill Jonas launched his annual

report, which featured a case study of petrol sniffing issues on the Lands. In a national

media report entitled ‘Black Land Council “Scapegoated” Over Suicides’, Jonas bluntly

claimed that AP was being scapegoated:

by the South Australian Government for the significant problems in the way that it—the State

Government—has gone about addressing petrol-sniffing issues over the past year (DiGirolamo

2004, p. 8).

6.10 Collins Flies in

Undeterred, the Rann government next secured the services of ex-Labor NT Senator Hon.

Bob Collins206 to fill the position vacated by Litster. Rann viewed Collins as ‘the right

person’ for the troubleshooting role (South Australian House of Assembly, 4 May 2004,

p. 1967). Collins commenced at the end of March and made a brief 24-hour visit to the

Lands in April 2004, accompanied by Premier Rann, Aboriginal Affairs Minister Roberts,

regional MPs, a range of government officials and a 15-strong press contingent.

A photo feature in The Age depicted the Lands as a community of people ‘trapped in a

cycle of poverty and hopelessness that is destroying another Aboriginal generation’ (The

Age, 24 April 2004, p. 1). It described the spectacle of Collins’ first visit from a local’s

perspective:

In a gesture of trust this week to coincide with the arrival of Bob Collins, the communities of

Umuwa and Ernabella allowed several journalists in with the SA Premier, Mike Rann, a former

minister of Aboriginal affairs and land rights activist. While The Age travelled independently,

about 15 Adelaide journalists flew in for a visit that lasted less than 24 hours and followed

Rann’s itinerary. Expecting at the very least a meeting and tour of the town, Ernabella

community chairman Joseph Tapaya…and others prepared to sit down to talk about their

problems and hopes for a way forward. The meeting never happened.

At Umuwa, an expected meeting between Rann and the AP Council executive also never took

place. ‘I feel disappointed,’ Tapaya said after Rann’s group left. ‘I think it was a bit rude to just

206 Collins had been appointed an Officer of the Order of Australia (AO) for services to the NT and

Indigenous rights in January 2004, and he was a well-known figure in Australian (Labor) politics who

undertook consultancy work in Indigenous policy after a successful career in NT politics, as well as serving

as a Senator and Minister in the Commonwealth Parliament. During the period of his consultancy for Rann

on the APY Lands, he sustained critical injuries in a road accident in the NT in June (while not at work on

the SA consultancy itself), which led to his hospitalisation and later resignation from the South Australian

Government adviser’s position in August 2004. During this time, he was charged with a number of serious

offences relating to child p*rnography and child sexual assault; however, he died prior to the charges being

heard in court. On 14 February 2008, the NT Coroner found that Collins had committed suicide prior to

facing court on the child sex abuse charges (ABC 2008).

191

come in and walk around without seeing the chairperson first. It would have been good to have

a yarn with him, have a coffee and talk things over.’ The way AP Council chairman Gary Lewis

saw it, the Premier’s group ‘walked around in circles’ at Umuwa, then talked to white staff at

the office of the indigenous (sic) health service provider, Nganampa Health….

‘We thought he was going to talk to the AP executive about what the Government wanted to do

with the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands and the community about how people are dying and how

we can work together and help people in the community,’ Lewis said. ‘But he just comes in here

and wastes all that opportunity’ (Debelle 2004, p. 1).

Executive member Makinti Minutjukur was determined to put on record her take on

events. In consultation with other TOs, she wrote another strongly worded rebuke to the

Premier. While the following represents one Anangu view, it was a collectively prepared

letter. Minutjukur’s letter was cited extensively by Australian Democrat Kate Reynolds

(Reynolds, Hansard, LC, 31 May 2004, p. 1677) during parliamentary debates on Collins’

increasingly contentious role in the Lands. First, Minutjukur addressed the Premier’s

behaviour:

When you visited the Lands at the end of April we were looking forward to meeting you after

we received a fax at the Pukatja Community office telling us to expect you. I got Council

members ready for a meeting with you and we had the kettle boiling for a cup of tea. When you

didn’t arrive I drove across the creek …and found you outside the TAFE building in front of the

newspaper cameras. Unfortunately, I didn’t see you again (Reynolds, Hansard, LC, 31 May

2004, p. 1677).

Minutjukur then described the positive anticipation in the community surrounding

Collins’ appointment:

When I first heard that Bob Collins was going to work with us on the Lands for the government

I was interested and hopeful. I heard that he is married to a Tiwi woman and I felt that he was a

good choice for the job. He would know how to listen to Aboriginal people. I had never met

him before.

The Community Council members and I all felt this was to be a very important and serious

meeting. Now was a chance, after all the years of not being listened to, to talk straight to the

Government. We expected that what we had to say would be listened to with respect, and would

be taken seriously. Pukatja Community Council’s meeting with Bob began three hours later than

scheduled.

Several people had re-arranged their day to be ready for the meeting, and some councillors, who

had been waiting since 11 am, gave up and had gone away by the time he arrived. I introduced

myself and Bob said, ‘Oh hello, Makinti. I know who you are.’ I felt shocked inside because he

does not know me, and it didn’t feel like a good start. Less than two minutes after he arrived at

the Community office he suddenly walked away and went over for an unscheduled visit to the

arts centre. I was surprised; I felt it was rude. He came back half an hour later wearing one of

Ernabella Arts’ new bird beanies. This one looks like a galah.

The long letter continued with an account of the dire health and welfare situation on the

Lands, and the importance Anangu had attached to meetings with the Premier and Collins

as opportunities to discuss petrol sniffing and other urgent health and well-being issues.

It also revealed that some Anangu felt that Collins was not really interested in

consultation, but rather that he was pushing for a government-preferred outcome:

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Bob has been sent by the Government to work between Anangu and Government, so that

together— we can solve the dreadful problems in Anangu life: where people are dying young

from petrol….

Bob talked about the APY election. He talked at us (original author emphasis). He talked on

and on at us about the election. He said that if an election were held straight away, then COAG

money promised to APY at the beginning of 2003 would be released in July this year.

Someone asked what if there is no election? Bob replied, no money. In disbelief that person

asked the question again. Same answer (Reynolds, Hansard, LC, 31 May 2004, 1677).

6.10.1 Collins reports and resigns

Collins’ first report, entitled ‘APY Land Council and Community Safety in the Lands—

Report by the Co-ordinator of Government Services to the APY Lands’, was tabled in

Parliament by the Premier a fortnight after reciving the letter cited above (Rann, South

Australian House of Assembly, 4 May 2004, pp. 1967–1968). Rann praised Collins for

his ‘exceptional understanding of the needs and aspirations of indigenous Australians’:

[Collins] has spent many hours meeting with dozens of people involved in service delivery here

in Adelaide, in Alice Springs and also on the APY Lands. More importantly, he has met and

held extensive discussions with many community members during the time he recently spent on

the lands (Reynolds, Hansard, LC, 31 May 2004, p.1678).

In his report, Collins (2004, p. 1) argued that ‘fundamental structural problems’ with AP

were ‘impeding the delivery of important community initiatives’, that ‘there appears to

be a profoundly dysfunctional situation’ and that the current situation was ‘entirely

unacceptable’. The nature of these ‘structural problems’ was implied by delays with

COAG trials, withholding of Commonwealth funds and confusion about the role of AP

in relation to the APLIICC.

Collins (2004, p. 3) was clear that there had been no wrongdoing by Lewis or others on

the Executive. However, he recommended that ‘legislation [be] introduced to provide for

an election for the APY land Council [sic] as soon as practicable’, that the ‘SA Electoral

Commission conduct the election’, and that the ‘Commission ensure to the greatest extent

practicable that all Anangu in the Lands have an opportunity to participate in this process

if they wish to’ (Collins 2004, p. 4; cited in Hansard, LC, 4 May 2014, p. 1418). Collins

recommended that this election be held within 12 months, and that a review be undertaken

so that amendments to the PLRA could be considered before the end of the 12-month

term.

Collins recommended the solution to ‘what the problem [was] represented to be’ to

paraphrase Bacchi (2009, p. 1). His brief was to focus on human service delivery, but he

worked on the problem as the Government saw it and focused on questions of AP

governance rather than petrol sniffing or the timely delivery of promised government

193

support. His attention to petrol sniffing was limited to a restatement of yet-to-be-

implemented recommendations about night patrols, additional funds for SAPOL and the

construction of short-term detention facilities (Collins 2004, pp. 4–5).

None of this was new input. The introduction of night patrols and added resources for

SAPOL were recommended as urgent issues by the Coroner in 2002. AP already held

elections under the scrutiny of the SA Electoral Commission. A Review of the PLRA by a

Select Committee, which was established in August 2002,207 was soon to report on exactly

the matters that Collins suggested be reviewed. All of these were current issues about

which Collins would have been well aware.

However, the stand-out feature of Collins’ Report was his proposal that legislation be

introduced to force an AP Executive election ‘as soon as practicable’. This served Rann

well. Under the PLRA, this was one way to overcome the approval that the incumbent

AP Executive had secured from the SA Consumer Affairs Commission to register a

change to its Constitution, which had given it a three-year term.208

In recommending legislation to force an Executive election, Collins backed the

Government’s strategy of making an issue of Anangu governance, constructing this as

the reason for delays and shortcomings in service delivery, thereby obfuscating

government inaction. Collins (2004, p. 3) however, was careful to be fair in his report by

noting that, despite being ‘lobbied heavily’ by opponents of the incumbent Executive, he

had:

no reason to believe any member of the APY Executive took any improper or inappropriate

action.209

Yet the AP Executive was being undermined and isolated as the Government worked to

fine-tune its ‘policy storyline’ (Fischer 2003, p. 86) ahead of a second Coronial Inquest.

The Premier announced that additional police resources that were promised after the first

Coronial Inquest in 2002 - which were to cover ‘seven fully sworn police officers,

including an inspector’ - were being allocated to the Lands (Rann, House of Assembly, 4

207 The PLR SC was tasked with reporting by October 2002 (Hansard, LC, 29 August 2002, p. 957). 208 Approval to extend the term of the Executive had been agreed to by Anangu on repeated occasions since

2002; it was a resolution of the previous Executive to do likewise and then agreed in January, March, May,

September and again in a qualified way in December 2003. It was a key feature of the ‘Statement of Intent’

and the Working Together COAG MoU. 209 Collins was emphatic on this point, repeating in his recommendations that while he believed that

legislation to compel an immediate election was needed, he did not wish this to ‘infer…that any member

of the APY Land Council has taken any improper or inappropriate action’ (Collins 2004, p. 4).

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May 2014, p. 196). In addition, the forbearance of Anangu regional agencies was

acknowledged as resources that were promised two years earlier were finally provided:

Additional health workers have been or soon will be employed on the Lands, including two

health coordinators to work with Nganampa Health Service, four youth workers and a youth

coordinator. Extra funds have also been provided for the NPY Women’s Council (Rann,

Hansard, HA, 4 May 2014, p. 196).

On 25 May, three weeks after Collins’ report was tabled, the ‘Pitjantjatjara Land Rights

(Executive Board) Amendment Bill’ was introduced to Parliament (Roberts, Hansard, 25

May 2004, p. 1573). While stating that the Bill did not ‘imply that any member of the

Executive Board has taken any improper or inappropriate action’ (Hansard 2004, p. 1573;

see also Collins 2004, p. 3), Minister Roberts argued that uncertainty about extending the

incumbent Executive’s term was causing concern in the community and among funders.

At the same time, debate on other amendments to the PLRA dealing with petrol sniffing

contained in the ‘Pitjantjatjara Land Rights (Regulated Substances) Amendment Bill’210

was adjourned.

Premier Rann next contracted Collins to pursue ‘urgent discussions with the

Commonwealth to ensure that there is no delay in the rollout of funding for services

delivered on the lands’ (Rann, House of Assembly 4 May 2004, p. 1968). However,

Collins’ period of consultancy engagement was cut short by a road accident in June 2004,

which left him seriously injured and unable to continue his work.

6.11 Report of the Select Committee on Pitjantjatjara Land Rights

The Select Committee on Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act, which was established in August

2002, was originally to report back in October that year on the following Terms of

Reference:

a) the operation of the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981;

b) opportunities for, and impediments to, enhancement of the cultural life and the economic and

social development of the traditional owners of the lands;

c) the past activities of the Pitjantjatjara Council and Anangu Pitjantjatjara Executive in relation

to the lands;

d) future governance required to manage the lands and ensure efficient and effective delivery of

human services and infrastructure;

e) any other matters. (Legislative Council, 29 August 2002, p. 958).

After collecting evidence throughout September 2002 in Adelaide and on the Lands, and

then preparing a report and recommendations in late 2003, the SC waited until 2 June

210 To introduce a new category of offence and stronger penalties for selling or supplying regulated

substances on the Lands.

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2004 to table its Report. The SC noted that it was finalising its recommendations ready

to report:

when in March 2004, the Government signalled its intention to intervene in the management of

the AP Lands…consequently administrative matters associated with that intervention are not

considered within this Report (SC, 2 June 2004, p. 8).

The Rann Government’s March 2004 intervention appears to have been as much of a

surprise to the SC as it was to others. The SC spent two years collecting the views of all

major policy actors; they met on 28 occasions, received 60 written submissions and took

evidence from 96 Anangu and non-Anangu witnesses (SC 2004, p. 9).

The Report is a comprehensive account of the operation of the PLRA, the program

delivery on the Lands and the effect of petrol sniffing on people in communities. As a

formal parliamentary document, it provides a rich repository of first-hand witness

quotations chronicling the heterogeneity of Anangu voices.

The SC Report (2004) highlighted divergent views on governance and the delivery of

human services on the Lands. Past AP Chair Owen Burton advocated for AP to be the

‘umbrella’ organisation on the Lands:

It is time to change the Act so that the Anangu Pitjantjatjara is recognised as an umbrella

organisation and then when other government departments are making contact they know to

come through the Anangu Pitjantjatjara, the umbrella organisation on the Lands (Evidence,

Burton, 26 September 2002, p. 75).

Nganampa Health and the NPY Women’s Council strongly opposed this model, arguing

that it was the role of regional Anangu agencies to be the focus for the delivery of services.

The NPY Women’s Council asserted that regional Anangu organisations had been

established by Anangu for this very purpose (SC 2004, p. 76). The then incumbent AP

Chair, Lewis also opposed the ‘umbrella model of governance’, arguing that:

Anangu Pitjantjatjara should be retained as a land-holding entity and that a separate entity

should be established to coordinate the delivery of human services and infrastructure…key

functions of the new entity would be to determine what services are required, to arrange for their

provision—either directly or through other organisations—and…maintain an

advisory/coordinating role with government departments, agencies and service providers….

Anyone holding an elected or paid position with one entity would be precluded from

simultaneously holding a position with the other (Submission 24: G Lewis; Submission 17: Y

Lester; Submission 14: I Baker; Submission 13: Ascione, Hope & Associates, SC, p. 76).

Reflecting on the original intent of the PLRA, the SC noted that the framers of the original

Act had not envisaged the increased demand over time for a range of human services on

the Lands, and hence had provided no guidance in this area. Citing a representative of the

Crown Solicitor’s Office, the SC Report (2004, p. 72) noted that ‘the Act is silent with

respect to the delivery of infrastructure and human services to Anangu communities’:

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There is no function of AP which relates to anything other than land administration.… It was

meant to be a land rights act that is all. It was not meant to be a welfare act or a general service

provider. The body was never set up for doing those things (SC 2004 [Evidence M Johns, 5

September 2002, Q55 & Q56], p. 72).

The SC Report (2004, p. 2) argued that a combination of: ‘(a) adverse conditions on the

AP Lands, (b) a misplaced reliance on the Act [and] (c) confusion as to the role of the

land-holding body corporate’ had hampered effective government service delivery. It also

recommended a strengthening of Parliamentary oversight through the reinvigorated

Aboriginal Lands Parliamentary Standing Committee, noting that:

At times, the rhetoric of self-determination has obscured the need for Parliament to stay

informed, and fostered an unhelpful spirit of laissez-faire (SC 2004, p. 3).

The SC recommended that the Act be amended to reflect the contemporary need for

improved human service delivery on the Lands, who should coordinate this, how such

services should be delivered and what governance mechanism should guide the delivery

of such services. It canvassed local government for the Lands, noting that this had been

suggested in Dodson’s (2002) Report.

The Report recommended the inclusion of both Pitjantjatjara and Yankunytjatjara people

in the Act’s title, a clearer election and representative process, and means for the inclusion

of more women on the Executive Board (SC 2004, pp. 3–7). It restated the urgency of the

2002 Coroner’s Report recommendations—for more police on the Lands, triennial

funding for agencies and programs, immediate development of a rehabilitation facility for

petrol sniffers, and implementation of the recommendations of a review of disability

services on the Lands by consultant Tregenza in 2002.

Finally, the SC Report contained a brief ‘Dissenting Statement’ by Liberal (Opposition)

members of the committee, the Hon. Caroline Schaefer and the Hon. Robert Lawson,

Shadow Minister (SC 2002, pp. 100–102). Their statement placed on record their view

that the announcement of 15 March 2004—that ‘self-rule’ on the AP Lands was

finished—had interrupted the work of the SC. Citing the censure motion that followed in

the parliament, they stated their position that ‘the grandstanding actions of the state

government in seeking to lay the sole blame on the Executive and others working on the

Lands was deplorable’ (SC 2004, p. 101).

Calling this a ‘shameful device to deflect blame’ (SC 2004, p.101) for the Rann

government’s own failure to implement the Coroner’s 2002 recommendations on tackling

petrol sniffing, the ‘Dissenting Statement’ nonetheless stated its support for the SC

Report’s recommendations.

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6.12 O’Donoghue and Costello Enter the Fray

After Collins’ resignation in August 2004, Premier Rann turned to Lowitja O’Donoghue

for advice. The daughter of a Yankunytjatjara woman, Lowitja O’Donoghue had been

inaugural Chair of ATSIC from 1990 to 1996. O’Donoghue preferred to undertake the

consultancy in partnership with the Rev. Tim Costello, CEO of World Vision Australia.

Together on 25 August, they were appointed ‘advisors to the Premier’ and asked to

‘review the progress of the taskforce and the whole of government approach and the

recommendations made by Senator Bob Collins’ (Roberts, LC Hansard, 14 September

2004, p. 10; O’Donoghue & Costello 2005, p. 1).

The appointment of Lowitja O’Donoghue was unusual. She was part of an active group

of Yankunytjatjara women who formed a network that was concerned about what was

happening on the Lands and that operated alongside the Yankunytjatjara Council (YC).

Lester, an early instigator and key driver of the PC and PLRA, founded the YC in the

1980s to agitate for greater equity between Pitjantjatjara and Yankunytjatjara extended

family groups in the politics and governance of the Lands.211 O’Donoghue was a well-

known passionate advocate for self-determination. Having faced censure in parliament in

March, Rann was perhaps looking for an unassailable shield in his approach to the Lands,

or perhaps he simply respected Lowitja O’Donoghue’s standing.

By the time the O’Donoghue–Costello consultancy commenced, the Pitjantjatjara Land

Rights (Executive Board) Amendment Act had passed212, and a new AP Executive election

was scheduled for 4 October 2004. O’Donoghue’s first visit to the Lands in late August,

accompanied by the Premier’s Department and World Vision staff, took place as

community tensions about the forced Executive elections escalated. O’Donoghue

commented explicitly on this tension:

The disputes between community leaders about preferred management structures and how they

perceived existing ones function were very explicit. There has been poor communication not

just within the community but between the community and the government.…

Support and assistance is desperately required to address areas such as petrol sniffing….

There is great frustration of what appears to be a lot of agency/Government talk about things

being done but little action to be shown for it….

Dissatisfaction with the government was expressed and a plea for some quick action and results

to at least restore some sense of hope and momentum….

211 The arbitrary state and territory colonial borders held little or no meaning for Anangu in relation to their

connections to country (see the discussion of Yankunytjatjara and Pitjantjatjara country in, for example,

Toyne & Vachon 1984). 212 The Pitjantjatjara Land Rights (Executive Board) Amendment Act was assented to on 15 July 2004

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There are too many short term visitors and very few people stay and properly listen to the

community issues and seem to deliver (O’Donoghue & Costello 2005, p. 2).

In her report with Costello, O’Donoghue noted diverse views about the role of the AP,

suggesting that some saw it ‘as just another service provider, not a peak body’ (2005, p.

3), while others argued that the Executive should ‘only deal with mining companies, grant

permits and matters strictly pertaining to Land as opposed to [being] a separate peak body

for welfare and service delivery’ (O’Donoghue & Costello 2005, p. 8).

She also observed the jostling for power between competing protagonists, and with

tongue-in-cheek humour, she noted that there were those who believed AP:

is the right governance instrument through which all of government funding can flow. They say

it just elects the wrong people!

O’Donoghue and Costello (2005, p. 8) suggested that developing a local government

model for the Lands was ‘the critical piece of intellectual and policy work’ needing to be

done. She also suggested the need for a public forum ‘where some of the large

philosophical issues can be debated’, such as:

What does self-determination actually mean and what model for self-governance best flows

from that?…

how are the issues of long term partnership and consultation, capacity and community building

to be reconciled to the political imperatives of further coroner’s reports and the requirements

for immediate and quick relief? (ibid).

O’Donoghue and Costello (2005, p. 6) expressed reservations about the over-reliance

they had observed on the tri-state regional Anangu service providers, and suggested that

clarification was needed of the multiple layers of accountability expected by the South

Australian Government. O’Donoghue especially advocated for a more nuanced

understanding of the dispersed governance on the Lands, whereby a range of Anangu

service delivery agencies, community councils and Anangu governance bodies, including

the Executive and AP itself, comprised of all TOs, formed a governance domain or system

of interconnected and intersecting kinship, as well as functional organisational

relationships (O’Donoghue & Costello 2005, p.8).

In O’Donoghue and Costello’s view, this dispersed governance was culturally compatible

with Anangu ways of decision-making, situational leadership and shared roles. While not

linear, such a dispersed Aboriginal governance system need not be at odds with a

‘rationalised’ service delivery system or appropriate ‘lines of accountability’ (ibid).

O’Donoghue and Costello (2005, p. 8) also recommended the creation of an ‘honest

broker’ for the Lands, ‘with powers like an Ombudsman to range across every

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Department area with access and power to intervene and unblock resources’. Such a

position would be based on the Lands and cut through ‘the various silos of Government

departments’ as well as ‘any petty clan bitterness’ (O’Donoghue & Costello 2005, p. 8).

The ‘Anangu Pitjantjatjara and Yankunytjatjara Lands Report’ (O’Donoghue & Costello

2005) was delivered to Rann on 21 October 2004 but not tabled until 23 March 2005 (see

Lawson, Legislative Council 4 April 2005, p. 1472 and 6 April 2005, p. 1353). A lack of

acknowledgement and lack of response to her recommendations caused O’Donoghue

much anguish. It soured her relationship with Rann and his Government and led to a

residual bitterness that surfaced in a series of public recriminations in the ensuing months.

6.13 Executive Board Elections—October 2004

6.13.1 Crisis exploitation

By October 2004, when the O’Donoghue–Costello Report was finished, the South

Australian Government had largely already achieved its aims. Attention was now firmly

fixed on questions of Anangu governance. A new Executive election was imminent, and

it was likely the incumbent critics of the government would be unseated. The SC Report

had set parameters for a full Review of the PLRA. The ‘policy storyline’ (Fischer 2003,

p. 86) was firmly in the government’s control and aligned to its agenda. With the passage

of the ‘Pitjantjatjara Land Rights (Executive Board) Amendment Bill’ in July 2004, Rann

had achieved a tactical victory. He had successfully positioned the (Lewis-led) AP

Executive as being responsible for delays in the delivery of much-needed petrol sniffing

support to the Lands.

t’Hart’s (2007, p. 4) analysis of crisis management as a form of ‘defensive containment’,

in which governments curtail fall-out from an unexpected emergency and policy

processes move ‘back to normal as soon as possible’, is a useful conceptualisation here.

t’Hart (2007, p. 4) observed that governmental actors who are ‘bent on getting things

done’ will often frame ‘problems’ to promote their political authority or policy

preferences as ‘solutions’.

Katzenstein (cited in Maddison 2013, p. 38) elsewhere defines this ‘politics of meaning

making’ as a form of ‘discursive politics’, pointing out that such conceptual changes also

have material effects. The framing of Anangu governance as the problem served to not

only obfuscate government culpability, but it also appealed to the latent everyday racisms

in the broader community with a simple narrative and ‘policy storyline’ of Aboriginal

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dysfunction, rather than a complex story about what Dillon and Westbury (2007, p. 53)

termed ‘implementation incapacity’.213

In polling reported in mid 2004, Rann had overcome an earlier slump to regain his

position as Australia’s most popular Premier and extend his lead over SA’s Liberal

Opposition. Rann’s decisive management of ‘a social crisis facing Anangu Pitjantjatjara

communities in the state’s north’ was one of the issues listed by McGarry as contributing

to his regaining his standing in the polls (The Australian, 7 July 2004, p. 6).

Lewis, Lester, Kumanara Thompson and other leading TOs in the campaign for the PLRA

in the 1970s and 1980s felt increasingly aggrieved. The efforts of the Rann Government

to blame AP and unseat the Executive could not have been more crushing.

6.13.2 The extraordinary elections—who votes, where and how?

The 2004 Executive elections were supported by the SA State Electoral Office (SEO).214

Following the passage of the ‘Pitjantjatjaa Land Rights (Executive Board) Amendment

Act 2004’, the Electoral Commissioner was now formally identified in the legislation as

the ‘Returning Officer’, along with specific ‘electorates’ being named:

(a) an election of one member of the Executive Board from each of the following community

groups (and each community group will constitute an electorate for the election):

(i) Pipalyatjara/Kalka;

(ii) Watarru;

(iii) Kanypi/Nyapari/Angatja;

(iv) Amata/Tjurma;

(v) Kaltjiti/Irintata/Watinuma;

(vi) Anilalya/Turkey Bore;

(vii) Pukatja/Yunyarinyi;

(viii) Mimili;

(ix) Iwantja;

(x) Amuruna/Railway Bore/Witjintitja/Walatina; and

(b) an election of the Chairperson of the Executive Board.

Under the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981, eligibility to participate in the elections

had always been restricted to persons who were ‘Pitjantjatjara’ and ‘of or above the age

of 18 years’. Now, given the amendment, a voter also had to be ‘a member of a community

constituting an electorate’.

As in previous elections, the Chairperson was to be elected by the electorate at large.

Eligible Anangu could now stand for the remaining 10 positions as representatives for

their specific local ‘electorate’. Previously, elections for the Executive were held during

213 It is interesting to note Peter Shergold, a key architect of the ‘whole of government’ approaches to

service delivery, commented that ‘The challenge in short is implementation. It is very much harder than it

sounds’ (Shergold 2003, p. 1). 214 The Executive elections in 2002 and at the 2003 AP AGM were similarly supported by the SA SEO.

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a Special Meeting of AP, with those present engaging in a long process of discussion,

deliberation and assent.

The Pitjantjatjara Land Rights (Executive Board) Amendment Act 2004, propelled this

open process into a more individualised private space that was imbued with presumptions

about the importance of individualised choice—for example, one person, one vote.

Familiar notions to Anangu of open decision-making, which for generations had centred

on communal responsibility, with individuals nested together within their social, physical

and cultural universe (Morphy 2007), were rapidly replaced by practices that were

designed around Western notions of an atomised self. While not without precedent, as

ATSIC and state and Commonwealth ballots worked on this basis, the change to

customary decision-making on the Lands was perplexing for many older TOs.

The new election rules introduced challenging questions about voter eligibility: who was

to be deemed a ‘Pitjantjatjara’ person for the purposes of being allowed to vote? How

would residency or zoned constituencies as designated ‘electorates’ now fit into this new

notion of eligibility to stand? Another administrative complexity was that, in the absence

of an AP-wide electoral ‘roll’, how would the right to vote be determined? How would

they then exercise that vote?

The SEO was concerned with how to ensure that people voted in their ‘electorates’, given

that some people considered themselves part of a community due to cultural or family

ties but lived elsewhere.215 Anangu tended to move regularly between communities, and

between communities and homelands. They were also connected to families and

communities across the tri-state region. Would it be fair to allow or disallow someone to

vote for a representative on the Executive if they were linked through song-lines or

family/cultural history to a Lands community but lived in Alice Springs or just across the

border in NT or WA?

There was also concern about how to ensure that people only voted once in one

electorate/community. At one stage, the SEO considered stamping an ink mark (indelible

ink or stain) on those who voted, and using ultra violet light to check people who

presented to vote in order to reduce the chance of multiple voting across electorates, as

215 Mobility of Anangu in and across the Lands and tri-state region is discussed in Chapter 1; see also

Peterson (2004), James (2005), Taylor (2006), Prout (2008a, 2008b) and Habibis (2011).

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had been trialled in Timor and other UN-monitored elections. Amidst strong protests from

some Anangu at the prospect of being ‘treated like cattle’,216 this idea was scrapped.

In evidence given by the then SA Electoral Commissioner (Steve Tully) to the Aboriginal

Lands Parliamentary Standing Committee (detailed in its Annual Report, 2004/5, p. 53)

regarding the conduct of the October 2004 AP Executive Board elections, Tully explained

that after careful consideration, ‘self-identification’ was favoured in determining people’s

eligibility to vote:

I opted to retain…self-identification with a community as being the overriding criteria.… Whilst

the definition of membership of a community was an issue and will continue to be an issue, I

also suspect that the requirement to be a Pitjantjatjara person could cause as much

controversy…. I was quite relaxed with self-identification all along because, traditionally, that

has been the way that things have happened. I knew that if we had tight criteria someone would

have to make a judgment that was going to cause what I thought would be immense problems

in deciding who is in and who is out (ALPSC 2004/5, p. 53).

The 2004/5 annual report of the SA SEO provided a detailed summary of the elections,

including the ‘considerable organization and time spent in an election advertising what

resulted in a display of election posters in each of the communities’ (p. 22) and broadcasts

by PY Media.

216 At a meeting the author was present for, AP leaders and SA electoral staff discussed the possibility of

using electoral ink or stain on Anangu voters, one elder volunteered to be stamped to test its effects.

Discussion continued until it was suddenly disrupted by this elder collapsing, rolling on the ground and

holding the site of the stamp as if it was burning. People rushed to his aid. ‘Only kidding’ he said! ‘Just

imagining what it might feel like if it was burning through my skin’. He chuckled with a big grin. ‘The

speed you all moved at means to me you can’t guarantee it won’t cause an allergic reaction’ he said.

Discussion resumed, with the elders enjoying this display of Anangu whimsy and good humour in the midst

of seriousness. The meeting ruled out ink and opted for the use of marbles in the ballot.

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Figure 6.2: SA State Electoral Office 2004, APY Lands election poster 2004, of SEO

Annual Report 2004/5, p. 22

At the close of nominations on 6 September 2004, a total of 33 nominations had been

received and accepted for the 11 vacancies, including three nominations for the position

of Chairperson (SEO 2004/5, p. 22). With the assistance of local teachers and other

volunteers, electoral ‘stations’ were located in each community, and the ballot took place

on 4 October between 9.30 am and 3 pm (as proscribed by the Act).

In total, 703 people voted for the Chairperson; according to the SEO, this ‘compared

favourably to the 220 people who voted for the Chairperson at the last AP elections’

(Tully cited in ALPSC 2004/5, p. 55). Bernard Singer (303 votes) was declared the

Chairperson, having gained six more votes than Gary Lewis (297), with Stanley Douglas

finishing third (103 votes).217 The voting system used was ‘first past the post’, so there

was no distribution of preferences.

In ballots to elect local representatives, 656 people voted across the 10 electorates.218 This

was an increase of 159 on the 497 people who participated in the pre-selection of local

217 See p. 22 onwards in the SEO annual report; and Aboriginal Lands Standing Committee Annual Report

(2004/5, p. 53). 218 Using the total numbers of people participating in both the pre-selection and the final AGM vote for the

2002 AGM, Hill and Alport (2010) suggested that 853 Anangu participated in the earlier 2002 AP Executive

ballot.

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representatives to the Executive in October 2002,219 but 180 less than the 677 people from

the Lands who voted in the SA state election held in February 2002220 (Tully cited in

ALPSC 2004/5, p. 55; see also estimates cited in Hill & Alport 2010, p. 244). There was

also a marked variance in voting across the designated local electorates; for example, 101

people voted in Iwantja, but only 11 voted in the electorate comprising Amuruna/Railway

Bore/Witjintitja/Walatina.

6.13.3 Gender and representativeness

The new Executive comprised three women and eight men, an increase of one woman

over the previous (2002) Executive. It is interesting to note the gender disparity on the

Executive; for the October 2004 election, ‘approximately 56% of voters were female,

40% were male and 4% of names recorded were unreadable or were marks that could not

be determined’ (Tully cited in ALPSC 2004/5, p. 56).221 The proportion of women

representatives on the AP Executive Board closely mirrored the proportion of women in

the SA parliament at the time, and slightly exceeded that of women in Australia’s national

parliament at the same time (National Museum of Australia 2002, p. 5).

As noted, the ballot for the Chairperson was close, with only six votes separating Singer

and Lewis. This was similar to previous ballots on the Lands; in the 2002 ballot, Lewis

had beaten Singer by just 10 votes (The Australian, 5 October 2004, p. 2). As in State and

national elections, two main political tendencies regularly contested for ascendancy on

the Lands, plus other smaller third groupings. On the Lands the major tendencies were

often elected turn and turn-about in what were usually close elections outcomes.

The robust politics and dynamic democracy on the Lands at the time was reflected in high

voter participation, with 60–70% of eligible voters regularly participating in (voluntary)

AP elections.222 Compared to the comparatively low voter turn-out for (voluntary) local

government elections in SA, which at this time was approximately half of this level (30–

219 After the community-based pre-selection of nominees for the Executive in October 2002, the names

were then ratified at the 7 November 2002 AGM of AP, in which 236 people participated. 220 The figure of 677 includes people who listed the Lands as their place of residency at the time of the state

election in February 2002; thus, it includes a number of non-Anangu, as well as Anangu voters. However,

it is debateable whether this accounts for the total difference in voting numbers. 221 ABS data (2006) suggest a breakdown overall of 49.4% male and 50.6% female for the Lands population

(see Chapter 1). 222 See SEO report (ALSC 2004/5) and ABS regarding the number of eligible voters at this time. See also

Anangu Paper Tracker (2010) regarding state election trends for more information:

<http://www.papertracker.com.au/archived/apy-lands-voting-in-state-elections/#_edn7>.

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40%),223 the Lands constituency could be viewed as being actively engaged and

representative.

6.13.4 Election fall-out

Despite the close election for Chairperson, media reports reproduced the discourse of

dysfunction with headlines such as: ‘Blacks ditch “dysfunctional” council’:

hundreds of voters across the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands…dumped the region’s

‘dysfunctional’ governing body in an election forced by the Rann Government following the

deaths of four youths in a month from petrol sniffing (The Australian, 5 October 2004, p. 2).

In this article, Commonwealth (Liberal) Indigenous Affairs Minister Amanda Vanstone

congratulated new Chair Bernard Singer and expressed hope for a ‘productive

relationship with the new body’. Similarly, SA (Liberal) Opposition Aboriginal Affairs

spokesperson Lawson ‘welcomed’ the result as a ‘long overdue change for the Lands,

plagued by petrol sniffing for the past 20 years’ (The Australian, 5 October 2004, p.2).

The Australian’s triumphalism at Lewis’s defeat seemed out of proportion given that he

had been Chair for less than 20 months, and also given the closeness of the ballot. In

contrast, the Aboriginal-run Koori Mail (20 October 2004, p. 4) and The Bulletin

magazine (12 October 2004, p. 13) attacked the result, questioning the legitimacy of

Singer for having ‘a history of significant criminal offending’ (Koori Mail, 20 October

2004, p. 4). Singer was reported at this time as being ‘on a two-year good behaviour bond

for assaulting a young woman’ (Koori Mail, 20 October 200, p.44).

A legal challenge was also mooted on the basis of reports that ‘a number of people who

voted in the elections no longer lived…on the Lands’ (Koori Mail, 20 October 2004, p.4).

There were allegations that people had voted who were bused onto the Lands ‘from

Coober Pedy and Port Augusta…where they lived’ (Koori Mail, 20 October 2004, p.4).

SA Minister Roberts acknowledged the role played by past Chair Lewis (South Australian

Legislative Council, 18 October 2004, p. 193), while stressing that the government looked

forward to working with Singer:

‘There is nothing in the Land Rights Act that precludes anyone convicted with an offence from

holding office’, he said (Koori Mail, 20 October 2004, p. 4).

6.13.5 Centralising control

On 14 October 2004, less than two weeks after the forced Executive elections, Rann

announced the transfer of ‘the division known as the Department of Aboriginal Affairs

223 See Russell (2004).

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and Reconciliation (DAARe) to the Department of Premier and Cabinet’ (Ministerial

Statement, House of Assembly, 14 October 2004, p. 454). Narungga man Peter

Buckskin,224 CEO of DAARe, was demoted in this move and now reported as a section

director through a new Division of Indigenous Affairs and Special Projects, which was

headed by public servant Joslene Mazel, a previous special adviser to Rann, to the CEO

of the Department of Premier and Cabinet. For many people in Aboriginal communities

across Australia, replacing Aboriginal leadership in this way was viewed as a backwards

step, as reflected by the following Koori Mail headline:

BLACK BUSINESS IN WHITE HANDS…the creation of the new division has effectively

stripped power from the head of DAARE (Koori Mail, 20 October 2004, p. 4).

While Minister Roberts kept his portfolio title, he too was effectively sidelined, with the

carriage of Aboriginal Affairs now firmly in the hands of the Premier. Rann also abolished

the cumbersome APLIICC machinery, establishing instead a cross-departmental

Aboriginal Lands Task Force in the premier’s department. Echoing the rhetoric of COAG,

he explained that:

It makes good sense to place DAARE within the Department of Premier and Cabinet, which is

well placed as a central agency to drive the ‘whole of government approach’ to Aboriginal

Affairs (House of Assembly, 14 October 2004, p. 454).

Rann’s rapid and somewhat ruthless response to the growing criticism of his

government’s tardy response to petrol sniffing on the Lands positioned him on the front

foot and in control just as the Coroner’s second inquest got underway.

6.14 Second Coronial Inquest

The second Coronial Inquest (Chivell 2005) into deaths from petrol sniffing commenced

in November 2004. It covered the deaths of Kunmanara Ward and Kunmanara Ken, who

had died in Indulkana on 22 May 2003 and in Amata on 19 December 2003 respectively,

and the deaths of Kunmanara Ryan and Kunmanara Cooper, who died on 2 March and

24 March 2004 in Mimili.

In his Report published on 14 March 2005, Chivell found that Ward (19 years old) had

hanged himself from the ‘monkey bars at the playground at Indulkana’ after he ‘had been

sniffing petrol and had been angry and upset that day’ (Chivell 2005, p. i). Kunmanara

Ken (35 years old) was found to have died of ‘exposure’ related to ‘severe organic brain

224 As mentioned in Chapter 5, Peter Buckskin was a well-respected South Australian Narungga man who

had worked for the Commonwealth Government and been adviser to Dr David Kemp (Liberal), the

Commonwealth Minister for Education, Training and Youth Affairs in the first Howard Cabinet. He was

specifically recruited by Labor Minister Terry Roberts, who worked closely with Buckskin on APY and

other Aboriginal affairs issues during his term of office.

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damage as a result of sniffing petrol since he was a boy’ (Chivell 2005, p. ii). In the case

of Kumanara Ryan (25 years old), who suffered from depression, there was no evidence

that he had been ‘sniffing petrol at any relevant time immediately before he died’;

however, Ryan’s psychiatrist had ‘expressed concern regarding his ongoing drug abuse’

(Chivell 2005, p. ii).

The Coroner found that Kunmanara Cooper (27 years old) had hanged himself after

‘sniffing petrol prior to his death’ (Chivell 2005, p. ii). Cooper had been in transit on the

Lands after being held in correctional and secure care facilities in Port Augusta and

Adelaide for some time, and he was thought to have been waiting for a lift home to

Pipalyatjara at the time of his death near Mimili. The urgent provision of correctional and

rehabilitation services on the Lands had been recommended by the Coroner’s earlier

findings.

In a confronting finding that was an indictment on the lack of action by successive

governments since 1986, and particularly since his 2002 Inquest, Chivell stated that:

Many of the issues associated with Kunmanara Cooper’s case could not have arisen if there had

been a correctional facility available on or near the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands. It is impossible

to know whether his death could have been prevented if such a facility had existed in March

2004, but it is reasonable to suggest that it may have been [author’s emphasis] (Chivell 2005,

p. iii).

Chivell (2005) found that there had been a ‘marked increase in suicidal and self-harming

behaviour on the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands since March 2004’. Petrol sniffing and

other substance abuse, along with mental illness and family, domestic and sexual violence

were listed as contributing factors, combined with ‘socio-economic factors including

poverty, hunger, illness, low education levels, unemployment, boredom, and feelings of

hopelessness’, which the Coroner said had not changed since his 2002 Inquest.

Chivell (2005, p. iii) argued that locating responsibility for the APLIICC with the

Department for Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation (DAARe) had been ‘a mistake’, as

it ‘did not have sufficient resources, power and authority to drive major change in key

government agencies’. While noting that a leaner and more proactive Aboriginal Lands

Task Force in the premier’s department had since replaced the APLIICC, Chivell (2005,

pp. 99–103) stated that as the circ*mstances on the Lands had worsened rather than

improved since his first inquest, ‘it is appropriate that I should repeat the general

recommendations I made in the 2002 findings’, and he proceeded to list them in full again

in this second Inquest Report.

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Chivell (2005, p. iv) commented that it was only after he had signalled a further Coronial

Inquest following the tragic spate of Anangu deaths in March 2004 that funding began to

flow, stating that ‘these events appear to have galvanised the South Australian

Government into more urgent action’:

It is very unfortunate that the optimism expressed by South Australian Government

representatives during the 2002 inquests did not translate into the ‘prompt, forthright, properly

planned, properly funded action’ which was called for, until March 2004.

As in 2002, the 2005 Coronial Inquest did not find fault with, nor recommend, any

changes to Anangu governance. Nor was it suggested that the PLRA needed to be

amended before the government could appropriately respond to petrol sniffing and other

social welfare issues on the Lands.

While acknowledging that ‘political instability’ surrounding the Executive had been of

some hindrance, Chivell (2005) levelled responsibility for ineffective action and delays

in service provision unequivocally at the feet of the South Australian Government.

He was repeatedly critical of the Government’s penchant for committees and

consultations without a clear focus on follow-through delivery. He chronicled a consistent

lack of action on most of the critical recommendations he had identified for urgent action

in 2002.

The 2005 Coronial Inquest Report was an indictment of the Rann government’s (in)action

over urgently needed support for the Lands, which had resulted in further deaths from

petrol sniffing. However, this aspect of the Inquest’s report received minimal media

attention and little public discussion. Less publicity and less policy discussion attended

the inquest’s findings than reported on the government’s racialised rhetoric blaming the

AP Executive and demonising Anangu governance for the tragedies that the Lands had

endured.

APY had been successfully constructed in the public domain as if it were a ‘failed state’

(Dillon 2007) in need of major reform. The Coroner’s careful weighing of evidence and

his findings of fact did not disrupt the highly politicised dominant policy storyline. The

stage was now set for the planned overhaul of the PLRA in the months ahead.

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Chapter 7: Limiting Self-determination

The Pitjantjatjara Land Rights (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2005 and Anangu

Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Land Rights (Regulated Substances) Amendment Act 2006

‘A person or a group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the

people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning

or contemptible picture of themselves. Non-recognition or misrecognition can

inflict harm; can be a form of oppression, imprisoning one in a false,

distorted, and reduced mode of being’ (Taylor 1994, p. 25)

7.1 Introduction

This chapter explores how the South Australian Government capitalised on the narrow

win by new AP Chair Bernard Singer in October 2004 to push for significant amendments

to the PLRA, which were achieved in October 2005. It examines these legislative changes

and compares provisions of the amended Act with those of the original. It argues that the

amendments limited the Anangu self-determination envisaged by the original framers of

the PLRA 1981. This chapter asks how a crisis in Anangu–state relations, which began

with media criticism of inadequate government service delivery in a series of tragic deaths

by petrol sniffing on the Lands could be transformed in less than 12 months into a debate

about ‘problems’ with Anangu governance justifying rushed changes to the PLRA.

The chapter then explores how shifts in policy framing served to stigmatise Anangu

sociality, modes of organisation and cultural capacities. Longstanding health issues such

as petrol sniffing, which were previously recognised as part of a legacy of systemic

disempowerment from the destructive aspects of colonisation, were reframed as

manifestations of Indigenous incapacity or promulgated as evidence of remote

communities as ‘failed societies’ (Dillon 2007; Dillon & Westbury 2007).

Drawing on the work of theorists such as Kymlicka, Cairns, Tully, Taylor and Fraser on

minority rights and the politics of recognition, this chapter concludes by reflecting on the

possibilities and limitations of ‘self-determination’ within the context of the APY Lands.

It contemplates the shifting constructions of APY throughout the 25-year period of

changing national policy settings and locates this within broader questions of recognition,

sovereignty, decolonisation and power.

7.2 Anger, Anguish, Acquiescence, as the PLRA is Again Amended

Following the release of the second Coronial Inquest Report in March 2005, Rann boldly

pushed forward with plans to overhaul the PLRA. Nationally, the policy environment was

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favourable to Rann’s plans. Health Minister Tony Abbott had announced Commonwealth

support for rolling out Opal fuel across the Lands in Adelaide in February, which was a

welcome boost for Rann, who was under pressure in relation to petrol sniffing on the

Lands (Abbott & Vanstone 2005;225 Lawson, SA Legislative Council, 3 March 2005, p.

132). Indigenous Affairs Minister Amanda Vanstone further extolled the

Commonwealth’s commitment to what she termed a ‘quiet revolution in Indigenous

affairs’226 away from self-determination and towards more ‘whole-of-government’

coordinated arrangements, whereby public servants would focus on direct engagement

‘out in the field’, charged with ‘the responsibility of making individual agreements with

individual communities’ (Vanstone 2005, p. 6). Since abolishing ATSIC in 2004,

Howard’s government had absorbed Indigenous programs into mainstream departments

and established 29 regionally located Indigenous Coordinating Centres (ICCs), tasking

public servants in these offices:

to work together across departments, with Indigenous communities and with State/Territory

government departments to develop formal agreements which would guide a more whole-of-

government and whole-of-community approach to both funding and service delivery (Gray &

Sanders 2006, p. 1).

7.2.1 Tjungugka Kuranyukutu Palyantjaku

Rann was keen to work with the Commonwealth’s more interventionist agenda. In a joint

press release,227 Rann, Abbott and Vanstone announced the formation of Tjungugka

Kuranyukutu Palyantjaku (TKP),228 which exemplified these new partnership

arrangements (Rann, Abbott & Vanstone, 1 April 2005). TKP was a COAG-driven

service providers’ forum comprising the state (Premier’s Department, DAARe) and

Commonwealth government officials (COAG, ICC and DoHA) and Directors of Anangu

regional organisations such as the NPY Women’s Council, Nganampa Health, AP

Services and PY Media.

225 Minister for Health and Ageing (Hon. Tony Abbott) and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and

Indigenous Affairs (Senator Amanda Vanstone) (2005). 226 Sanders (2008a) has also referred to this period as a ‘generational revolution’ in which public

commentators like Noel Pearson gave voice to policy ideas not antipathetic to those of the Howard

government. See also Sanders (2014, p. 7). 227 Rann, Vanstone and Abbott (1 April 2005). 228 TKP is a Pitjantjatjara/Yankunytjatjara expression that means ‘together towards the future’. For a further

explanation, see ‘Progress on the APY Lands’ (February 2007).

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Notably, this new TKP regional consultative forum had no direct lines of accountability

to AP or its Executive, despite these being the designated (and elected) governance

bodies—the Anangu ‘body corporate’—established by the PLRA.229

Rann heralded TKP as the forum that would improve the lives of Anangu ‘by sharing

responsibility for planning and coordination of services as well as reporting [to

government] on progress’ (Rann, Abbott & Vanstone, 1 April 2005).

Anangu organisations were being drawn ever further into processes of government

decision-making. As von Sturmer (1985, p. 48) had earlier argued, the discourse of self-

determination could easily conceal ways for the state to co-opt Aboriginal organisations

into its agendas, including through indirect means, ‘namely by creating “Aboriginal”

organizations which are then required or demanded or invited to participate in

government decision-making’.

Although TKP was initiated and driven by Commonwealth and state government

officials, it was also endorsed by Anangu at the AP AGM in early March (AP General

Meeting Minutes, 8 March 2005). After negotiations with regional Anangu agencies, the

Commonwealth offered a package of $175,000 for a TKP secretariat to support the

coordination of services, including $43,000 earmarked for PY Media for a

‘communications strategy’ (TKP Minutes of Meeting, 1 April 2005, p. 5).230 Along with

earlier COAG funding for Mai Wiru (Nganampa Health) and PY Ku (PY Media)

projects,231 these regional Anangu agencies were receiving a strong boost of

Commonwealth resources.

While the Commonwealth worked to secure the cooperation of Anangu regional agencies,

the South Australian Government pursued its legislative reform agenda. Officers of the

Department of Premier and Cabinet had been liaising closely with the Singer-led

Executive since its election in October 2004, and Rann’s intention to review the PLRA

was signalled to AP in February 2005 with a request for PY Media to translate and

broadcast notice of the review across the Lands. Rann charged the Director of DAARe,

229 AP had a representative on TKP, but in effect, AP, as the ‘body corporate’ of all TOs on the Lands, is

viewed in this model as simply another regional agency rather than the body of all Anangu, as envisioned

in the PLRA. 230 The budget was earmarked for the Anangu directors’ salary and travel with a further sum to PY Media

to assist with the communications strategy about TKP and the government’s plans to review the PLRA. 231 The COAG trial Mai Wiru and PY Ku projects are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis.

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which had now become a division within the Department of Premier and Cabinet232 with

gaining support for legislative change at the AP AGM in March.

However, at the AP AGM, Anangu argued that while the South Australian Government

could work with ‘PY Media to organise a radio announcement of Land Rights Act

Review’, it was the responsibility of AP to conduct consultations with TOs. The AGM

resolved:

That Anangu Pitjantjatjara (AP) supports the review of the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981

and that AP will, through its Executive Board in accordance with its duties and responsibilities

under sections 6 & 7 of the Act: Section 6: ascertain the wishes and opinions of traditional

owners Section 7: consult with its members; and that AP supports the review of the Pitjantjatjara

Land Rights Act happening in two parts: Stage 1: review of the AP structure and role; Stage 2:

review of external commercial activity and AP’s approach; and that AP supports its executive

board continuing discussions with government about the Act and that AP executive report to

Anangu through the consultation process (AP AGM Minutes, 8 March 2005).

7.2.2 ‘Undermining self-determination’

Anangu service providers were buoyed by the flow of Commonwealth funds and

optimism around the introduction of Opal through the Commonwealth’s new Petrol

Sniffing Program.233 This caused some Anangu to consider the review of the PLRA an

opportunity for renewal. Others were less convinced and saw a potential diminution of

their voice.

Lowitja O’Donoghue, who had completed her stint as special adviser to Rann in October

the previous year, was dismayed that her report on the Lands234 had not been made public,

nor its recommendations enacted. By March 2005, Lowitja O’Donoghue was making her

frustrations public:

Government adviser Lowitja O’Donoghue is frustrated it is taking so long to improve life in the

Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands, after last year’s petrol sniffing related suicides. ‘I mean the Premier

232 See Chapter 6 for more details of the transfer of DAARe into the Department of Premier and Cabinet by

Premier Rann in late 2004. 233 As cited above, the Commonwealth established the Petrol Sniffing Prevention Program in February 2005

as a means for providing low aromatic fuel like Opal to participating remote communities. The PSPP was

implemented by the Department of Health and Ageing (DoHA) and became its contribution to the broader

whole‐of‐government Petrol Sniffing Strategy (PSS). The PSS was further developed in September 2005

as a collaborative approach between the Commonwealth and WA, SA and NT governments, aiming to

reduce the incidence and effect of petrol sniffing. Under the PSS, the respective jurisdictions agreed to

develop: consistent legislation; appropriate levels of policing; further roll-out of LAF; alternative activities

for young people; treatment and respite facilities; communication and education strategies; and

strengthening and supporting communities and evaluation (see Hanson, Wells, Lansdowne & Pope 2015;

ANAO Audit Report 2014–2015, <http://www.anao.gov.au>). 234 O’Donoghue and Costello (2015) was completed and provided to Premier Rann in October 2004, but

not made public until late March 2005, invoking much criticism not only from Lowitja O’Donoghue (e.g.,

Koori Mail, 18 May 2005, p. 5), but also the South Australian Democrats (e.g., Hon. K Reynolds, LC

Hansard, 20 September 2005, pp. 2616–2623) and Opposition (e.g., Hon. R Lawson, LC Hansard, 20

September 2005, pp. 2612–2616; Dr McFettridge, HA Hansard, 19 October 2005, pp. 2713–2716).

213

knows, I told him today, I’m totally frustrated by the lack of Government’s quick response’, she

said (ABC News, 23 March 2005).

Lowitja O’Donoghue had recommended in her report the appointment of an ‘honest

broker’ for the Lands with the access, legitimacy and powers of an ‘Ombudsman’ to

intervene with, for and on behalf of Anangu (O’Donoghue & Costello 2005, p. 8).

Increasingly worried at the complexity of bureaucratic issues compounding life on the

Lands, she argued publicly that this position was urgently needed so Anangu could

‘clarify governance confusion’, determine what ‘self-determination’ might mean and

identify the best models for ‘self-governance’ to strengthen, rather than dilute, self-

determination.

Rann’s response, with its imperial analogy, signalled the antithesis of Lowitja

O’Donoghue’s more empowering vision:

‘We need a sort of a czar who’s prepared to be tough!’ Mr Rann said (ABC News, 23 March

2005).

O’Donoghue was not alone in her concerns about the levels of government control on the

Lands. Immediate past AP Chair (and Chair of Pukatja Community Council) Gary Lewis,

critical of the pressure on TOs to amend the PLRA, set about gathering signatures from

Anangu across the Lands for a petition to Parliament condemning Rann for:

undermining the self-determination and authority of all Traditional Owners of the Pitjantjatjara

Lands (Lewis cited in Lawson, South Australian Legislative Council, 5 April 2005, p. 1452).

Lewis’s petition asserted the rights of TOs to freely express their views and opinions. It

reminded Rann (and the AP Executive) of the statutory requirement (under the PLRA)

that consultation and the approval of TOs was needed before any major decision could be

taken. It criticised the Executive for not seeking separate legal representation and

requested funding so that TOs could access independent legal representation about any

proposed changes to the PLRA.

At this time, the Executive’s legal advice came through a lawyer provided to the

Executive by the South Australian Government to help advise and support the Executive

with its deliberations. Lewis and other TOs argued that this constituted a conflict of

interest, and that Anangu interests were insufficiently protected. Lewis argued that TOs

needed independent legal representation in order to fully consider the implications of any

changes to their rights to self-determination that might result from amending the PLRA.

Alternative legal advice was accessed with the support of the Uniting Church and its non-

government arm UnitingCare Wesley, a coalition of supporters drawn from other

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academic and social justice organisations.235 This allowed those TOs who were unhappy

with, or sceptical of, advice from the government to push back against the Executive.

Tensions about proposed changes to the PLRA continued to mount during April and May

as first the Executive and then the government (Department of Premier and Cabinet) held

consultation meetings.236 Anxiety about the future was becoming widespread as views

continued to polarise at hastily convened consultation sessions. Concern at the pace of

change was expressed by staff at the Nganampa Health Council, who complained that the

timelines for the review were ‘extremely short’ (NHC correspondence, 22 April 2005

cited in Reynolds, LC, 20 September 2005, p. 2621).

The NPY Women’s Council also wrote to the Department of Premier and Cabinet through

DAARe, complaining that on the days the consultations about the PLRA were held, they

were away for work in the NT. Australian Democrat Kate Reynolds raised this concern

in parliament, arguing that while the consultations were taking place:

NPY Women’s Council members were at Finke attending general and executive

meetings…[which] means that the most influential women on the lands were not able to participate

because they had commitments elsewhere (Reynolds, LC, 20 September 2005, p. 2621).

In evidence given to the Aboriginal Lands Parliamentary Standing Committee237 about

the consultation process,238 witnesses argued that Anangu TOs were concerned about the

government’s motives:

There is also a perception that the Task Force within Premier and Cabinet has worked fairly

secretly…people were saying they did not know what is happening and therefore were worried

and suspicious. Many people were frightened that decisions were being made behind closed

doors and they are fearful of deals being done (ALPSC Annual Report 2004/5, p. 86).

Despite growing resistance and protests about the pace of change, the South Australian

Government released a Draft Bill to Amend the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 in

235 A list of supporters on p. 34 of the Annual Report 2005/6 of the Aboriginal Lands Parliamentary

Committee includes a network of people drawn from the Yankunytjatjara People’s Network, the University

of South Australia, Adelaide University, UnitingCare Wesley Adelaide, Uniting Aboriginal and Islander

Christian Congress, Australians for Native Title and Reconciliation (SA), Port Adelaide Greens, and the

Australian Peace Committee (SA Branch), among others. 236 In May 2005, the government held consultation meetings at three locations on the APY Lands, which

aimed to build on earlier consultation meetings conducted by the AP Executive in April (see p. 23 of the

Annual Report of the Aboriginal Lands Parliamentary Standing Committee 2005/6 for more information

on the consultation process). 237 As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the Pitjantjatjara Lands Parliamentary Committee was established

after the 1987 amendments to the PLRA; however, the Committee ceased to meet after the Liberals came

to office in 1993, and it expired in 1997. After the Rann Labor minority government took office in 2002,

the passing of the Aboriginal Lands Parliamentary Standing Committee Act 2003 enabled Minister Roberts

to re-establish the Committee with a broader brief for the ALT Act, the MTLRA as well as the PLRA as

the Aboriginal Lands Parliamentary Standing Committee. The Committee held its first meeting on 27

November 2003 with Roberts in the Chair. 238 2 June 2005, Q1332, ALPSC Annual Report 2004/5, p. 86.

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mid June. In a letter to the ALPSC,239 Joslene Mazel, the Executive Director for the

Indigenous Affairs Division of the Department of Premier and Cabinet, stated that:

The content of this Bill reflects the outcomes of negotiations between the SA Government, the

AP Executive Board (and their lawyers), traditional owners and Anangu generally, the

Commonwealth Government and various persons/organisations who made written submissions.

The AP Executive Board, and the SA Government have endorsed this Draft Bill (ALPSC

Annual Report, 2005/6, p. 23. Italicised words in original letter).

Earlier debates on the Lands now escalated amidst general confusion about the Draft Bill.

As the polarisation of views among Anangu deepened and conflicts broke out on the

Lands, Lowitja O’Donoghue again criticised the South Australian Government’s

handling of AP issues, suggesting that:

‘They are playing one group off against another’, she said. ‘It is very devious behaviour’

(O’Donoghue, 13 June 2005, p. 5).

A Special AP General Meeting held at Umuwa in late June was well attended but

acrimonious. Different versions of the role of government officials in the meeting

emerged, with official minutes recording that only three aspects of the changes proposed

received the unanimous support of Anangu present: i) the proposal to legislate a three-

year term for the Executive; ii) the role definitions and terms proposed for General

Manager and Director positions; and iii) ‘amendments to the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights

Act 1981 to include Yankunytjatjara’ (AP, Special General Meeting Minutes, 21–22 June

2005).

7.2.3 TOs travel to Adelaide to appear before the Aboriginal Lands Parliamentary

Standing Committee

In August, just as in the lead-up to the inauguration of the PLRA 25 years earlier, dozens

of Anangu TOs, their families, friends and supporters made the long journey to Adelaide

to discuss their Land Rights Act. Indeed, some of the same elders present for the original

negotiations around the Act formed part of one or other of the delegations that had formed

around competing interpretations of both the need for, and the approach being taken to,

legislative change. Anangu with divergent and conflicting views had requested an

opportunity to speak to the ALPSC. Before representatives of the rival camps gave

evidence before a special meeting of the Committee in the Old Parliament House chamber

on 25 August, a large gathering of Anangu with their supporters, legal advisers, extended

families and friends gathered in the gallery of this grand venue.

239 Letter from Ms J Mazel (15 June 2005) (D203). Italicised words as per original letter.

216

In the gallery of the Old Parliament House, Anangu representatives for and against change

gathered to speak in the historic chamber. Tension was palpable among the gathering

Anangu groups and between the non-Anangu party political rivals on the ALPSC. It was

a privilege and enlightening to bear witness to what happened next.

Two of the most senior, intense and often spirited protagonists in the internal politics of

Anangu community life, who held opposing views on the proposed amendments to the

Act, stood up together and asked for silence. Together they began to sing, leading all of

the Anangu present, who solemnly joined in. In unison, Anangu who were present all

stood and sang together with one strong melodic powerful voice, first in Pitjantjatjara and

then in English.

No one present that day could easily forget the sound of Anangu singing together before

the tense and significant debate that was to follow about the future of their governance

arrangements and their Land Rights Act. The powerful singing silenced all non-Anangu

and filled the Old Parliament House with the passion and richness of the Pitjantjatjara

language and resonance of united voices. The meeting and speeches proceeded with

dignity and tolerance, despite the deeply entrenched and divided views held.

7.2.4 ‘Tjukurpa nyanganpa kampa kutjupankuku Pitjantjatjara Land Rights

Actangka’

After starting proceedings by singing in unison, the large group of assembled Anangu

broke into two groups: those speaking for the Draft Bill to amend the PLRA and those

against. Those speaking in favour of amending the PLRA, led by AP Chair Singer, formed

the largest group and gave evidence first. Singer tabled a document and read an opening